I am indeed very grateful for your kind invitation to address the Annual Session of the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation. I am happy to see this great gathering of the Scheduled Castes. Having regard to the very short time which has elapsed since its establishment, the growth of the Federation appears by all evidence to be phenomenal. That the Scheduled Castes all over India have rallied round the Federation and are determined to make the Federation their only representative organization is beyond question. The growth of the Federation within so short a time will not be fully appreciated unless the tremendous difficulties in the way of our organization have been fully appreciated. There are agents of other political organizations which decoy our people by false blandishments, by false promises and by false propaganda. There is the ignorance of our own people, who do not know the critical nature of the times we are living in and who do not know the value of organization for achieving our political objects. There is a lamentable lack of resources at our command. We have no money. We have no press. The crudest of tyrannies and oppressions, to which our people are subjected, day in and day out all over India, are never reported by the Press. Even our views on social and political questions are systematically suppressed by an organized conspiracy on the part of the Press. We have no funds to maintain a machinery, to render help to our people and to educate, agitate and organize them.

These are the odds we have to contend against. That the Federation, notwithstanding these difficulties, should have grown to this dimension is entirely due to our men who have been ceaselessly and unselfishly devoting themselves to the building up of this organization. I am sure you would like me to pay Mr. Ganpat Mahadev Jadhav, the President of the Bombay City Scheduled Castes Federation, our tribute for the work he has done. As everyone knows, he possesses remarkable degree of organizing capacity and I am sure the success of this Session is due to a great extent to his efforts and to those who have been his co-workers.

Ordinarily, at a gathering such as this I would have spoken—and our people would expect me to speak—on any one of the social and political problems of the Scheduled Castes. But I do not propose to engage myself in a discourse on so sectarian a subject. Instead, I propose to speak on a topic, which is general and has a wider appeal, namely the shape and form of the future Constitution of India.

It may be as well for me to explain the reasons for my decision. For the moment, the responsibility for leading the movement of the Scheduled Castes and facing its day-to-day problems does not lie on my shoulders. On account of my office I am out of it and I have no desire to take it up. That is one reason why I do not propose to take up a sectarian subject which is related only to the Scheduled Castes.

The Scheduled Castes are often charged as being selfish, interested only in themselves; that they have no constructive suggestions to make for the solution of the country's political problem. The charge is entirely untrue, and if it is true, the Untouchables will not be the only ones who will be found guilty of it. Most people in India do not make constructive suggestions. The reason is not that there are not people capable of constructive thought. The reason why all constructive thought remains bottled up is because a long and continuous propaganda has inculcated upon the minds of the generality of the people that nothing should be respected and nothing should be accepted unless it emanates from the Congress. It is this which has killed all constructive thought in this country. At the same time, I believe this charge against the Scheduled Castes should be repelled in a positive way by showing that the Scheduled Castes are capable of putting forth constructive proposals for the general political advancement of the country which the country, if it cares to, may consider. This is the second reason why I have on this occasion chosen this subject of general interest.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR FRAMING THE CONSTITUTION

Before I set out in concrete terms the constitutional proposals I have in mind, I wish to raise two preliminary issues. First is : Who should frame a Constitution for India ? It is necessary to raise this question because there are quite a lot of people in India who are hoping, if not asking, the British Government to resolve the deadlock and to frame a Constitution for India. I think there is a gross fallacy in such a view which needs to be exposed. A Constitution, framed by the British Government and imposed upon Indian, sufficed in the past. But if the nature of the future Constitution Indians are clamouring for, is borne in mind it will be clear that an imposed Constitution will not do.

