Chapter IV : Break-up of Unity

Chapter V : Weakening of the Defences

Chapter VI : Pakistan and communal peace



There seem to be three reasons present to the mind of the Hindus who are opposing this scheme of Pakistan. They object to the scheme :—


1.     Because it involves the breaking-up of the unity of India.

2.     Because it weakens the defence of India.

3.     Because it fails to solve the communal problem.

Is there any substance in these objections ? This  part is concerned with an examination of the validity of  these objections.





Before the Hindus complain of the destruction of the unity of India, let them make certain that the unity they are harping upon does exist. What unity is there between Pakistan and Hindustan?

Those Hindus, who maintain the affirmative, rely chiefly upon the fact that the areas which the Muslims want to be separated from India have always been a part of India. Historically this is, no doubt, true. This area was a part of India when Chandragupta was the ruler; it continued to be a part of India when Hsuan Tsang, the Chinese pilgrim, visited India in the 7th century A. D. In his diary, Hsuan Tsang has recorded that India was divided into five divisions or to use his language, there were ‘ five Indies '1[f.1] : (1) Northern India, (2) Western India, (3) Central India, (4) Eastern India and (5) Southern India and that these five divisions contained 80 kingdoms. According to Hsuan Tsang, Northern India comprised the Punjab proper, including Kashmir and the adjoining hill States with the whole of Eastern Afghanistan beyond the Indus, and the present Cis-Satlaj States to the west of the Sarasvati river. Thus, in Northern India there were included the districts of Kabul, Jallalabad, Peshawar, Ghazni and Bannu, which were all subject to the ruler of Kapisa, who was a Hindu Kshatriya and whose capital was most probably at Charikar, 27 miles from Kabul. In the Punjab proper, the hilly districts Taxila, Singhapura, Urasa, Punch and Rajaori, were subject to the Raja of Kashmir; while the whole of the plains, including Multan and Shorkot, were dependent on the ruler of Taki or Sangala, near Lahore. Such was the extent of the northern boundary of India at the time when Hsuan Tsang came on his pilgrimage. But as Prof. Toynbee points out :

" We must be on our guard against ' historical sentiment ', that is against arguments taken from conditions which once existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real at the present moment They are most easily illustrated by extreme examples. Italian newspapers have described the annexation of Tripoli as recovering the soil of the Fatherland because it was once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek Chauvinists on the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexandar the Great in the fourth century B.C. and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ochrida, in the opposite corner, was the capital of the Bulgarian Tzardom in the tenth century A. D., though the drift of time has buried the tradition of the latter almost as deep as the achievements of the ' Emathian Conqueror ' on which the modem Greek nationalists insist so strongly. "

The same logic applies here. Here also arguments are taken from conditions which once existed but which are no longer real and which omit to take into consideration later facts which history has to record during practically one thousand years—after the return of Hsuan Tsang.

It is true that when Hsuan Tsang came, not only the Punjab but what is now Afghanistan was part of India and further, the people of the Punjab and Afghanistan were either Vedic or Buddhist by religion. But what has happened since Hsuan Tsang left India ?

The most important thing that has happened is the invasion of India by the Muslim hordes from the north-west. The first Muslim invasion of India was by the Arabs who were led by Mahommad Bin Qasim. It took place in 711 A. D. and resulted in the conquest of Sind. This first Muslim invasion did not result in a permanent occupation of the country because the Caliphate of Baghdad, by whose order and command the invasion had taken place, was obliged by the middle of the 9th century A. D. to withdraw 2[f.2]  its direct control from this distant province of Sind. Soon after this withdrawal, there began a series of terrible invasions by Muhammad of Ghazni in 1001 A. D. Muhammad died in 1030 A. D., but within the short span of 30 years, he invaded India 17 times. He was followed by Mahommad Ghori who began his career as an invader in 1173. He was killed in 1206. For thirty years had Muhammad of Ghazni ravaged India and for thirty years Mahommad Ghori harried the same country in the same way. Then followed the incursions of the Moghul hordes of Chenghiz Khan. They first came in 1221. They then only wintered on the border of India but did not enter it. Twenty years after, they marched on Lahore and sacked it. Of their inroads, the most terrible was under Taimur in 1398. Then comes on the scene a new invader in the person of Babar who invaded India in 1526. The invasions of India did not stop with that of Babar. There occurred two more invasions. In 1738 Nadirshah's invading host swept over the Punjab like a flooded river " furious as the ocean ". He was followed by Ahmadshah Abdalli who invaded India in 1761, smashed the forces of the Mahrattas at Panipat and crushed for ever the attempt of the Hindus to gain the ground which they had lost to their Muslim invaders.

These Muslim invasions were not undertaken merely out of lust for loot or conquest. There was another object behind them. The expedition against Sind by Mahommad bin Qasim was of a punitive character and was undertaken to punish Raja Dahir of Sind who had refused to make restitution for the seizure of an Arab ship at Debul, one of the sea-port towns of Sind. But, there is no doubt that striking a blow at the idolatry and polytheism of Hindus and establishing Islam in India was also one of the aims of this expedition. In one of his dispatches to Hajjaj, Mahommad bin Qasim is quoted to have said :

" The nephew of Raja Dahir, his warriors and principal officers have been dispatched, and the infidels converted to Islam or destroyed. Instead of idol-temples, mosques and other places of worship have been created, the Kulbah it read, the call to prayers is raised, so that devotions are performed at staled hours. The Takbir and praise to the Almighty God are offered every morning and evening. " 3[f.3] 

After receiving the above dispatch, which had been forwarded with the head of the Raja, Hajjaj sent the following reply to his general:

" Except that you give protection to all, great and small alike, make no difference between enemy and friend. God, says, ' Give no quarter to infidels but cut their throats '. Then know that this is the command of the  great God. You shall not be too ready to grant protection, because it will prolong your work. After this give no quarter to any enemy except those who are of rank." 4[f.4] 

Muhammad of Ghazni also looked upon his numerous invasions of India as the waging of a holy war. Al' Utbi, the historian of Muhammad, describing his raids writes :

" He demolished idol temples and established Islam. He captured ...... cities, killed the polluted wretches, destroying the idolaters, and gratifying Muslims. ' He then returned home and promulgated accounts of the victories obtained for Islam. ....... and vowed that every year he would undertake a holy war against Hind 5[f.5] . " Mahommed Ghori was actuated by the same holy zeal in his invasions of India. Hasan Nizami, the historian, describes his work in the following terms :

" He purged by his sword the land of Hind from the filth of infidelity and vice, and freed the whole of that country from the thorn of God-plurality and the impurity of idol-worship, and by his royal vigour and intrepidity left not one temple standing 6[f.6]  

Taimur has in his Memoir explained what led him to invade India. He says:

" My object in the invasions of Hindustan is to lead a campaign against the infidels, to convert them to the true faith according to the command of Muhammad (on whom and his family be the blessing and peace of God), to purify the land from the defilement of misbelief and polytheism, and overthrow the temples and idols, whereby we shall be Ghazis and Mujahids, companions and soldiers of the faith before God. " 7[f.7] 

These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions of India as they were wars among the Muslims themselves. This fact has remained hidden because the invaders are all lumped together as Muslims without distinction. But as a matter of fact, they were Tartars, Afghans and Mongols. Muhammad of Ghazni was a Tartar, Mahommed of Ghori was an Afghan, Taimur was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, while Nadirshah and Ahmadshah Abdalli were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was out to destroy the Tartar and the Mongol was out to destroy the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving family cemented by the feeling of Islamic brotherhood. They were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often wars of mutual extermination. What is, however, important to bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts they were all united by one common objective and that was to destroy the Hindu faith.

The methods adopted by the Muslim invaders of India are not less significant for the subsequent history of India than the object of their invasions.

