Philosophy of Hinduism
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Chapter 1 Philosophy of Hinduism
Does Hinduism
recognize Equality?
How does Hinduism stand in
this matter?
Does Hinduism
recognise Fraternity?
What
is the value of
such a religion to man ?
On
what level does Hindu morality
stand?
Of
what use is this philosophy of
the Upanishadas?
(The script published in
the Writings and Speeches, vol. 3 published by Government of Maharashtra did
not have any chapter names. It was divided in I to VI parts. For the sake of
readership convenience we are providing additional hyperlinks to some paras by
way of projecting some questions in the text. )
Editorial Note:
This script on Philosophy of Hinduism was found as a well-bound copy
which we feel is complete by itself.
The whole script seems to be a Chapter of one big scheme. This foolscap
original typed copy consists of 169 pages.— Editors
What is the philosophy of Hinduism? This is a question which arises in its logical sequence.
But apart from its logical sequence its importance is such that it can never be
omitted from consideration. Without it no one can understand the aims and
ideals of Hinduism.
It is obvious that such a study must
be preceded by a certain amount of what may be called clearing of the ground
and defining of the terms involved.
At the outset it may be asked what does this
proposed title comprehend? Is this title of the
Philosophy of Hinduism of the same nature as that of the Philosophy of
Religion? I wish I could commit myself one way or the other on this point.
Indeed I cannot. I have read a good deal on the subject, but I confess I have
not got a clear idea of what is meant by Philosophy of Religion. This is
probably due to two facts. In the first place while religion is something
definite, there is nothing definite*[f1] as to what is to be included in the
term philosophy. In the second place Philosophy and Religion have been
adversaries if not actual antagonists as may be seen from the story of the
philosopher and the theologian. According to the story, the two were engaged in
disputation and the theologian accused the
philosopher that he was "like a blind man in a
dark room, looking for a black cat which was not there".
In reply the philosopher charged the theologian
saying that "he was like a blind man in the
dark room, looking for a black cat which was not there but he declared to have
found there". Perhaps it is the unhappy choice
of the title — Philosophy of Religion—which is responsible for causing
confusion in the matter of the exact definition of its field. The nearest
approach to an intelligible statement as to the exact subject matter of
Philosophy of Religion I find in Prof. Pringle-Pattison
who observes[f2] :—
"A few words may be useful at the outset as an indication of what we commonly mean by the Philosophy of Religion. Plato described philosophy long ago as the synoptic view of things. That is to say, it is the attempt to see things together-to keep all the main features of the world in view, and to grasp them in their relation to one another as parts of one whole. Only thus can we acquire a sense of proportion and estimate aright the significance of any particular range of facts for our ultimate conclusions about the nature of the world-process and the world-ground. Accordingly, the philosophy of any particular department of experience, the Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of Art, the Philosophy of Law, is to be taken as meaning an analysis and interpretation of the experience in question in its bearing upon our view of man and the world in which he lives. And when the facts upon which we concentrate are so universal, and in their nature so remarkable, as those disclosed by the history of religion—the philosophy of man's religious experience—cannot but exercise a determining influence upon our general philosophical conclusions. In fact with many writers the particular discussion tends to merge in the more general."
"The facts with which a
philosophy of religion has to deal are supplied by the history of religion, in
the most comprehensive sense of that term. As Tiele
puts it, "all religions of the civilised and uncivilised world, dead and
living", is a `historical and psychological phenomenon' in all its
manifestations. These facts, it should be noted, constitute the data of the
philosophy of religion; they do not themselves constitute a `philosophy' or, in
Tiele's use of the term, a `science' of religion.
`If, he says, 1 have minutely described all the religions in existence, their
doctrines, myths and customs, the observances they inculcate, and the
organisation of their adherents, tracing the different religions from their origin to their bloom and decay, I
have merely. Collected the materials with which the
science of religion works'. 'The historical record,
however complete, is not enough; pure history is not philosophy. To achieve a
philosophy of religion we should be able to discover in the varied
manifestations a common principle to whose roots in human nature we can point,
whose evolution we can trace by intelligible-stages from lower to higher and
more adequate forms, as well as its intimate relations with the other main
factors in human civilisation".
If this is Philosophy of Religion it appears to me that it is merely a different name for that department of study, which is called comparative religion with the added aim of discovering a common principle in the varied manifestations of religion. Whatever be the scope and value of such a study, I am using the title Philosophy of Religion to denote something quite different from the sense and aim given to it by Prof. Pringle-Pattison. I am using the word Philosophy in its original sense, which was two-fold. It meant teachings as it did when people spoke of the philosophy of Socrates or the philosophy of Plato. In another sense it meant critical reason used in passing judgements upon things and events. Proceeding on this basis Philosophy of Religion is to me not a merely descriptive science. I regard it as being both descriptive as well as normative. In so far as it deals with the teachings of a Religion, Philosophy of Religion becomes a descriptive science. In so far as it involves the use of critical reason for passing judgement on those teachings, the Philosophy of Religion becomes a normative science. From this it will be clear what I shall be concerned with in this study of the Philosophy of Hinduism. To be explicit I shall be putting Hinduism on its trial to assess its worth as a way of life.
Here is one part of the ground cleared. There remains another part to be cleared. That concerns the ascertainment of the factors concerned and the definitions of the terms I shall be using.
A study of the Philosophy of Religion it seems to me involves the determination of three dimensions. I call them dimensions because they are like the unknown quantities contained as factors in a product. One must ascertain and define these dimensions of the Philosophy of Religion if an examination of it is to be fruitful.
Of the three dimensions, Religion is
the first. One must therefore define what he understands by religion in order
to avoid argument being directed at cross-purposes. This is particularly
necessary in the case of Religion for the reason that there is no agreement as
to its exact definition. This is no place to enter upon an elaborate
consideration of this question. I will therefore content myself by stating the meaning in which I am using the word in
the discussion, which follows.
I am using the word Religion to mean
Theology. This will perhaps be insufficient for the purposes of definition. For
there are different kinds of Theologies and I must particularise which one I
mean. Historically there have been two Theologies spoken of from ancient times.