The difference between the past Constitutions and the future Constitution of India is fundamental, and those, who still rely on the British for framing a Constitution for India, do not seem to have realized this difference. The difference lies in this that the past Constitutions contained a breakdown clause. But the future Constitution of India cannot contain such a breakdown clause. People in India decry the breakdown clause—by now the notorious section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. That is because they do not know the why and the how of its place in the Act. Its importance will become apparent if two important considerations governing the political life of a community are borne in mind. First of these considerations is that Law and Order is the medicine of the body politic, and when the body politic goes sick this medicine must be administered. Indeed, so important is this consideration that failure to administer it must be deemed to be a crime against society and civilization. The second consideration is that though it is true that no government has a vested right to govern, it is equally true that there must always be a government to govern—which I mean maintain Law and Order—until it is displaced by a better government. The breakdown clause serves these two purposes. As such, it is of the highest value for the peace and tranquillity of the people. It is the one and only means which can save the country from anarchy. For, when Constitutional Government fails, the breakdown clause has at least the merit of maintaining Government.

In the past this distinction between Constitutional Government and Government with the provision for Government stepping in when Constitutional Government failed, was a feasible proposition. It was feasible because while the British Government gave Indians the right to a Constitutional Government, it kept to itself the right to govern, should Constitutional Government fail. In the future Constitution of India, it would not be possible to maintain this distinction. It would not be possible for the British Government to give the Indians the right to Constitutional Government and also to keep to itself the right to govern in case there was a breakdown in the Constitutional Government. The reason is quite obvious. The past Constitutions of India did not treat India as a Dominion. The future Constitution will proceed on the assumption that India will be a Dominion. The breakdown clause or the possibility of Government stepping in, when Constitutional Government has failed, can be reconciled in the case of a country, which has no Dominion Status. But the two are irreconcilable in the case of a Dominion. In the case of a Dominion or for the matter of that in the case of any free country, there is either a Constitutional Government or a Rebellion.

What does this mean ? It means that it is impossible to frame a Constitution for an Indian Dominion with a possibility of a breakdown. To put the same thing in a different language the Constitution must be so made that it will not only command the obedience but also the respect of all ; and all or if not all, at any rate, all important elements in the national life of India shall be prepared to uphold it and to give it their support. This can happen only if the Constitution is framed by Indians for Indians and with the voluntary consent of Indians. If the Constitution is imposed by the British Government and is not accepted by one section and is opposed by another, there will arise in the country an element, hostile to the Constitution, and which will devote its energies not to working the Constitution but to breaking it. The anti-constitution party may look upon destroying the Constitution as its only duty and may engage itself in "pronouncing" against a party working the Constitution in the real Latin American fashion.

It is useless for the British to frame a Constitution for India which they will not remain to enforce. The same result will ensue if the Constitution is imposed by one powerful section or a combination of such sections on other sections. I am, therefore, firmly of opinion that if Indians want Dominion Status, they cannot escape the responsibility of framing their own Constitution. The position is thus inescapable,

III

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The second question that I wish to raise is : Should there be a Constituent Assembly, charged with the function of making a Constitution ? Constituent Assembly is on the lips of everybody. The Congress parties in their resolutions, passed before the Congress ministries resigned, demanded that the Constitution for India should be made by a Constituent Assembly composed of Indians. A Constituent Assembly was included in the Cripps proposals. The Sapru Committee has followed suit.

I must state that I am wholly opposed to the proposals of a Constituent Assembly. It is absolutely superfluous. I regard it as a most dangerous project, which may involve this country in a Civil War. In the first place, I do not see why a Constituent Assembly is at all necessary. Indians are not in the same position as the Fathers of the American Constitution were, when they framed the Constitution of the United States. They had to evolve ideas, suitable for the constitution for a free people. They had no constitutional patterns before them to draw upon. This cannot however be the case for Indians. Constitutional ideas and constitutional forms are ready at hand. Again, room for variety is very small. There are not more than two or three constitutional patterns to choose from. Thirdly, there are hardly any big and purely constitutional questions about which there can be said to be much dispute among Indians. It is agreed that the future Indian Constitution should be Federal. It is also more or less settled what subjects should go to the Centre and what to the Provinces. There is no quarrel over the division of Revenues between the Centre and the Provinces, none on Franchise and none on the relation of the Judiciary to the Legislature and the Executive. The only point of dispute, which is outstanding, centres round the question of the residuary powers—whether they should be with the Centre or with the Provinces. But that is hardly a matter worth bothering about. Indeed, the provision contained in the present Government of India Act could be adopted as the best compromise.