Mahommad bin Qasim's first act of religious zeal was forcibly to circumcise the Brahmins of the captured city of Debul ; but on discovering that they objected to this sort of conversion, he proceeded to put all above the age of 17 to death, and to order all others, with women and children, to be led into slavery. The temple of the Hindus was looted, and the rich booty was divided equally among the soldiers, after one-fifth, the legal portion for the government, had been set aside.

Muhammad of Ghazni from the first adopted those plans that would strike terror into the hearts of the Hindus. After the defeat of Raja JaipalinA.D. 1001, Muhammad ordered that Jaipal " be paraded about in the streets so that his sons and chieftains might see him in that condition of shame, bonds and disgrace; and that fear of Islam might fly abroad through the country of the infidels. "

"The slaughtering of ' infidels' seemed to be one thing that gave Muhammad particular pleasure. In one attack on Chand Rai, in A. D. 1019, many infidels were slain or taken prisoners, and the Muslims paid no regard to booty until they had satiated themselves with the slaughter of the infidels and worshippers of the sun and fire. The historian naively adds that the elephants of the Hindu armies came to Muhammad of their own accord, leaving idols, preferring the service of the religion of Islam. " 8[f.8] 

Not infrequently, the slaughter of the Hindus gave a great setback to the indigenous culture of the Hindus, as in the conquest of Bihar by Muhammad Bakhtyar Khilji. When he took Nuddea (Bihar) the Tabaquat-i-Nasiri informs us that:

" great plunder fell into the hands of the victors. Most of the inhabitants were Brahmins with shaven heads. They were put to death. Large number of books were found......... but none could explain their contents as all the men had been killed, the whole fort and city being a place of study. "  9[f.9] 

Summing up the evidence on the point. Dr. Titus concludes :

" Of the destruction of temples and the desecration of idols we have an abundance of evidence. Mahommad bin Qasim carried out his plan of destruction systematically in Sind, we have seen, but he made an exception of the famous temple at Multan for purposes of revenue, as this temple was a place of resort for pilgrims, who made large gifts to the idol. Nevertheless, while he thus satisfied his avarice by letting the temple stand, he gave vent to his malignity by having a piece of cow's flesh tied around the neck of the idol.

" Minhaj-as-Siraj further tells how Mahommad became widely known for having destroyed as many as a thousand temples, and of his great feat in destroying the temple of Somnath and carrying off its idol, which he asserts was broken into four parts. One part he deposited in the Jami Masjid of Ghazni, one he placed at the entrance of the royal palace, the third he sent to Mecca, and the fourth to Medina. 10[f.10] "

It is said by Lane Poole that Muhammad of Ghazni " who had vowed that every year should see him wage a holy war against the infidels of Hindustan " could not rest from his idol-breaking campaign so long as the temple of Somnath remained inviolate. It was for this specific purpose that he, at the very close of his career, undertook his arduous march across the desert from Multan to Anhalwara on the coast, fighting as he went, until he saw at last the famous temple:

" There a hundred thousand pilgrims were wont to assemble, a thousand Brahmins served the temple and guarded its treasures, and hundreds of dancers and singers played before its gates. Within stood the famous linga, a rude pillar stone adorned with gems and lighted by jewelled candelebra which were reflected in rich hangings, embroidered with precious stones like stars, that decked the shrine..... Its ramparts were swarmed with incredulous Brahmins, mocking the vain arrogance of foreign infidels whom the God of Somnath would assuredly consume. The foreigners, nothing daunted, scaled the walls; the God remained dumb to the urgent appeals of his servants; fifty thousand Hindus suffered for their faith and the sacred shrine was sacked to the joy of the true believers. The great stone was cast down and its fragments were carried off to grace the conqueror's palace. The temple gates were setup at Ghazni and a million pounds worth of treasure rewarded the iconoclast " 11[f.11] 

The work done by Muhammad of Ghazni became a pious tradition and was faithfully followed by those who came after him. In the words of Dr. Titus 12[f.12] 

"Mahommad Ghori, one of the enthusiastic successors of Muhammad of Ghazni, in his conquest of Ajmir destroyed pillars and foundations of the idol-temples, and built in their stead mosques and colleges, and the precepts of Islam and the customs of the law were divulged and established. At Delhi, the city and its vicinity were freed from idols and idol worship, and in the sanctuaries of the images of the Gods mosques were raised by the worshippers of the one God.

" Qutb-ud-Din Aybak also is said to have destroyed nearly a thousand temples, and then raised mosques on their foundations. The same author states that he built the Jami Masjid, Delhi, and adorned it with the stones and gold obtained from the temples which had been demolished by elephants, and covered it with inscriptions (from the Quran) containing the divine commands. We have further evidence of this harrowing process having been systematically employed from the inscription extant over the eastern gateway of this same mosque at Delhi, which relates that the materials of 27 idol temples were used in its construction.

" Ala-ud-Din, in his zeal to build a second Minar to the Jami Masjid, to rival the one built by Qulb-ud-Din, is said by Amir Khusru not only to have dug stones out of the hills, but to have demolished temples of the infidels to furnish a supply. In his conquests of South India the destruction of temples was carried out by Ala-ud-Din as it had been in the north by his predecessors.

" The Sultan Firoz Shah, in his Futuhat, graphically relates how he treated Hindus who had dared to build new temples. ' When they did this in the city (Delhi) and the environs, in opposition to the law of the Prophet, which declares that such are not to be tolerated, under Divine guidance I destroyed these edifices. I killed these leaders of infidelity and punished others with stripes, until this abuse was entirely abolished and where infidels and idolaters worshipped idols, Musalmans now by God's mercy perform their devotions to the true God."

Even in the reign of Shah Jahan, we read of the destruction of the temples that the Hindus had started to rebuild, and the account of this direct attack on the piety of the Hindus is thus solemnly recorded in the Badshah-namah :

" It had been brought to the notice of His Majesty, says the historian, that during the late reign (of Akbar) many idol-temples had been begun but remained unfinished at Benares, the great stronghold of infidelity. The infidels were now desirous of completing them. His Majesty, the defender of the faith, gave orders that at Benares and throughout all his dominions in every place all temples that had been begun should be cast down. It was reported from the Province of Allahabad that 76 temples had been destroyed in the district of Benares. "  13[f.13] 

It was left to Aurangzeb to make a final attempt to overthrow idolatry. The author of ' Ma ' athir-i-Alamgiri dilates upon his efforts to put down Hindu teaching, and his destruction of temples in the following terms :

" In April, A. D. 1669, Aurangzib learned that in the provinces of Thatta, Multan and Benares, but especially in the latter, foolish Brahmins were in the habit of expounding frivolous books in their schools, and that learners, Muslims as well as Hindus, went there from long distances.... The ' Director of the Faith ' consequently issued orders to all the governors of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and temples of the infidels; and they were enjoined to put an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous worship.. ...Later it was reported to his religious Majesty that the Government officers had destroyed the temple of Bishnath at Benares. " 14[f.14]  

As Dr. Titus observes 15 [f.15] 

" Such invaders as Muhammad and Timur seem to have been more concerned with iconoclasm, the collection of booty, the enslaving of captives, and the sending of infidels to hell with the' proselytizing sword ' than they were with the conversion of them even by force. But when rulers were permanently established the winning of converts became a matter of supreme urgency. It was a part of the stale policy to establish Islam as the religion of the whole land.

"Qutb-ud-Din, whose reputation for destroying temples was almost as great as that of Muhammad, in the latter part of the twelfth century and early years of the thirteenth, must have frequently resorted to force as an incentive to conversion. One instance may be noted: when he approached Koil (Aligarh) in A. D. 1194, ' those of the garrison who were wise and acute were converted to Islam, but the others were slain with the sword '.