Mythical theology and Civil theology. The Greeks who
distinguished them gave each a definite content. By Mythical theology they
meant the tales of gods and their doings told in or implied by current
imaginative literature. Civil theology according to them consisted of the
knowledge of the various feasts and fasts of the State Calendar and the ritual
appropriate to them. I am not using the word theology in either of these two
senses of that word. I mean by theology natural
theology[f3] which is-the doctrine of God and the divine, as
an integral part of the theory of nature. As traditionally understood there are
three thesis which `natural theology' propounds. (1) That God exists and is the
author of what we call nature or universe (2) That God controls all the events
which make nature and (3) God exercises a government over mankind in accordance
with his sovereign moral law.
I am aware
there is another class of theology known as Revealed
Theology—spontaneous self disclosure of divine reality—which may be
distinguished from Natural theology.
But this distinction does not really matter. For as has been pointed out[f4] that a revelation may either
"leave the results won by Natural
theology standing without modifications, merely supplementing them by
further knowledge not attainable by unassisted human effort" or it "may
transform Natural theology in such a way that all the truths of natural
theology would acquire richer and deeper meaning when seen in the light of a
true revelation." But the view that a genuine natural theology and a genuine revelation
theology might stand in real contradiction may be safely excluded as not
being possible.
Taking the three
thesis of Theology namely (1) the existence of God, (2) God's providential
government of the universe and (3) God's moral government of mankind, I take
Religion to mean the propounding of an ideal scheme of divine governance the
aim and object of which is to make the social order in which men live a moral
order. This is what I understand by Religion and this is the sense in which I
shall be using the term Religion in this discussion.
The second dimension is to know the ideal scheme for which a Religion stands. To define what is the fixed, permanent and dominant part in the religion of any society and to separate its essential characteristics from those which are unessential is often very difficult. The reason for this difficulty in all probability lies in the difficulty pointed out by Prof. Robertson Smith[f5] when he says:—
"The traditional usage of religion had grown up gradually in the course of many centuries, and reflected habits of thought, characteristic of very diverse stages of man's intellectual and moral development. No conception of the nature of the gods could possibly afford the clue to all parts of that motley complex of rites and ceremonies which the later paganism had received by inheritance, from a series of ancestors in every state of culture from pure savagery upwards. The record of the religious thought of mankind, as it is embodied in religious institutions, resembles the geological record of the history of the earth's crust; the new and the old are preserved side by side, or rather layer upon layer".
The same thing has happened in India.
Speaking about the growth of Religion in India, says Prof. Max Muller :—
"We have seen a religion growing up
from stage to stage, from the simplest childish prayers to the highest
metaphysical abstractions. In the majority of the hymns of the Veda we might
recognise the childhood; in the Brahmanas and their
sacrificial, domestic and moral ordinances the busy manhood; in the Upanishads the old age of the Vedic
religion. We could have well understood if, with the historical progress of the
Indian mind, they had discarded the purely childish prayers as soon as they had
arrived at the maturity of the Brahamans; and if,
when the vanity of sacrifices and the real character of the old god's had once
been recognised, they would have been superseded by the more exalted religion of the Upanishads.
But it was not so. Every religious thought that had once found expression in
India, that had once been handed down as a sacred heirloom, was preserved, and
the thoughts of the three historical periods, the childhood, the manhood, and
the old age of the Indian nation, were made to do permanent service in the
three stages of the life of every individual. Thus alone can we explain how the
same sacred code, the Veda, contains not only the records of different phases
of religious thought, but of doctrines which we may call almost diametrically
opposed to each other."
But this difficulty is not so great in
the case of Religions which are positive
religions. The fundamental characteristic of positive Religions, is that they have not grown up like primitive
religions, under the action. of unconscious forces
operating silently from age to age, but trace their origin to the teaching of
great religious innovators, who spoke as the organs of a divine revelation.
Being the result of conscious formulations the philosophy of a religion which
is positive is easy to find and easy to state. Hinduism like Judaism,
Christianity and Islam is in the main a positive religion. One does not have to search for its scheme of divine
governance. It is not like an unwritten constitution. On the Hindu scheme of
divine governance is enshrined in a written constitution and any one who cares
to know it will find it laid bare in that Sacred Book called the Manu Smriti, a divine Code
which lays down the rules which govern the religious, ritualistic
and social life of the Hindus in minute detail and which must be regarded as
the Bible of the Hindus and containing the philosophy of Hinduism.
The third dimension in the philosophy
of religion is the criterion[f6] to be adopted for judging the value
of the ideal scheme of divine governance for which a given Religion stands.
Religion must be put on its trial. By what criterion shall it be judged? That
leads to the definition of the norm. Of the three dimensions this third one is
the most difficult one to be ascertained and defined.
Unfortunately the question does not
appear to have been tackled although much has been written on the philosophy of
Religion and certainly no method has been found for satisfactorily dealing with
the problem. One is left to one's own method for determining the issue. As for
myself I think it is safe to proceed on the view that to know the philosophy of
any movement or any institution one must study the revolutions which the
movement or the institution has undergone. Revolution is the mother of philosophy and if it is not the mother
of philosophy it is a lamp which illuminates philosophy. Religion is no
exception to this rule. To me therefore it seems quite evident that the best
method to ascertain the criterion by which to judge the philosophy of Religion
is to study the Revolutions which religion has undergone. That is the method
which I propose to adopt.
Students of History are familiar with
one Religious Revolution. That Revolution was concerned with the sphere of
Religion and the extent of its authority. There was a time when Religion had
covered the whole field of human knowledge and claimed infallibility for what
it taught. It covered astronomy and taught a theory of the universe according
to which the earth is at rest in the center of the universe, while the sun,
moon, planets and system of fixed stars revolve round it each in its own
sphere. It included biology and geology and propounded the view that the growth
of life on the earth had been created all at once and had contained from the
time of creation onwards, all the heavenly bodies that it now contains and all
kinds of animals of plants. It claimed medicine to be its province and taught
that disease was either a divine visitation as punishment for sin or it was the
work of demons and that it could be cured by the intervention of saints, either
in person or through their holy relics; or by
prayers or
pilgrimages; or (when due to demons) by exorcism and by treatment which the demons (and the patient) found disgusting. It also claimed physiology and psychology to be its domain and taught that the body and soul were two distinct substances.