Having regard to this I cannot see why a Constituent Assembly is necessary to incubate a constitution. So much of the Constitution of India has already been written out in the Government of India Act, 1935, that it seems to be an act of supererogation to appoint a Constituent Assembly to do the thing over again. All that is necessary is to delete those sections of the Government of India Act, 1935, which are inconsistent with Dominion Status.

The only function which could be left to a Constituent Assembly is to find a solution of the Communal Problem. I am quite positive that whatever be the terms of reference of the Constituent Assembly, the Communal Question should not form a part of them. Consider the composition of the Constituent Assembly as suggested by the Sapru Committee. The total membership is fixed at 160. The election is by joint electorates by members of the Provincial Legislative Assemblies under a system of proportional representation and the decision is to be by three-fourths of the members present and voting. Can a minority accept this Constituent Assembly as a safe body, in the impartiality of which it can place implicit confidence ? The answer to this question must depend upon what answers one can give to two other questions : Does it guarantee that the representatives of a minority elected to the Assembly will be its true representatives ? Secondly, does it guarantee that the decision of the Assembly with regard to the claims of any particular minority will not in fact be an imposition on the minority ? On neither of these two questions can I confidently say that a minority need have no cause for fear.

Before taking up these questions, let me point out what differences there are between the Cripps Constituent Assembly and the Sapru Constituent Assembly. They may be stated as follows :

(i) The total number for the Constituent Assembly fixed by the Sapru Committee is 160. Sir Stafford Cripps had not fixed any number. But the provision contained in his proposal that the Constituent Assembly shall consist of ten per cent of the total number of members of the Provincial Legislatures virtually fixed the number to about 158—a difference of only 2.

(ii) The method of election to the Constituent Assembly by the Sapru Committee is by joint electorate under the system of proportional representation. In this there is no difference between the Cripps plan and the Sapru plan for the composition of the Constituent Assembly.

(iii) Under the Cripps plan, there was no communal reservation. The Sapru plan departs from the Cripps plan in this respect, in as much as it reserves seats for particular communities in prescribed proportions. This difference is only normal. For, though the Cripps plan did not in terms fix the number, the scheme of proportional representation would have in fact resulted in such reservation. The difference in the quota of representation under the two schemes will be seen from the following table :

Communities and Interests

Quota of seats in the Constituent Assembly

	Under Cripps'	Under Sapru's
Hindus	77	51
Muslims	50	51
Scheduled Castes	15	20
Sikhs	3	8
Indian Christians	2	7
Anglo-Indians	1	2
Europeans	6	1
Aboriginal Tribes	2	3
Special Interests		16
Others	2	1
	158	160

The Sapru Committee has not only fixed the numbers for each Community in the composition of the Constituent Assembly but it has offered the Muslims equality with the Hindus. For this departure the Committee's plea is that in consideration for this offer it has demanded joint electorate as a basis for election to the Constituent Assembly. In this, the Committee must be said to have entirely misunderstood the Cripps proposals. Joint-Electorates were already provided for in the Cripps proposals one clause of which reads—" The members of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures are to form a single Electoral College ". This is simply another way of saying that the election shall be by joint-electorate. It has given something for nothing to one element and thereby put the other Communities in a hazard.

(iv) Under the Cripps proposal the decision of the Assembly was to be by majority of those present and voting. Under the Sapru proposal the decision is to be by a majority of 3/4th of those present and voting.

Now to revert to the two questions. How does the position stands with regard to the first question ? To give one's opinion on it, it is first necessary to know the communal distribution of the membership of the Provincial Legislative Assemblies. The following table sums up the position :

Distribution of Seats by Communities in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies [f1]

Communities	General	Women University Trade Unions		Commerce	Land lords	Total
1	2	3 4	5	6	7	8
Hindus	651	26 7	33	31	22	770
Muslims	482	10 1	5	6	13	517
Scheduled Castes.	151					151
Indian Christians.	20	1				21
Anglo-Indians	11	1				12
Sikhs	34	1			1	30
Europeans	26			19	1	46
Aboriginals	24					24
Total	1,399	39 8	38	.56