" Further examples of extreme measures employed to effect a change of faith are all too numerous. One pathetic case is mentioned in the lime of the reign of Firoz Shah (A. D. 1351—1388). An old Brahmin of Delhi had been accused of worshipping idols in his house, and of even leading Muslim women to become infidels. He was sent for and his case placed before the judges, doctors, elders and lawyers. Their reply was that the provisions of the law were clear. The Brahmin must either become a Muslim or be burned. The true faith was declared to him and the right course pointed out, but he refused to accept it. Consequently he was burned by the order of the Sultan, and the commentator adds, ' Behold the Sultan's strict adherence to law and rectitude, how he would not deviate in the least from its decrees '. "

Muhammad not only destroyed temples but made it a policy to make slaves of the Hindus he conquered. In the words of Dr. Titus:

" Not only was slaughter of the infidels and the destruction of their temples resorted to in earlier period of Islam's contact with India, but as we have seen, many of the vanquished were led into slavery. The dividing up of booty was one of the special attractions, to the leaders as well as to the common soldiers in these expeditions. Muhammad seems to have made the slaughter of infidels, the destruction of their temples, the capturing of slaves, and the plundering of the wealth of the people, particularly of the temples and the priests, the main object of his raids. On the occasion of his first raid he is said to have taken much booty ; and half a million Hindus, ' beautiful men and women ', were reduced to slavery and taken back to Ghazni. " 16[f.16] 

When Muhammad later took Kanauj, in A. D. 1017, he took so much booty and so many prisoners that * the fingers of those who counted them would have tired '. Describing how common Indian slaves had become in Ghazni and Central Asia after the campaign of A. D. 1019, the historian of the times says 17[f.17]   :

"The number of prisoners may be conceived from the fact that each was sold for from two to ten dirhams. These were afterwards taken to Ghazni, and merchants came from far distant cities to purchase them ;. . ....and the fair and the dark, the rich and the poor were commingled in one common slavery.

" In the year A.D. 1202, when Qulb-ud-Din captured Kalinjar, after the temples had been convened into mosques, and the very name of idolatry was annihilated, fifty thousand men came under the collar of slavery and the plain became black as pitch with Hindus. "

Slavery was the fate of those Hindus who were captured in the holy war. But, when there was no war the systematic abasement of the Hindus played no unimportant part in the methods adopted by the Muslim invaders. In the days of Ala-ud-Din, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Hindus had in certain parts given the Sultan much trouble. So, he determined to impose such taxes on them that they would be prevented from rising in rebellion.

" The Hindu was to be left unable to keep a horse to ride on, to carry arms, to wear fine clothes, or to enjoy any of the luxuries of life. " 18[f.18] 

Speaking of the levy of Jizyah Dr. Titus says 19[f.19]  ''

" The payment of the Jizyah by the Hindus continued throughout the dominions of the sultans, emperors, and kings in various parts of India with more or less regularity, though often, the law was in force in theory only ; since it depended entirely on the ability of the sovereign to enforce his demands. But, finally, it was abolished throughout the Moghul Empire in the ninth year of the enlightened Akbar's reign (A. D. 1665), after it had been accepted as a fundamental part of Muslim government policy in India for a period of more than eight centuries. "

Lane Poole says that

" the Hindu was taxed to the extent of half the produce of his land, and had to pay duties on all his buffaloes, goats, and other milk-cattle. The taxes were to be levied equally on rich and poor, at so much per acre, so much per animal. Any collectors or officers taking bribes were summarily dismissed and heavily punished with sticks, pincers, the rack, imprisonment and chains. The new rules were strictly carried out, so that one revenue officer would string together 20 Hindu notables and enforce payment by blows. No gold or silver, not even the betelnut, so cheering and stimulative to pleasure, was to be seen in a Hindu house, and the wives of the impoverished native officials were reduced to taking service in Muslim families. Revenue officers came to be regarded as more deadly than the plague; and to be a government clerk was disgrace worse than death, in so much that no Hindu would marry his daughter to such a man. " 20[f.20]  


These edicts, says the historian of the period,

" were so strictly carried out that the chaukidars and khuts and muqad-dims were not able to ride on horseback, to find weapon, to wear fine clothes, or to indulge in betel. . .... No Hindu could hold up his head. ..... Blows, confinement in the stocks, imprisonment and chains were all employed to enforce payment. "

All this was not the result of mere caprice or moral perversion. On the other hand, what was done was in accordance with the ruling ideas of the leaders of Islam in the broadest aspects. These ideas were well expressed by the Kazi in reply to a question put by Sultan Ala-ud-Din wanting to know the legal position of the Hindus under Muslim law. The Kazi said :

" They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue officer demands silver from them they should without question, and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt in their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it..... The due subordination of the Dhimmi is exhibited in this humble payment, and by this throwing of dirt into their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a duty, and contempt for religion is vain. God holds them in contempt, for he says, ' Keep them in subjection '. To keep the Hindus in abasement is especially a religious duty, because they are the most inveterate enemies of the Prophet, and because the Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, and make them captive, saying, ' Convert them to Islam or kill them, and make them slaves, and spoil their wealth and properly '. No doctor but the great doctor (Hani-fah), to whose school we belong, has assented to the imposition of jizya on Hindus ; doctors of other schools allow no other alternative but ' Death or Islam '. "  21[f.21] 

Such is the story of this period of 762 years which elapsed between the advent of Muhammad of Ghazni and the return of Ahmadshah Abdalli.

How far is it open to the Hindus to say that Northern India is part of Aryavarta ? How far is it open to the Hindus to say because once it belonged to them, therefore, it must remain for ever an integral part of India ? Those who oppose separation and hold to the ' historic sentiment ' arising out of an ancient fact that Northern India including Afghanistan was once part of India and that the people of that area were either Buddhist or Hindus, must be asked whether the events of these 762 years of incessant Muslim invasions, the object with which they were launched and the methods adopted by these invaders to give effect to their object are to be treated as though they were matters of no account ?

Apart from other consequences which have flowed from them these invasions have, in my opinion, so profoundly altered the ' culture and character of the northern areas, which it is now proposed to be included in a Pakistan, that there is not only no unity between that area and the rest of India but that there is as a matter of fact a real antipathy between the two.

The first consequence of these invasions was the breaking up of the unity of Northern India with the rest of India. After his conquest of Northern India, Muhammad of Ghazni detached it from India and ruled it from Ghazni. When Mahommed Ghori came in the field as a conqueror, he again attached it to India and ruled it from Lahore and then from Delhi. Hakim, the brother of Akbar, detached Kabul and Kandahar from Northern India. Akbar again attached it to Northern India. They were again detached by Nadirshah in 1738 and the whole of Northern India would have been severed from India had it not been for the check provided by the rise of the Sikhs. Northern India, therefore, has been like a wagon in a train, which can be coupled or uncoupled according to the circumstances of the moment. If analogy is wanted, the case of Alsace-Lorraine could be cited. Alsace-Lorraine was originally part of Germany, like the rest of Switzerland and the Low Countries. It continued to be so till 1680, when it was taken by France and incorporated into French territory. It belonged to France till 1871, when it was detached by Germany and made part of her territory. In 1918, it was again detached from Germany and made part of France. In 1940, it was detached from France and made part of Germany.