Bit by bit this vast Empire of Religion was destroyed. The Copernican Revolution freed astronomy from the domination of Religion. The Darwinian Revolution freed biology and geology from the trammels of Religion. The authority of theology in medicine is not yet completely destroyed. Its intervention in medical questions still continues. Opinion on such subjects as birth control, abortion and sterilisation of the defective are still influenced by theological dogmas. Psychology has not completely freed itself from its entanglements. None the less Darwinism was such a severe blow that the authority of theology was shattered all over to such an extent that it never afterwards made any serious effort to remain its lost empire.
It is quite natural that this disruption
of the Empire of Religion should be treated as a great Revolution. It is the
result of the warfare which science waged against theology for 400 years, in
which many pitched battles were fought between the two and the excitement
caused by them was so great that nobody could fail to be impressed by the
revolution that was blazing on.
There is no doubt that this religious revolution has been a great blessing. It has established freedom of thought. It has enabled society " to assume control of itself, making its own the world it once shared with superstition, facing undaunted the things of its former fears, and so carving out for itself, from the realm of mystery in which it lies, a sphere of unhampered action and a field of independent thought". The process of secularisation is not only welcomed by scientists for making civilisation—as distinguished from culture—possible, even Religious men and women have come to feel that much of what theology taught was unnecessary and a mere hindrance to the religious life and that this chopping of its wild growth was a welcome process.
But for ascertaining the norm for
judging the philosophy of Religion we must turn to another and a different kind
of Revolution which Religion has undergone. That Revolution touches the nature
and content of ruling conceptions of the relations of God to man, of Society to
man and of man to man. How great was this revolution can be seen from the
differences which divide savage society from civilized society.
Strange as it may seem no systematic
study of this Religious Revolution has so far been made. None the less this
Revolution is so great and so immense that it has brought about a complete
transformation in the nature of Religion as it is taken to be by savage society
and by civilised society although very few seem to be aware of it.
To begin with the comparison between
savage society and civilised society.
In the religion of the savage one is
struck by the presence of two things. First is the performance of rites and
ceremonies, the practice of magic or tabu and the worship of fetish or totem.
The second thing that is noticeable is that the rites, ceremonies, magic, tabu,
totem and fetish are conspicuous by their connection with
certain occasions. These occasions are chiefly those, which represent the
crises of human life. The events such as birth, the birth of the first born,
attaining manhood, reaching puberty, marriage, sickness, death and war are the
usual occasions which are marked out for the performance of rites and
ceremonies, the use of magic and the worship of the totem.
Students of the origin and history of
Religion have sought to explain the origin and substance of religion by
reference to either magic, tabu and totem and the rites and ceremonies
connected therewith, and have deemed the occasions with which they are
connected as of no account. Consequently we have theories explaining religion
as having arisen in magic or as having arisen in fetishism. Nothing can be a greater
error than this. It is true that savage society practices magic, believes in
tabu and worships the totem. But it is wrong to suppose that these constitute
the religion or form the source of religion. To take such a view is to elevate
what is incidental to the position of the principal. The principal thing in the
Religion of the savage are the elemental facts of human existence such as life,
death, birth, marriage etc. Magic, tabu, totem are things which are incidental.
Magic, tabu, totem, fetish etc., are not the ends. They are only the means. The
end is life and the preservation of life. Magic, tabu etc., are resorted to by
the savage society not for their own sake but to conserve life and to exercise evil influences from doing harm
to life. Thus understood the religion of the savage society was concerned with
life and the preservation of life and it is these life processes which
constitute the substance and source of the religion of the savage society. So
great was the concern of the savage society for life and the preservation of
life that it made them the basis of its religion. So central were the life
processes in the religion of the savage society that everything, which affected
them, became part of its religion. The ceremonies of the savage society were
not only concerned with the events of birth, attaining of manhood, puberty,
marriage, sickness, death and war they were also concerned with food. Among
pastoral peoples the flocks and herds are sacred. Among agricultural peoples
seedtime and harvest are marked by ceremonials performed with some reference to
the growth and the preservation of the crops. Likewise drought, pestilence, and
other strange, irregular phenomena of nature occasion the performance of
ceremonials. Why should such occasions as harvest and famine be accompanied by
religious ceremonies? Why is magic, tabu, totem be
of such importance to the savage. The only answer is that they all affect the
preservation of life. The process of life and its preservation form the main
purpose. Life and preservation of life is the core and centre of the Religion
of the savage society. As pointed out by Prof. Crawley
the religion of the savage begins and ends with the affirmation and
conservation of life.
In life and preservation of life
consists the religion of the savage. What is however true of the religion of
the savage is true of all religions wherever they are found for the simple
reason that constitutes the essence of religion. It is true that in the present
day society with its theological refinements this essence of religion has
become hidden from view and is even forgotten. But that life and the
preservation of life constitute the essence of religion even in the present day
society is beyond question. This is well illustrated by Prof. Crowley. When speaking of the religious life of man in
the present day society, he says how—
"a man's religion does not enter
into his professional or social hours, his scientific or artistic moments; practically its chief claims are settled on one day
in the week from which ordinary worldly concerns
are excluded. In fact, his life is in two parts; but the moiety with which
religion is concerned is the elemental. Serious thinking on ultimate questions
of life and death is, roughly speaking, the essence of his Sabbath; add to this the habit of prayer, giving the thanks
at meals, and the subconscious feeling that birth and death, continuation and
marriage are rightly solemnised by religion, while business and pleasure may
possibly be consecrated, but only metaphorically or by an overflow of religious
feeling."
Comparing this description of the
religious concerns of the man in the present day society with that of the
savage, who can deny that the religion is essentially the same, both in theory
and practice whether one speaks of the religion of the savage society or of the
civilised society.
It is therefore clear that savage and civilised societies agree in one respect. In both the central interests of religion—namely in the life processes by which individuals are preserved and the race maintained—are the same. In this there is no real difference between the two. But they differ in two other important respects.
In the first place in the religion of
the savage society there is no trace of the idea of God. In the second place in the
religion of the savage society there is no bond between morality and Religion.
In the savage society there is religion without God. In the savage society
there is morality but it is independent of Religion.
How and when the idea of God became
fused in Religion it is not possible to say. It may be that the idea of God had
its origin in the worship of the Great Man in Society, the Hero—giving rise to
theism—with its faith in its living God. It may be that the idea of God came
into existence as a result of the purely philosophical speculation upon the
problem as to who created life—giving rise to Deism—with its belief in God as
Architect of the Universe.[f7] In any case the idea of God is not
integral to Religion. How it got fused into Religion it is difficult to
explain. With regard to the relation between Religion and Morality this much
may be safely said. Though the relation between God and Religion is not quite
integral, the relation between Religion and morality is. Both religion and
morality are connected with the same elemental facts of human existence—namely
life, death, birth and marriage. Religion consecrates these life processes
while morality furnishes rules for their preservation. Religion in consecrating
the elemental facts and processes of life came to consecrate also the rules
laid down by Society for their preservation. Looked at from this point it is
easily explained why the bond between Religion and Morality took place. It was
more intimate and more natural than the bond between Religion and God. But when
exactly this fusion between Religion and Morality took place it is not easy to
say.
Be that as it may, the fact remains
that the religion of the Civilised Society differs from that of the Savage
Society into two important features. In civilised
society God comes in the scheme of Religion. In civilised society morality
becomes sanctified by Religion.
This is the first stage in the
Religious Revolution I am speaking of. This Religious Revolution must not be
supposed to have been ended here with the emergence of these two new features
in the development of religion. The two ideas having become part of the
constitution of the Religion of the Civilised Society have undergone further
changes which have revolutionized their meaning and their moral significance.
The second stage of the Religious Revolution marks a very radical change. The
contrast is so big that civilized society has become split into two, antique
society and modern society, so that instead of speaking of the religion of the
civilised society it becomes necessary to speak of the religion of antique
society as against the religion of modern society.
The religious revolution, which marks
off antique society from modern society, is far greater than the religious
revolution, which divides savage society from civilised society. Its dimensions
will be obvious from the differences it has brought about in the conceptions
regarding the relations between God, Society and Man. The first point of
difference relates to the composition of society. Every human being, without choice
on his own part, but simply in virtue of his birth and upbringing, becomes a member of what we call a natural society. He belongs that is to a
certain family and a certain nation. This membership lays upon him definite
obligations and duties which he is called upon to fulfil as a matter of course
and on pain of social penalties and disabilities while at the same time it
confers upon him certain social rights and advantages. In this respect the
ancient and modern worlds are alike. But in the words of Prof. Smith[f8]:—
"There is this important difference, that the tribal or national societies of the ancient world were not strictly natural in the modern sense of the word, for the gods had their part and place in them equally with men. The circle into which a man was born was not simply a group of kinsfolk and fellow citizens, but embraced also certain divine beings, the gods of the family and of the state, which to the ancient mind were as much a part of the particular community with which they stood connected as the human members of the social circle. The relation between the gods of antiquity and their worshippers was expressed in the language of human relationship, and this language was not taken in a figurative sense but with strict literally. If a god was spoken of as father and his worshippers as his offspring, the meaning was that the worshippers were literally of his stock, that he and they made up one natural family with reciprocal family duties to one another. Or, again, if the god was addressed as king, and worshippers called themselves his servants, they meant that the supreme guidance of the state was actually in his hands, and accordingly the organisation of the state included provision for consulting his will and obtaining his direction in all weighty matters, also provision for approaching him as king with due homage and tribute.
"Thus a man was born into a fixed
relation to certain gods as surely as he was born into relation to his fellow
men; and his religion, that is, the part of conduct which was determined by his
relation to the gods, was simply one side of the general scheme of conduct
prescribed for him by his position as a member of society. There was no
separation between the spheres of religion and of ordinary life. Every social
act had a reference to the gods as well as to men, for the social body was not
made up of men only, but of gods and men."
Thus in ancient Society men and their
Gods formed a social and political as well as a religious whole. Religion was founded
on kinship between the God and his worshippers. Modern Society has eliminated
God from its composition. It consists of men only.
The second point of difference between
antique and modern society relates to the bond between God and Society. In the
antique world the various communities
"believed in the existence of many
Gods, for they accepted as real the Gods of their enemies as well as their own,
but they did not worship the strange Gods from whom they had no favour to
expect, and on whom their gifts and offerings would have been thrown away.... Each group had its own God, or perhaps a God and
Goddess, to whom the other Gods bore no relation whatever, " [f9]
The God of the antique society was an exclusive God. God was owned by and bound to one singly community. This is largely to be accounted for by
"the share taken by the Gods in
the feuds and wars of their worshippers. The enemies of the God and the enemies
of his people are identical; even in the Old
Testament `the enemies of Jehovah' are originally
nothing else than the enemies of Israel. In battle each God fights for his own
people, and to his aid success is ascribed ; Chemosh
gives victory to Moab, and Asshyr
to Assyria ; and often the divine image or symbol
accompanies the host to battle. When the ark was brought into the camp of
Israel, the Philistines said, "Gods are come
into the camp ; who can deliver us from their own
practice, for when David defeated them at Baalperazirm, part of the booty consisted in their idols which had
been carried into the field. When the Carthaginians, in their treaty with Phillip of Macedon, speak
of "the Gods that take part in the campaign," they doubtless refer to the inmates of the
sacred tent which was pitched in time of war beside the tent of the general,
and before which prisoners were sacrificed after a victory. Similarly an Arabic
poet says, "Yaguth went forth with us against Morad"; that is, the image of the God Yaguth was
carried into the fray".
This fact had produced a solidarity between God and the community.