The methods adopted by the invaders have left behind them their aftermath. One aftermath is the bitterness between the Hindus and the Muslims which they have caused. This bitterness, between the two, is so deep-seated that a century of political life has neither succeeded in assuaging it, nor in making people forget it. As the invasions were accompanied with. destruction of temples and forced conversions, with spoliation of property, with slaughter,, enslavement and abasement of men, women and children, what wonder if the memory of these invasions has ever remained green, as a source of pride to the Muslims and as a source of shame to the Hindus ? But these things apart, this north-west corner of India has been a theatre in which a stern drama has been played. Muslim hordes, in wave after wave, have surged down into this area and from thence scattered themselves in spray over the rest of India. These reached the rest of India in thin currents. In time, they also receded from their farthest limits ; while they lasted, they left a deep deposit of Islamic culture over the original Aryan culture in this north-west corner of India which has given it a totally different colour, both in religious and political outlook. The Muslim invaders, no doubt, came to India singing a hymn of hate against the Hindus. But, they did not merely sing their hymn of hate and go back burning a few temples on the way. That would have been a blessing. They were not content with so negative a result. They did a positive act, namely, to plant the seed of Islam. The growth of this plant is remarkable. It is not a summer sapling. It is as great and as strong as an oke. Its growth is the thickest in Northern India. The successive invasions have deposited their ' silt ' more there than anywhere else, and have served as watering exercises of devoted gardeners. Its growth is so thick in Northern India that the remnants of Hindu and Buddhist culture are just shrubs. Even the Sikh axe could not fell this oak. Sikhs, no doubt , became the political masters of Northern India, but they did not gain back Northern India to that spiritual and cultural unity by which it was bound to the rest of India before HsuanTsang. The Sikhs coupled it back to India. Still, it remains like Alsace-Lorraine politically detachable and spiritually alien so far as the rest of India is concerned. It is only an unimaginative person who could fail to take notice of these facts or insist in the face of them that Pakistan means breaking up into two what is one whole.

What is the unity the Hindu sees between Pakistan and Hindustan ? If it is geographical unity, then that is no unity. Geographical unity is unity intended by nature. In building up a nationality on geographical unity, it must be remembered that it is a case where Nature proposes and Man disposes. If it is unity in external things, such as ways and habits of life, that is no unity. Such unity is the result of exposure to a common environment. If it is administrative unity, that again is no unity. The instance of Burma is in point. Arakan and Tenas-serim were annexed in 1826 by the treaty of Yendabu. Pegu and Martaban were annexed in 1852. Upper Burma was annexed in 1886. The administrative unity between India and Burma was forged in 1826. For over 110 years that administrative unity continued to exist. In 1937, the knot that tied the two together was cut asunder and nobody shed a tear over it. The unity between India and Burma was not less fundamental. If unity is to be of an abiding character, it must be founded on a sense of kinship, in the feeling of being kindred. In short, it must be spiritual. Judged in the light of these considerations, the unity between Pakistan and Hindustan is a myth. Indeed, there is more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma than there is between Pakistan and Hindustan. And if the Hindus did not object to the severance of Burma from India, it is difficult to understand how the Hindus can object to the severance of an area like Pakistan, which, to repeat, is politically detachable from, socially hostile and spiritually alien to, the rest of India.



How will the creation of Pakistan affect the question of the Defence of Hindustan ? The question is not a very urgent one. For, there is no reason to suppose that Pakistan will be at war with Hindustan  immediately it is brought into being. Nevertheless, as the question is sure to be raised, it is better to deal with it.

The question may be considered under three heads: (1) Question of Frontiers, (2) Question of Resources and (3) Question of Armed Forces.



It is sure to be urged by the Hindus that Pakistan leaves Hindustan without a scientific frontier. The obvious reply, of course, is that the Musalmans cannot be asked to give up their right to Pakistan, because it adversely affects the Hindus in the matter of their boundaries. But banter apart, there are really two considerations, which, if taken into account, will show that the apprehensions of the Hindus in this matter are quite uncalled for.

In the first place, can any country hope to have a frontier which may be called scientific? As Mr. Davies, the author of North-West Frontier, observes:

" It would be impossible to demarcate on the North-West of our Indian Empire a frontier which would satisfy ethnological, political and military requirements. To seek for a zone which traverses easily definable geographical features; which does not violate ethnic considerations by cutting through the territories of closely related tribes; and which at the same time serves as a political boundary, is Utopian."

As a matter of history, there has been no one scientific boundary for India and different persons have advocated different boundaries for India. The question of boundaries has given rise to two policies, the " Forward " Policy and the " Back to the Indus " Policy. The " Forward " Policy had a greater and a lesser intent, to use the language of Sir George Macmunn. In its greater intent, it meant active control in the affairs of Afghanistan as an Etat Tampion to India and the extension of Indian influence up to the Oxus. In its lesser intent, it was confined to the absorption of the tribal hills between the administered territory (i.e. the Province of N.-W.F.) and Afghanistan as defined by the Durand Line and the exercise of British control right up to that line. The greater intent of the Forward Policy, as a basis for a safe boundary for India, has long been abandoned. Consequently, there remain three possible boundary lines to choose from: (1) the Indus River, (2) the present administrative boundary of the N.-W. F. P. and (3) the Durand Line. Pakistan will no doubt bring the boundary of Hindustan Back to the Indus, indeed behind the Indus, to the Sutlej. But this " Back to the Indus " policy was not without its advocates. The greatest exponent, of the Indus boundary was Lord Lawrence, who was strongly opposed to any forward move beyond the trans-indus foot-hills. He advocated meeting any invader in the valley of the Indus. In his opinion, it would be an act of folly and weakness to give battle at any great distance from the Indus base ; and the longer the distance an invading army has to march through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the more harassed it would be. Others, no doubt, have pointed out that a river is a weak line of defence. But the principal reason for not retiring to the Indus boundary seems to lie elsewhere. Mr. Davies gives the real reason when he says that the

" ' Back to Indus ' cry becomes absurd when it is examined from the point of view of the inhabitants of the modern North-West Frontier Province. Not only would withdrawal mean loss of prestige, but it would also be a gross betrayal of those peoples to whom we have extended our beneficent rule."

In fact, it is no use insisting that any particular boundary is the safest, for the simple reason that geographical conditions are not decisive in the world today and modern technique has robbed natural frontiers of much of their former importance, even where they are mighty mountains, the broadest streams, widest seas or far stretching deserts.

In the second place, it is always possible for nations with no natural boundaries to make good this defect. Countries are not wanting which have no natural boundaries. Yet, all have made good the deficiencies of nature, by creating artificial fortifications as barriers, which can be far more impregnable than natural barriers. There is no reason to suppose that the Hindus will not be able to accomplish what other countries similarly situated have done. Given the resources, Hindus need have no fear for want of a naturally safe frontier.




More important than the question of a scientific frontier, is the question of resources. If resources are ample for the necessary equipment, then it is always possible to overcome the difficulties created by an unscientific or a weak frontier. We must, therefore, consider the comparative resources of Pakistan and Hindustan. The following figures are intended to convey an idea of their comparative resources:

Resources of Pakistan




Revenues 22[f.22] 





N.-W. F. P.












Baluchistan ..








Total ..






Resources of Hindustan




Revenues 23[f.23] 





















C. P. & Berar





























These are gross figures. They are subject to certain additions and deductions. Revenues derived by the Central Government from Railways, Currency and Post and Telegraphs are not included in these figures, as it is not possible to ascertain how much is raised from each Province. When it is done, certain additions will have to be made to the figures under revenue. There can be no doubt that the share from these heads of revenue that will come to Hindustan, will be much larger than the share that will go to Pakistan. Just as additions will have to be made to these figures, so also deductions will have to be made from them. Most of these deductions will, of course, fall to the lot of Pakistan. As will be shown later, some portion of the Punjab will have to be excluded from the scheme of Western Pakistan. Similarly, some portion of Bengal will have to be excluded from the proposed Eastern Pakistan, although a district from Assam will have to be added to it. According to me, fifteen districts will have to be excluded from Bengal and thirteen districts shall have to be excluded from the Punjab. Sufficient data are not available to enable any one to give an exact idea of what would be the reduction in the area, population and revenue, that would result from the exclusion of these districts. One may, however, hazard the guess that so far as the Punjab and Bengal are concerned, their revenues would be halved. What is lost by Pakistan by this exclusion, will of course be gained by Hindustan. To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Western and Eastern Pakistan will be 60 crores minus 24crores, i.e., 36 crores, the revenues of Hindustan will be about 96 crores plus 24 crores, i.e., 120 crores.

The study of these figures, in the light of the observations I have made, will show that the resources of Hindustan are far greater than the resources of Pakistan, whether one considers the question in terms of area, population or revenue. There need, therefore, be no apprehension on the score of resources. For, the creation of Pakistan will not leave Hindustan in a weakened condition.



The defence of a country does not depend so much upon its scientific frontier as it does upon its resources. But more than resources does it depend upon the fighting forces available to it.

What are the fighting forces available to Pakistan and to Hindustan ?

The Simon Commission pointed out, as a special feature of the Indian Defence Problem, that there were special areas which alone offered recruits to the Indian Army and that there were other areas which offered none or if at all, very few. The facts revealed in the following table, taken from the Report of the Commission, undoubtedly will come as a most disagreeable surprise to many Indians, who think and care about the defence of India :


Areas of Recruitment

Number of Recruits drawn

1   N.-W. Frontier Province


2   Kashmir


3   Punjab


4   Baluchistan


5   Nepal


6   United Provinces


7   Rajputana


8   Central India


9   Bombay


10 Central Provinces


11 Bihar & Orissa


12 Bengal


13 Assam


14 Burma


15 Hyderabad


16      Mysore


17      Madras


18      Miscellaneous





The Simon Commission found that this state of affairs was natural to India, and in support of it, cited the following figures of recruitment from the different Provinces of India during the Great War especially because " it cannot be suggested that any discouragement was offered to recruitment in any area ":



Combatants Recruits Enlisted

Non-combatants Recruits Enlisted


Madras Bombay








United Provinces
























Bihar and Orissa




Central Provinces





















          These data reveal in a striking manner that the fighting forces available for the defence of India mostly come from areas which are to be included in Pakistan. From this it may be argued, that without Pakistan, Hindustan cannot defend itself.

The facts brought out by the Simon Commission are, of course, beyond question. But they cannot be made the basis of a conclusion, such as is suggested by the Simon Commission, namely, that only Pakistan can produce soldiers and that Hindustan cannot. That such a conclusion is quite untenable will be seen from the following considerations.

In the first place, what is regarded by the Simon Commission as something peculiar to India is not quite so peculiar. What appears to be peculiar is not due to any inherent defect in the people. The peculiarity arises because of the policy of recruitment followed by the British Government for years past. The official explanation of this predominance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is that they belong to the Martial Classes. But Mr. Chaudhari 24 [f.24]  has demonstrated, by unimpeachable data, that this explanation is far from being true. He has shown that the predominance in the Army of the men of the North-West took place as early as the Mutiny of 1857, some 20 years before the theory of Martial and Non-martial Classes was projected in an indistinct form for the first time in 1879 by the Special Army Committee 25[f.25]   appointed in that year, and that their predominance had nothing to do with their alleged fighting qualities but was due to the fact, that they helped the British to suppress the Mutiny in which the Bengal Army was so completely involved. To quote Mr. Chaudhari :

" The pre-Mutiny army of Bengal was essentially a Brahmin and Kshalriya army of the Ganges basin. All the three Presidency Armies of those days, as we have slated in the first part of this article, were in a sense quite representative of the military potentialities of the areas to which they belonged, though none of them could, strictly speaking, be correctly described as national armies of the provinces concerned, as there was no attempt to draw upon any but the traditional martial elements of the population. But they all got their recruits mainly from their natural areas of recruitment, viz., the Madras Army from the Tamil and Telugu countries, the Bombay Army from Western India, and the Bengal Army from Bihar and U. P. and to a very limited extent from Bengal. There was no official restriction on the enrolment of men of any particular tribe or caste or region, provided they were otherwise eligible. Leaving aside for the moment the practice of the Bombay and the Madras Armies, the only exception to this general rule in the Bengal Army was that which applied to the Punjabis and Sikhs, who, inspite of their magnificent military traditions, were not given a fair representation in the Army of Northern India. Their recruitment, on the contrary, was placed under severe restrictions by an order of the Government, which laid down that ' the number of Punjabis in a regiment is never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of them lobe Sikhs'. It was only the revolt of the Hindustani regiments of the Bengal Army that gave an opportunity to the Punjabis to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the British authorities. Till then, they remained suspect and under a ban, and the Bengal Army on the eve of the Mutiny was mainly recruited from Oudh, North and South Bihar, especially the latter, principally Shahabad and Bhojpur, the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna and Rohilkhund. The soldiers recruited from these areas were mostly high-caste men. Brahmins of all denominations, Kshatriyas, Rajputs and Ahirs. The average proportion in which these classes were enrolled in a regiment was: (1) Brahmin 7/24, (2) Rajputs 1/4, (3) Inferior Hindus 1/6, (4) Musalmans 1/6, (5) Punjabis 1/8.

"To this army, the area which now-a-days furnishes the greatest number of soldiers—the Punjab, Nepal, N.-W. F. Province, the hill tracts of Kumaon and Garhwal, Rajpulana,—furnished very few recruits or none at all. There was practical exclusion in it of all the famous fighting castes of India,—Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi Musalmans, Dogras, Jats, Pathans, Garhwalis, Rajpulana Rajpuls, Kumaonis, Gujars, all the tribes and seels, in fact, which are looked upon today as atower of strength of the Indian Army. A single year and a single rebellion was, however, to change all this. The Mutiny, which broke out in 1857, blew up the old Bengal Army and brought into existence a Punjabized and barbarized army, resembling the Indian Army of today in broad lines and general proportions of its composition.

" The gaps created by the revolt of the Hindustani regiments (of the Bengal Army) were at once filled up by Sikhs and other Punjabis, and hillmen eager for revenge and for the loot of the cities of Hindustan. They had all been conquered and subjugated by the British with the help of the Hindustani soldiers, and in their ignorance, they regarded the Hindustanis, rather the handful of British, as their real enemies. This enmity was magnificently exploited by the British authorities in suppressing the Mutiny. When the news of the enlistment of Gurkhas reached Lord Dalhousie in England he expressed great satisfaction and wrote to a friend: ' Against the Oudh Sepoys they may confidently be expected to fight like devils'. And after the Mutiny, General Mansfield, the Chief of the Staff of the Indian Army, wrote about the Sikhs: ' It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindustan and haled the Bengal Army that the Sikhs had flocked to our standard instead of seeking the opportunity to strike again for their freedom. They wanted to revenge themselves and to gain riches by the plunder of Hindustani cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay, it was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and stamping on the heads of their enemies. In short, we turned to profit the esprit de corps of the old Khalsa Army of Ranjit Singh, in the manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last ".

" The relations thus established were in fact to last much longer. The services rendered by the Sikhs and Gurkhas during the Mutiny were not forgotten and henceforward the Punjab and Nepal had the place of honour in the Indian Army."

That Mr. Chaudhari is right when he says that it was the Mutiny of 1857 which was the real cause of the preponderance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is beyond the possibility of doubt. Equally incontrovertible is the view of Mr. Chaudhari that this preponderance of the men of the North-West is not due to their native superiority in fighting qualities, as the same is amply borne out by the figures which he has collected, showing the changes in the composition of the Indian Infantry before and after the Mutiny.    



Percentage of men from different Paris



North-West India

North-East India

U. P, Bihar

South India



Punjab, N.-W. F., Kashmir

Nepal, Garhwal, Kumaon





Less than 10


Not less






than 90








































These figures show that in 1856, one year before the Mutiny, the men from the North-West were a negligible factor in the Indian Army. But in 1858, one year after the Mutiny, they had acquired a dominant position which has never received a setback.