"Hence, on the principle of solidarity
between Gods and their worshippers, the particularism characteristic of
political society could not but reappear in the sphere of religion. In the same
measure as the God of a clan or town had indisputable claim to the reverence
and service of the community to which he belonged, he was necessarily an enemy
to their enemies and a stranger to those to whom they were strangers".[f10]
God had become attached to a community, and the community had become attached to their God. God had become the God of the Community and the Community had become the chosen community of the God.
This view had two consequences. Antique Society never came to conceive that God could be universal God, the God of all. Antique Society never could conceive that there was any such thing as humanity in general.
The third point of difference between ancient and modern society, has reference to the conception of the fatherhood of God. In the antique Society God was the Father of his people but the basis of this conception of Fatherhood was deemed to be physical.
"In heathen religions the Fatherhood of
the Gods is physical fatherhood. Among the Greeks, for example, the idea that the
Gods fashioned men out of clay, as potters fashion images, is relatively modern.
The older conception is that the races of men have Gods for their ancestors, or
are the children of the earth, the common mother of Gods and men, so that men
are really of the stock or kin of the Gods. That the same conception was
familiar to the older Semites appears from the Bible. Jeremiah describes
idolaters as saying to a stock, Thou art my father ;
and to a stone, Thou has brought me forth. In the ancient poem, Num. xxi. 29, The Moabites are
called the sons and daughters of Chemosh, and at a
much more recent date the prophet Malachi calls a
heathen woman "the daughter of a strange God". These phrases are doubtless accommodations to
the language, which the heathen neighbours of Israel used about themselves. In
Syria and Palestine each clan, or even complex of clans forming a small
independent people, traced back its origin to a great first father ; and they indicate that, just as in Greece this
father or progenitor of the race was commonly identified with the God of the
race. With this it accords that in the judgment of most modern enquirers several names of deities appear in the old
genealogies of nations in the Book of Genesis. Edom,
for example, the progenitor of the Edomites, was
identified by the Hebrews with Esau the brother of Jacob, but to the heathen he
was a God, as appears from the theophorous proper
name Obededom, " worshipper of Edom", the extant fragments of Phoenician and Babylonian cosmogonies date from a time when tribal
religion and the connection of individual Gods with particular kindreds
was forgotten or had fallen into the
background. But in a generalized form the notion that men are the offspring of
the Gods still held its ground. In the Phoenician cosmogony of Philo Bablius it does so
in a confused shape, due to the authors euhemerism,
that is, to his theory that deities are nothing more than deified men who had
been great benefactors to their species. Again, in the Chaldaean
legend preserved by Berosus, the belief that men
are of the blood of the Gods is expressed in a form too crude not to be very
ancient; for animals as well as men are said to have been formed out of clay
mingled with the blood of a decapitated deity. "[f11]
This conception of blood kinship of
Gods and men had one important consequence. To the antique world God was a
human being and as such was not capable of absolute virtue and absolute
goodness. God shared the physical nature of man and was afflicted with the
passions infirmities and vices to which man was subject. The God of the antique world had all the wants and appetites of man
and he often indulged in the vices in which many revelled. Worshipers had to
implore God not to lead them into temptations.
In modern Society the idea of divine
fatherhood has become entirely dissociated from the physical basis of natural
fatherhood. In its place man is conceived to be created in the image of God ;
he is not deemed I to be begotten by God. This change in the conception of the
fatherhood of God looked at from its moral aspect has made a tremendous
difference in the nature of God as a Governor of the Universe. God with his
physical basis was not capable of absolute good and absolute virtue. With God
wanting in righteousness the universe could not
insist on righteousness as an immutable principle. This dissociation of God
from physical contact with man has made it possible for God to be conceived of
as capable of absolute good and absolute virtue.
The fourth point of difference relates
to the part religion plays when a change of nationality takes place.
In the antique world there could be no change of nationality unless it was accompanied by a change of Religion. In the antique world, "It was impossible for an. individual to change his religion without changing his nationality, and a whole community could hardly change its religion at all without being absorbed into another stock or nation. Religions like political ties were transmitted from father to son ; for a man could not choose a new God at will ; the Gods of his fathers were the only deities on whom he could count as friendly and ready to accept his homage, unless he forswore his own kindred and was received into a new circle of civil as well as religious life."
How change of religion was a condition precedent to a Social fusion is well illustrated by the dialogue between Naomi and Ruth in the Old Testament.
"Thy Sister" says Naomi to Ruth, "is gone back unto her people and unto her Gods"; and Ruth replies, "Thy people shall be my people and thy God my God."
It is quite clear that in the ancient
world a change of nationality involved a change of cult. Social fusion meant
religious fusion.
In modern society abandonment of
religion or acceptance of another is not necessary for social fusion. This is
best illustrated by what is in modern terminology and naturalisation, whereby
the citizen of one state abandons his citizenship of the state and becomes a
citizen of new state. In this process of naturalisation religion has no place.
One can have a social fusion which is another name for naturalisation without
undergoing a religious fusion.
To distinguish modern society from
antique society it is not enough to say that Modern Society consists of men
only. It must be added that it consists of men who are worshippers of different
Gods.
The fifth point of difference relates to the necessity of knowledge as
to the nature of God as part of religion.
"From the antique point of view, indeed
the question what the Gods are in themselves is not a religious but a
speculative one ; what is requisite to religion is
a practical acquaintance with the rules on I
which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to frame
their conduct—what in 2 Kings xvii. 26 is called
the "manner"
or rather the "customary law " (misphat) of the
God of the land. This is true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets
speak of the knowledge of the laws and principles of His government in Israel,
and a summary expression for religion as a whole is "the
knowledge and fear of Jehovah," i.e. the
knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent obedience. An
extreme skepticism towards all religious speculation is recommended in the Book
of Ecclesiastes as the proper attitude of piety,
for no amount of discussion can carry a man beyond the plain rule, to "fear God and keep His Commandments". This counsel the author puts into the mouth of
Solomon, and so represents it, not unjustly, as summing up the old view of
religion, which in more modern days had unfortunately begun to be undermined."
The sixth point of difference relates
to the place of belief in Religion.