It will thus be seen that the distinction between Martial and Non-martial Classes, which was put forth for the first time in 1879, as a matter of principle, which was later on insisted upon as a matter of serious consideration by Lord Roberts 26 [f.26]  and which was subsequently recognised by Lord Kitchener as a principle governing recruitment to the Indian Army, had nothing to do with the origin of this preponderance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army. No doubt, the accident that the people from North-West India had the good luck of being declared by the Government as belonging to the Martial Class, while most of the classes coming from the rest of India had the ill-luck of being declared Non-martial Classes had important consequences. Being regularly employed in the Army, the people of North-West India came to look upon service in the Army as an occupation with a security and a career which was denied to men from the rest of India. The large number of recruits drawn from North-West India, therefore, indicates nothing more than this—namely, owing to the policy of the British Government, service in the Army has become their occupation and if people in other parts of India do not readily come forth to enlist in the Army, the reason is that Government did not employ them in the Army. People follow their ancestral occupations whether they like it or not. When a people do not take to a new occupation it does not necessarily mean that they are not fit for it. It only means that it is not their ancestral occupation.

This division between Martial and Non-martial Classes is, of course, a purely arbitrary and artificial distinction. It is as foolish as the Hindu theory of caste, making birth instead of worth, the basis for recognition. At one time, the Government insisted that the distinction they had adopted was a real distinction and that in terms of fighting qualities, it meant so much fighting value. In fact, this was their justification for recruiting more men from the North-West of India. That this distinction has nothing to do with any difference in fighting qualities has now been admitted. Sir Phillip Chetwode, 27[f27]  late Commander-in-Chief of India, broadcasting from London on the constitution of the Indian Army, took pains to explain that the recruitment of a larger proportion of it from the Punjab, did not mean that the people of the Peninsula were without martial qualities. Sir Phillip Chetwode explained that the reason why men of the North were largely recruited for the Indian Army was chiefly climatic, as the men from the South cannot stand the extremes of heat and cold of North India. No race can be permanently without martial spirit. Martial spirit is not a matter of native instinct. It is a matter of training and anybody can be trained to it.

But apart from this, there is enough fighting material in Hindustan, besides what might be produced by special training. There are the Sikhs, about whose fighting equalities nothing need be said. There are the Rajputs who are even now included in the category of Martial Classes. In addition to these, there are the Mahrattas who proved their calibre as a fighting race during the last European War. Even the people of the Madras Presidency can be depended upon for military purposes. Speaking of the Madrasis as soldiers, General Sir Frederick P. Haines, at one time Commander-in-Chief in India, observed :

" It has been customary to declare that the Madras Army is composed of men physically inferior to those of the Bengal Army, and if stature alone be taken into consideration, this is true. It is also said that by the force of circumstances the martial feeling and the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in its ranks. I feel bound to reject the above assertions and others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to Madras troops. It is true that in recent years they have seen but little service; for, with the exception of the sappers, they have been specially excluded from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit for one moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras Sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill training and discipline, the Madras Sepoy is inferior to none; while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours. This has been manifested by the sappers and their followers in the Khyber; and the sappers are of the same race as the Sepoys."

Hindustan need, therefore, have no apprehension regarding the supply of an adequate fighting force from among its own people. The separation of Pakistan cannot weaken her in that respect.

The Simon Commission drew attention to three features of the Indian Army, which struck them as being special and peculiar to India. It pointed out that the duty of the Army in India was two-fold; firstly, to prevent the independent tribes on the Indian side of the Afghan frontier from raiding the peaceful inhabitants of the plains below. Secondly, to protect India against invasion by countries lying behind and beyond this belt of unorganized territories. The Commission took note of the fact that from 1850 to 1922, there were 72 expeditions against the independent tribes, an average of one a year, and also of the fact that in the countries behind and beyond this belt of unorganized territory, lies the direction from which, throughout the ages, the danger to India's territorial integrity has come. This quarter is occupied by " States which according to the Commission are not members of the League of Nations " and is, therefore, a greater danger to India now than before. The Commission insisted   on emphasizing that these two facts constituted a peculiar feature of the problem of military defence in India and so far as the urgency and extent of the problem is concerned, they are " without parallel elsewhere in the Empire, and constituted a difficulty in developing self-government which never arose in any comparable degree in the case of the self-governing Dominions ".

As a second unique feature of the Indian Army, the Commission observed:

" The Army in India is not only provided and organized to ensure against external dangers of a wholly exceptional character: it is also distributed and habitually used throughout India for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal peace. In all countries . . . . the military is not normally employed in this way, and certainly is not organized for this purpose. But the case of India is entirely different. Troops are employed many times a year to prevent internal disorder and, if necessary, to quell it. Police forces, admirably organized as they are, cannot be expected in all cases to cope with the sudden and violent outburst of a mob driven frantic by religious frenzy. It is, therefore, well understood in India both by the police and by the military—and, what is even more to the point, by the public at large—that the soldiers may have to be sent for.. .  This Use of the Army for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal order was increasing rather than diminishing, and that on these occasions the practically universal request was for British troops. The proportion of the British to Indian troops allotted to this duty has in fact risen in the last quarter of a century. The reason, of course, is that the British soldier is a neutral, and is under no suspicion of favouring Hindus against Mahomedans or Mahomedans against Hindus ..... Inasmuch as the vast majority of the disturbances which call for the intervention of the military have a communal or religious complexion, it is natural and inevitable that the intervention which is most likely to be authoritative should be that which has no bias, real or suspected, to either side. It is a striking fact in this connection that, while in regular units of the Army in India as a whole British soldiers are in a minority of about 1 to 21/2, in the troops allotted for internal security the preponderance is reversed, and for this purpose a majority of British troops is employed—in the troops car-marked (or internal security the proportion is about eight British to seven Indian soldiers."

Commenting upon this feature of the Indian Army the Commission said:

" When, therefore, one contemplates a future for India in which, in place of the existing Army organization, the country is defended and pacified by exclusively Indian units, just as Canada relics on Canadian troops and Ireland on Irish troops, it is essential to realize and bear in mind the dimensions and character of the Indian problem of internal order and the part which the British soldier at present plays (to the general satisfaction of the country-side) in supporting peaceful government."

The third unique feature of the Indian Army, which was pointed out by the Simon Commission, is the preponderance in it of the men from the North-West. The origin of this preponderance and the reasons underlying the official explanation given therefor have already been examined.

But, there is one more special feature of the Indian Army to which the Commission made no reference at all. The commission either ignored it or was not aware of it. It is such an important feature that it overshadows all the three features to which the Commission refers, in its importance and in its social and political consequences.

It is a feature which, if widely known, will set many people to think furiously. It is sure to raise questions which may prove insoluble and which may easily block the path of India's political progress—questions of far greater importance and complexity than those relating to Indianization of the Army.

This neglected feature relates to the communal composition of the Indian Army. Mr. Chaudhari has collected the relevant data in his articles, already referred to, which throws a flood of light on this aspect of the Indian Army. The following table shows the proportion of soldiers serving in the Indian Infantry, according to the area and the community from which they are drawn:


Changes in the Communal Composition of the Indian Army


Area and Communities

Percentage in 1914

Percentage in 1918

Percentage in 1919

Percentage in 1930

I. The Punjab,

N.-W. F. P. and Kashmir





(1) Sikhs





(2) Punjabi Musalmans





(3) Pathans





II. Nepal, Kumaon, Garhwal





(1) Gurkhas





III. Upper India





(1) U.P.Rajputs





(2) Hindustani Musalmans





(3) Brahmins





IV. South India





(1) Mahrattas





(2) Madras! Musalmans





(3) Tamils





V. Burma





(1) Burmans






This table brings out in an unmistakable manner the profound changes which have been going on in the communal composition of the Indian Army particularly after 1919. They are (1) a phenomenal rise in the strength of the Punjabi Musalman and the Pathan, (2) a substantial reduction in the position of Sikhs from first to third, ( 3) the degradation of the Rajputs to the fourth place, and (4 ) the shutting out of the U. P. Brahmins, the Madrasi Musalmans, and the Tamilians, both Brahmins and Non-Brahmins.

A further analysis of the figures for 1930, which discloses the communal composition of the Indian Infantry and Indian Cavalry, has been made by Mr. Chaudhari in the following table. 28[f.28] 


Communal Composition of the Indian Army in 1930




Percentage in Infantry

Percentage in Cavalry



Excluding Gurkhas

Including Gurkhas


1. Punjabi Musalman





2. Gurkhas





3. Sikhs





4. Dogras

North Punjab and









5. Jats

Rajputana, U. P.,









6. Pathans

N.-W. F. Province




7. Mahrattas





8. Garhwalis





9. U. P. Rajputs

U. P.




10. Rajputana Rajputs





11. Kumaonis





12. Gujars

N. E. Rajputana




13. Punjabi Hindus





14. Ahirs





15. Musalmans, Rajputs,

Neighbourhood of









16. Kaimkhanis





17. Kachins





18. Chins





19. Karens





20. Dekhani Musalmans





21. Hindustani Musalmans

U. P.





Reducing these figures in terms of communities, we get the following percentage as it stood in 1930 :



Percentage in Infantry

Percentage -in Cavalry


Including Gurkhas

Excluding Gurkhas


1. Hindus and Sikhs




2. Gurkhas




3. Muhammadans




4. Burmans





These figures show the communal composition of the Indian Army. The Musalmans according to Mr. Chaudhari formed 36% of the Indian Infantry and 30% of the Indian Cavalry.

These figures relate to the year 1930. We must now find out what changes have taken place since then in this proportion.

It is one of the most intriguing things in the Military history of India that no information is available on this point after 1930. It is impossible to know what the proportion of the Muslims in the Indian Army at present is. There is no Government publication from which such information can be gathered. In the past, there was no dearth of publications giving this information. It is very surprising that they should have now disappeared, or if they do appear, that they should cease to contain this information. Not only is there no Government publication containing information on this point, but Government has refused to give any information on the point when asked by members of the Central Legislative Assembly. The following questions and answers taken from the proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly show how Government has been strenuously combating every attempt to obtain information on the point :

There was an interpellation on 15th September 1938, when the following questions were asked and replies as stated below were given:

Arrangements for the Defence of India. 29[f.29] 

Q. 1360: Mr.Badri Dull Pande (on behalf of Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhya).


(a)         x           x           x           x

(b)         x           x           x           x

(c)         x           x           x           x


  (d) How many Indians have been recruited during 1937 and 1938 as soldiers and officers during 1937-38 for the Infantry and Cavalry respectively? Amongst the soldiers and officers recruited, how many are Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans, Garhwalis, Mahrattas, Madrasis, Biharis, Bengalis and Hindustanis of the United Provinces and Gurkhas ?

(e) If none but the Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans and Garhwalis have been recruited, is it in contemplation of the Honourable Member to recruit from all the Provinces for the defense of India and give them proper military training ?

(f) Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state if Provincial Governments will be asked to raise Provincial Regiments, trained and fully mechanised, for the defence of India? If not, what is his plan of raising an efficient army for the defence of India ?

Mr. C.M.G.Oglvie:

(a)  The Honourable Member will appreciate that it is not in the public interest to disclose the details of such arrangements.

(b)  5 cadets and 33 Indian apprentices were recruited for the Indian Air Force during 1937-38.

(c)  During 1937-38, 5 Indians have already been recruited to commissioned ranks in the Royal Indian Navy, 4 will be taken by competitive examination in October 1938, and 3 more by special examination of " Dufferin " cadets only. During the same period, 314 Indians were recruited to different non-commissioned categories in the Royal Indian Navy.

(d)  During the year ending the 31st March 1938, 54 Indians were commissioned as Indian Commissioned Officers. They are now attached to British units for training, and it is not yet possible to say what proportion will be posted to infantry and cavalry, respectively. During the same period, 961 Indian soldiers were recruited for cavalry, and 7,970 for infantry. Their details by classes are not available at Army Headquarters and to call for them from the recruiting officers all over India would not justify the expenditure of time and labour involved.

(e)  No.

(f)    The reply to the first portion is in the negative. The reply to the second portion is that India already possesses an efficient army and so far as finances permit, every effort is made to keep it up-to-date in all respects. Mr. S. Satyamurti: With reference to the answers to clauses (d) and (e) of the question taken together, may I know whether the attention of Government has been drawn to statements made by many public men that the bulk of the army is from the Punjab and from one community ? Have Government considered those facts and will Government also consider the desirability of making the army truly national by extending recruitment to all provinces and communities, so as to avoid the danger present in all countries of a military dictatorship seizing political power ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I am not sure how that arises from this question, but I am prepared to say that provincial boundaries do not enter into Government's calculations at all. The best soldiers are chosen to provide the best army for India and not for any province, and in this matter national considerations must   come   above   provincial considerations. Where the bulk of best military material is found, there we will go to get it, and not elsewhere.

Mr. S. Saty'amurti : May I know whether the bulk of the army is from the Punjab and whether the Government have forgotten the experience of the brave exploits of men from my province not very long ago in the Indian Army, and may I know if Madrasis are practically kept out and many other provinces are kept out of the army altogether ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Madras is not practically kept out of the army. Government gladly acknowledge the gallant services of the Madrasis in the army and they are now recruited to those Units where experience has proved them to be best. There are some 4,500 serving chiefly in the Sappers and Miners and Artillery.

Mr. S. Sayamurti : Out of a total of 120,000 ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : About that.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I take it, that, that is a proper proportion, considering the population of Madras, the revenue that Madras pays to the Central exchequer, and the necessity of having a national army recruited from all the provinces ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The only necessity we recognise is to obtain the best possible army.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I know by what tests Government have come to the conclusion that provinces other than the Punjab cannot supply the best elements in the Indian Army ?

Mr. Ogilvie : By experience.

Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmed: May I ask if it is not a fact that all branches of Accounts Department are monopolised by the Madrasis and will Government immediately reduce the number in proportion to their numerical strength in India?

Mr. Ogilvie : I do not see how that arises from this question either, but the Government are again not prepared to sacrifice efficiency for any provincial cause.

Indian Regiment consisting of Indians belonging to Different Castes 30[f.30] 


Q. 1078 : Mr.M.Anantasayanam Ayyangar (on behalf of Mr. Manu Subedar):

(a)  Will the Defence Secretary state whether any experiment has ever been made under British rule of having an Indian regiment consisting of Indians recruited from different provinces and belonging to the different castes and sections, such as Sikhs, Mahrattas, Rajputs, Brahmins and Muslims ?

(b)   If the reply to part (a) be in the negative, can a statement of Government's policy in this regard be made giving reasons why it has not been considered proper to take such action ?

(c)   Is His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief prepared to take up this matter with His Majesty's Government ?

(d)  Are Government aware that in the University Corps and in the Bombay Scout Movement, and in the Police Forces of the country, there is no separation by caste or creed ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

(a)  No.

(b)  Government regard it as a fundamental principle of organization that Military Sub-Units, such as companies and squadrons, must be homogeneous.

(c)  No, for the reason just mentioned.

(d)  Yes.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: May I know the meaning which Government attach to the word " homogeneous " ? Does it mean from the same province or the same community ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : It means that they must belong to the same class of persons.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I ask for some elucidation of this point ?   Do they make distinction between one class and another ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Certainly.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: On what basis ? Is it religious class or racial class or provincial class ? .

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Neither. It is largely racial class.

.Mr. S. Satyamurti: Which races are preferred and which are not preferred ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: I refer the Honourable Member to the Army List. Recruitment to the Indian Army 31[f.31] 

Q. 1162: Mr.Brojendra Narayan Chaudhary: Will the Defence Secretary please state :

(a)  Whether the attention of Government has been drawn to the address of the Punjab's Premier, the Hon'ble Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to his brother soldiers, in these words : " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army," as reported by the Associated Press of India in the Hindustan Times of the 5th September 1938; and

(b)  Whether it is the policy of Government to maintain the supremacy of Punjabis in the army by continuing to recruit the major portion from the Punjab ; or to attempt recruitment of the Army from all the provinces without racial or provincial considerations ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

    (a) Yes.