In ancient Society :—
"Ritual and practical usages were,
strictly speaking, the sum total of ancient religions. Religion in primitive
times was not a system of belief with practical applications ; it was a body of fixed traditional practices, to
which every member of society conformed as a matter of courage. Men would not
be men if they agreed to do certain things without having a reason for their
action ; but in ancient religion the reason was not
first formulated as a doctrine and then expressed in practice, but conversely,
practice preceded doctrinal theory. Men form
general rule of conduct before they begin to express general principles in
words ; political institutions are older than
political theories and in like manner religious institutions are older than
religious theories. This analogy is not arbitrarily chosen, for in fact the parallelism
in ancient society between religious and political institutions is complete. In
each sphere great importance was attached to form and precedent, but the
explanation why the precedent was followed consisted merely of legend as to its
first establishment. That the
precedent, once established, was authoritative did not appear to require
any proof. The rules of society were based on precedent, and the continued
existence of the society was sufficient reason why a precedent once set should
continue to be followed."
The seventh point of difference
relates to the place of individual conviction in Religion. In ancient Society :—
"Religion was a part of the organized
social life into which a man was born, and to which he conformed through life
in the same unconscious way in which men fall into any habitual practice of the
society in which they live. Men took the Gods and their worship for granted,
just as they took the other usages of the state for granted, and if they reason
or speculated about them, they did so on the presupposition that the
traditional usages were fixed things, behind which their reasoning must not go,
and which no reasoning could be allowed to overturn. To us moderns religion is
above all a matter of individual conviction and reasoned belief, but to the
ancients it was a part of the citizen's public life, reduced to fixed forms,
which he was not bound to understand and was not at liberty to criticize or to
neglect. Religious non-conformity was an offence against the state; for if sacred
tradition was tampered with the bases of society were undermined, and the
favour of the Gods was forfeited. But so long as the prescribed forms were duly
observed, a man was recognized as truly pious, and no one asked how his
religion was rooted in his heart or affected his reason. Like political duty,
of which indeed it was a part, religion was entirely comprehended in the
observance of certain fixed rules of outward conduct."
The eighth point of difference
pertains to the relation of God to Society and man, of Society to Man in the
matter of God's Providence.
First as to the difference in the
relation of God to Society. In this connection three points may be noted. The
faith of the antique world
"Sought nothing higher than a condition
of physical bien
etre. .
. . The good things desired of the
Gods were the blessings of earthly life, not spiritual but carnal things." What the antique societies asked and believed
themselves to receive from their God lay mainly in the following things :
"Abundant harvests, help against their
enemies and counsel by oracles or soothsayers in matters of natural difficulty." In the antique world
"Religion was not the affair of the
individual but of the Community. . . . It was the community,
and not the individual, that was sure of the permanent and the unfailing hand
of the deity." Next as to the difference in
the relation of God to man.
"It was not the business of the Gods of
heathenish to watch, by a series of special providence, over the welfare of
every individual. It is true that individuals laid their private affairs before
the Gods, and asked with prayers and views for strictly personal blessings. But
they did this just as they might crave a personal boon from a king, or as a son
craves a boon from a father, without expecting to get all that was asked. What
the Gods might do in this way was done as a matter of personal favour, and was
no part of their proper function as heads of the community."
"The Gods watched over a man's civic
life, they gave him his share in public benefits, the annual largess of the
harvest and the vintage, national peace or victory over enemies, and so forth,
but they were not sure helpers in every private need, and above all they would
not help him in matters that were against the interests of the community as a
whole. There was therefore a whole region of possible needs and desires for
which religion could and would do nothing." Next
the difference in the attitude of God and Society to man.
In the antique
world Society was indifferent to individual welfare. God as no doubt bound to
Society. But
"The
compact between the God and his worshippers was not held to pledge the deity to
make the private cares of each member of the Community his own."
"The
benefits expected of God were of a public character affecting the whole
community, especially fruitful seasons, increase of flocks of herds and success
in war. So long as community flourished the fact that an individual was
miserable reflected no discredit on divine providence."
On the contrary
the antique world looked upon the misery of a man as proof.
"That the sufferer was an evil-doer, justly
hateful to the Gods. Such a man was out of place among the happy and the
prosperous crowd that assembled on feast days before the alter." It is in accordance with this view that the
leper and the mourner were shut out from the exercise of religion as well as
from the privileges of social life and their food was not brought into the
house of God.
As for conflict between individual and individual and between society and the individual God had no concern. In the antique world :
"It was
not expected that (God) should always be busy righting human affairs. In
ordinary matters it was men's business to help themselves and their own kins
folk, though the sense that the God was always near, and could be called upon
at need, was a moral force continually working in some degree for the
maintenance of social righteousness and order. The strength of this moral force
was indeed very uncertain, for it was always possible for the evil-doer to
flatter himself that his offence would be overlooked."
In the antique world man did not ask God to be righteous to him.
"Whether in civil or in profane matters, the habit
of the old world was to think much of the community
and little of the individual life, and no one felt this to be unjust even
though it bore hardly on himself. The God was the God of the national or of the
tribe, and he knew and cared for the individual only as a member of the
community."
That
was the attitude that man in the antique world took of his own private
misfortune. Man came to rejoice before his God and "in
rejoicing before his God man rejoiced with and for the welfare of his kindred,
his neighbours and his country, and, in renewing by solemn act of worship the
bond that united him to God, he also renewed the bonds of family, social and
national obligation." Man in the antique world
did not call upon his maker to be righteous to him.
Such is this
other Revolution in Religion. There have thus been two Religious Revolutions.
One was an external Revolution. The other was an internal Revolution. The
External Revolution was concerned with the field within which the authority of
Religion was to prevail. The Internal Revolution had to do with the changes in
Religion as a scheme of divine Governance for human society. The External
Revolution was not really a Religious Revolution at all. It was a revolt of
science against the extra territorial jurisdiction
assumed by Religion over a field which did not belong. The Internal Revolution
was a real Revolution or may be compared to any other political Revolution,
such as the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution. It involved a
constitutional change. By this Revolution the Scheme of divine governance came
to be altered, amended and reconstituted.
How profound
have been the changes which this internal Revolution, has made in the antique
scheme of divine governance can be easily seen. By this Revolution God has
ceased to be a member of a community. Thereby he has become impartial. God has
ceased to be the Father of Man in the physical sense of the word. He has become
the creator of the Universe. The breaking of this blood bond has made it
possible to hold that God is good. By this Revolution man has ceased to be a
blind worshipper of God doing nothing but obeying his commands. Thereby man has
become a responsible person required to justify his belief in God's
commandments by his conviction. By this Revolution God has ceased to be merely
the protector of Society and social interests in gross have ceased to be the
center of the divine Order. Society and man have changed places as centers of
this divine order. It is man who has become the center of it.
All this
analysis of the Revolution in the Ruling concepts of Religion as a scheme of
divine governance had one purpose namely to discover the norm for evaluating
the philosophy of a Religion. The impatient reader may not ask where are these
norms and what are they? The reader may not have found the norms specified by
their names in the foregoing discussion. But he could not have failed to notice
that the whole of this Religious Revolution was raging around the norms for
judging what is right and what is wrong. If he has not, let me make explicit
what has been implicit in the whole of this discussion. We began with the
distinction between antique society and modern society as has been pointed out
they differed in the type of divine governance they accepted as their Religious
ideals. At one end of the Revolution was the antique society with its Religious
ideal in which the end was Society. At the other end of the Revolution is the
modern Society with its Religious ideal in which the end is the individual. To
put the same fact in terms of the norm it can be said that the norm or the
criterion, for judging right and wrong in the Antique Society was utility while the norm or the criterion
for judging right and wrong in the modern Society is Justice. The Religious Revolution was not thus a revolution in the
religious organization of Society resulting in the shifting of the center—from
society to the individual—it was a revolution in the norms.
Some may
demur to the norms I have suggested. It may be that it is a new way of reaching
them. But to my mind there is no doubt that they are the real norms by which to
judge the philosophy of religion. In the first place the norm must enable
people to judge what is right and wrong in the conduct of men. In the second
place the norm must be appropriate to current notion of what constitutes the
moral good. From both these points of view they appear to be the true norms.
They enable us to judge what is right and wrong. They are appropriate to the
society which adopted them. Utility as a criterion was appropriate to the
antique world in which society being the end, the moral good was held to be
something which had social utility. Justice as a criterion became appropriate
to the Modern World in which individual being the end, the moral good was held
to be something which does justice to the individual. There may be controversy
as to which of the two norms is morally superior. But I do not think there can
be any serious controversy that these are not the norms. If it is said that
these norms are not transcendental enough ; my
reply is that if a norm whereby one is to judge the philosophy of religion must
be Godly, it must also be earthly. At any rate these are the norms I propose to
adopt in examining the philosophy of Hinduism.
This is a long detour.
But it was a necessary preliminary to any inquiry into the main question.
However, when one begins the inquiry one meets with an initial difficulty. The
Hindu is not prepared to face the inquiry. He either argues that religion is of
no importance or he takes shelter behind the view—fostered by the study of
comparative Religion—that all religions are good. There is no doubt that both
these views are mistaken and untenable.
Religion as a social
force cannot be ignored. Religion has been aptly described by Hebert Spencer as "the
weft which everywhere crosses the warp of history".
This is true of every Society. But Religion has not only crossed everywhere the
warp of Indian History it forms the warp and woof of the Hindu mind. The life
of the Hindu is regulated by Religion at every moment of his life. It orders
him how during life he should conduct himself and how on death his body shall
be disposed of. It tells him how and when he shall indulge in his sexual
impulses. It tells him what ceremonies are to be performed when a child is
born—how he should name, how he should cut the hair on its head, how he should
perform its first feeding. It tells him what occupation he can take to, what
woman he should marry. It tells him with whom he should dine and what food he
should eat, what vegetables are lawful and what are forbidden. It tells how he
should spend his day, how many times he should eat, how many times he should
pray. There is no act of the Hindu which is not covered or ordained by
Religion. It seems strange that the educated Hindus should come to look upon it
as though it was a matter of indifference.
Besides, Religion is a social force.
As I have pointed out Religion stands for a scheme of divine governance. The
scheme becomes an ideal for society to follow. The ideal may be non-existent in
the sense that it is something which is constructed. But although non-existent,
it is real. For an ideal it has full operative force which is inherent in every
ideal. Those who deny the importance of religion not only forget this, they also
fail to realize how great is the potency and sanction that lies behind a
religious ideal as compound with that of a purely secular ideal. This is
probably due to the lag which one sees between the real and the ideal which is
always present whether the ideal is religious or secular. But the relative
potency of the two ideals is to be measured by another test—namely their power
to override the practical instincts of man. The ideal is concerned with
something that is remote. The practical instincts of man are concerned with the
immediate present. Now placed as against the force of the practical instincts
of man the two ideals show their difference in an unmistaken manner. The
practical instincts of man do yield to the prescriptions of a religious ideal
however much the two are opposed to each other. The practical instincts of man
do not on the other hand yield to the secular ideal if the two are in conflict.
This means that a religious ideal has a hold on mankind, irrespective of an
earthly gain. This can never be said of a purely secular ideal. Its power
depends upon its power to confer material benefit. This shows how great is the
difference in the potency and sanction of the two ideals over the human mind. A
religious ideal never fails to work so long as there is faith in that ideal. To
ignore religion is to ignore a live wire.
Again to hold that all religions are
true and good is to cherish a belief which is positively and demonstrably wrong. This belief, one is sorry to say, is the result
of what is known as the study of comparative religion. Comparative religion has
done one great service to humanity. It has broken down the claim and arrogance
of revealed religions as being the only true and good religions of study. While
it is true that comparative religion has abrogated the capricious distinction
between true and false religions based on purely arbitrary and a priori
considerations, it has brought in its wake some
false notions about religion. The most harmful one is the one I have mentioned
namely that all religions are equally good and that there is no necessity of
discriminating between them. Nothing can be a greater error than this. Religion
is an institution or an influence and like all social influences and
institutions, it may help or it may harm a society which is in its grip. As
pointed out by Prof. Tiele[f12] religion is
"one of the mightiest motors in the
history of mankind, which formed as well as tore asunder nations, united as
well as divided empires, which sanctioned the most atrocious and barbarous
deeds, the most libinous customs, inspired the most
admirable acts of heroism, self renunciation, and devotion, which occasioned
the most sanguinary wars, rebellions and persecutions, as well as brought about
the freedom, happiness and peace of nations—at one time a partisan of tyranny,
at another breaking its chains, now calling into existence and fostering a new
and brilliant civilization, then the deadly foe to
progress, science and art."
A force which shows such a strange contrast
in its result can be accepted as good without examining the form it takes and
the ideal it serves. Everything depends upon what social ideal a given religion
as a divine scheme of governance hold out. This is a question which is not
avowed by the science of comparative religion. Indeed it begins where
comparative religion ends. The Hindu is merely trying to avoid it by saying
that although religions are many they are equally good. For they are not.
However much the Hindu may seek to burke the inquiry into the philosophy of Hinduism
there is no escape. He must face it.
Now to begin with the subject. I
propose to apply both the tests, the test of justice and the test of utility to
judge the philosophy of Hinduism.
First I will apply the test of justice. Before doing so I want to explain what
I mean by the principle of justice.
No one has expounded it better than
Professor Bergbon[f13]. As interpreted by him the principle of justice
is a compendious one and includes most of the other principles which have
become the foundation of a moral order. Justice has always evoked ideas of
equality, of proportion of "compensation". Equity signifies equality. Rules and
regulations, right and righteousness are concerned with equality in value. If
all men are equal, all men are of the same essence and the common essence
entitled them to the same fundamental rights and to equal liberty.
In short justice is simply another
name for liberty equality and fraternity. It is in this sense I shall be using[f14] justice as a criterion to judge
Hinduism.
Which of these tenets does Hinduism
recognize? Let us take the question one by one.
1. Does Hinduism recognize Equality?
The question instantaneously brings to
one's mind the caste system. One striking feature of the caste system is that
the different castes do not stand as an horizontal series all on the same
plane. It is a system in which the different castes are placed in a vertical
series one above the other. Manu may not be
responsible for the creation of caste. Manu preached
the sanctity of the Varna and as I have shown Varna is the parent of caste. In
that sense Manu can be charged with being the progenitor if not the author of
the Caste System. Whatever be the case as to the guilt of Manu regarding the
Caste System there can be no question that Manu is responsible for upholding
the principle of gradation and rank.
In the scheme of Manu the Brahmin is
placed at the first in rank. Below
him is the Kshatriya. Below Kshatriya is the Vaishya. Below Vaishya is the Shudra and Below Shudra
is the Ati-Shudra (the Untouchables). This system
of rank and gradation is, simply another way of enunciating the principle of
inequality so that it may be truly said that Hinduism does not recognize
equality. This inequality in status is not merely the inequality that one sees
in the warrant of precedence prescribed for a ceremonial gathering at a King's
Court. It is a permanent social relationship among the classes to be observed—
to be enforced—at all times in all places and for all purposes. It will take
too long to show how in every phase of life Manu has introduced and made
inequality the vital force of life. But I will illustrate it by taking a few
examples such as slavery, marriage and Rule of Law.
Manu
recognizes[f15] Slavery. But he confined it to the Shudras. Only Shudras
could be made slaves of the three higher classes. But the higher classes could
not be the slaves of the Shudra.
But evidently practice differed from
the law of Manu and not only Shudras happened to
become slaves but members of the other three classes also become slaves. When
this was discovered to be the case a new rule was enacted by a Successor of
Manu namely Narada[f16]. This new rule of Narada
runs as follows :—
V 39. In the inverse order of the four
castes slavery is not ordained except where a man violates the duties peculiar
to his caste. Slavery (in that respect) is analogous to the condition of a
wife."
Recognition of slavery was bad enough.
But if the rule of slavery had been left free to take its own course it would
have had at least one beneficial effect. It would have been a levelling force.
The foundation of caste would have been destroyed. For under it a Brahmin might
have become the slave of the Untouchable and the Untouchable would have become
the master of the Brahmin. But it was seen that unfettered slavery was an equalitarian principle and an attempt was made to
nullify it. Manu and his successors therefore while recognising slavery ordain
that it shall not be recognised in its inverse order to the Varna System. That
means that a Brahmin may become the slave of another Brahmin. But he shall not
be the slave of a person of another Varna i.e. of the Kshatriya,
Vaishya, Shudra, or Ati-Shudra.
On the other hand a Brahmin may hold as his slave any one belonging to the four
Varnas. A Kshatriya can
have a Kshatriya, Vaisha, Shudra and Ati-Shudra as
his slaves but not one who is a Brahmin. A Vaishya can have a Vaishya, Shudra
and Ati-Shudra as his slaves but not one who is a Brahmin or a Kshatriya. A
Shudra can hold a Shudra and Ati-shudra can hold an
Ati-Shudra as his slave but not one who is a Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya or
Shudra.
Consider Manu on marriage. Here are
his rules governing intermarriage among the different classes. Manu says :—-
III. 12. "For the first marriage
of the twice born classes, a woman of the same class is recommended but for
such as are impelled by inclination to marry again, women in the direct order
of the classes are to be preferred."
III. 13. "A Shudra woman only must be the wife of Shudra : she and a Vaisya, of a Vaisya; they two and a Kshatriya, of a Kshatriya ; those two and a Brahmani of a Brahman."
Manu is of course opposed to
intermarriage. His injunction is for each class to marry within his class. But
he does recognize marriage outside the defined class. Here again he is
particularly careful not to allow intermarriage to do harm to his principle of
inequality among classes. Like Slavery he permits intermarriage but not in the
inverse order. A Brahmin when marrying outside his class may marry any woman
from any of the classes below him. A Kshatriya is free to marry a woman from
the two classes next below him namely the Vaishya
and Shudra but must not marry a woman from the Brahmin class which is above
him. A Vaishya is free to marry a woman from the Shudra Class which is next
below him. But he cannot marry a woman from the Brahmin and the Kshatriya Class
which are above him.