(b) I refer the Honourable Member to replies I gave to the supplementary questions arising from starred question No. 1060 asked by Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhyaya on 15th September 1938.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : With reference to the answer to part (a) of the question, my Honourable friend referred to previous answers. As far as I remember, they were not given after this statement was brought before this House. May I know if the Government of India have examined this statement of the Punjab Premier, " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army" ? May I know whether Government have considered the dangerous implications of this statement and will they take steps to prevent a responsible Minister going about and claiming provincial or communal supremacy in the Indian Army, which ought to remain Indian first and Indian last ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I can only answer in exactly the same words as I answered to a precisely similar question of the Hon'ble Member on the 15th September last. The policy of Government with regard to the recruitment has been repeatedly stated and is perfectly clear.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: That policy is to get the best material and I am specifically asking my Honourable friend—1 hope he realises the implications of that statement of the Punjab Premier. I want to know whether the Government have examined the dangerous implications of any provincial Premier claiming provincial supremacy in the Indian Army and whether they propose to take any steps to correct this dangerous misapprehension ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that there are no dangerous implications whatever but rather the reverse.

Mr. Satyamurti : Do Government accept the supremacy of any province or any community as desirable consideration, even if it is a fact, to be uttered by responsible public men and do not the Government consider that this will give rise to communal and provincial quarrels and jealousies inside the army and possibly a military dictatorship in this country ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that none of these foreboding have any justification at all.

Mr. M. S. Aney : Do the Government subscribe to the policy implied in the statement of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government's policy has been repeatedly stated and made clear.

Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it the policy that the Punjab should have its supremacy in the Army ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The policy is that the best material should be recruited for the Army.

Mr. M. S .Aney : I again repeat the question. Is it the policy of Government that Punjab should have supremacy in the Army ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I have repeatedly answered that question. The policy is that the Army should get the best material from all provinces and Government are quite satisfied that it has the best material at present.

Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it not, therefore, necessary that Government should make a statement modifying the policy suggested by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Government have no intention whatever of changing their policy in particular.

Another interpolation took place on 23rd November 1938 when the question stated below was asked :

Recruitment to the Indian Army from the Central Provinces and Berar 32[f.32] 

Q. 1402 : Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh : Will the Defence Secretary please state :

(a) The centres in the Central Provinces and Berar for recruiting men for the Indian Army ;

(b) The classes from which such men are recruited;

(c) The proportion of the men from the C. P. & Berar in the Army to the total strength of the Army, as well as to the population of these provinces ; and

(d) The present policy of recruitment, and if it is going to be revised; if not, why not?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

(a) There are no recruiting centres in the C. P. or Berar. Men residing in the C. P. are in the area of the Recruiting Officer, Delhi, and those of Berar in the area of the Recruiting Officer, Poona.

(b) Mahrattas of Berar are recruited as a separate class. Other Hindus and Mussalmans who are recruited from the C. P. and Berar are classified as " Hindus " or " Musalmans ", and are not entered under any class denomination.

(c) The proportion to the total strength of the Army is .03 per cent. and the proportion to the total male population of these provinces is .0004 per cent.

(d) There is at present no intention of revising the present policy, the reasons for which were stated in my reply to a supplementary question arising out of Mr. Satyamurti's starred question No. 1060, on the 15th September 1938, and in answer to part (a) of starred question No. 1086 asked by Mian Ghulam Kadir Muhammad Shahban on the same date, and in the reply of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the debates in the Council of State on the Honourable Mr. Sushil   Kumar Roy  Chaudhary's Resolution regarding military training for Indians on the 21st February 1938 and on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Sapru's Resolution on the recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army in April 1935.

This was followed by an interpellation on 6th February 1939, when the below mentioned question was asked :

Recruitment to the Indian Army 33[f.33] 

Q. 729; Mr. S. Satyamurti: Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state:

(a)     Whether Government have since the last answer on this question reconsidered the question of recruiting to the Indian Army from all provinces and from all castes and communities;

(b)     Whether they have come to any conclusion ;

(c)     Whether Government will categorically state the reasons as to why other provinces and communities are not allowed to serve in the army ; and

(d)     What are the tests by which they have come to the conclusion that other provinces and other communities than those from whom recruitment is made to the Indian Army to-day cannot come up to the standard of efficiency required of the Indian Army ?

Mr. C.M.G.Ogilvie:

(a)  No.

(b)    Does not arise.

(c)    and

(d)    The reasons have been categorically stated in my replies to starred questions Nos. 1060 and 1086of 15th September 1938, No. 1162 of 20th September 1938 and No. 1402 of 23rd November 1938 and also in the replies of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the Council of State to the debates on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Sapru's Resolution regarding recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army and the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy Chaudhary's Resolution regarding Military training for Indians, on the 13th March 1935 and 21st February 1938 respectively.

This conspiracy of silence on the part of the Government of India, was quite recently broken by the Secretary of State for India, who came forward to give the fullest information on this most vital and most exciting subject, in answer to a question in the House of Commons. From his answer given on 8th July 1943 we know the existing communal and provincial composition of the Indian Army to be as follows :


1.     Provincial Composition of the Indian Army






1. Punjab


7. Bengal Presidency


2. U. P.


8. C. P. & Berar



3. Madras Presidency


9. Assam



4. Bombay Presidency


10. Bihar



5. N. W. F. Province


11. Orissa



6. Ajmere & Merwara


12. Nepal



II. Communal Composition of the Indian Army

1. Muslims

2. Hindus & Gurkhas

3. Sikhs

4. Christians & The Rest

34 p.c.

50 p.c.

10 p.c.

6 p.c.



The information given by the Secretary of State is indeed very welcome. But, this is the war-time composition of the Indian Army. The peace-time composition must be very different. It rested on the well-known distinction between the Martial and Non-Martial Races. That distinction was abolished during the War. There is, however, no certainty that it will not be revived now that peace has returned. What we want to know is the peacetime communal composition of the Indian Army. That still remains an unknown fact and a subject of speculation.

Some say that the normal pre-war proportion of Muslims was between 60 and 70 p.c. Others say that it is somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50 p.c. In the absence of exact information, one could well adopt the latter figure as disclosing the true situation especially, when on inquiry, it happens to be confirmed by those who are in a position to form some idea on the matter. Even if the proportion be 50% it is high enough to cause alarm to the Hindus. If this is true, it is a flagrant violation of well established principles of British Army policy in India, adopted after the Mutiny.

After the Mutiny, the British Government ordered two investigations into the organization of the Indian Army. The first investigation was carried out by the Peel Commission which was appointed in 1859. The second investigation was undertaken by a body, called the Special Army Committee, appointed in 1879 to which reference has already been made.

The principal question considered by the Peel Commission was to find out the weaknesses in the Bengal Army, which led to the Mutiny of 1857. The Peel Commission was told by witness after witness that the principal weakness in the Bengal Army which mutinied was that

" In the ranks of the regular Army men stood mixed up as chance might befall. There was no separating by class and clan into companies........ In the lines, Hindu and Mahomedan, Sikh and Poorbeah were mixed up, so that each and all lost to some extent their racial prejudice and became inspired with one common sentiment." 34[f.34] 

It was, therefore, proposed by Sir John Lawrence that in organizing the Indian Army care should be taken " to preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and while it lasts, makes the Mahomedan of one country despise, fear or dislike the Mahomedan of another; Corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or Mahomedan of one province be enlisted in one regiment and no others, and having created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so, against the hour of need. .. .. By the system thus indicated two great evils are avoided : firstly, that community of feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces."  35[f.35] 

This proposal was supported by many military men before the Peel Commission and was recommended by it as a principle of Indian Army Policy. This principle was known as the principle of Class Composition.

The Special Army Committee of 1879 was concerned with quite a different problem. What the problem was, becomes manifest from the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The questionnaire included the following question :

"If the efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army is considered necessary for the safety of the Empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than among the weakest and least warlike races of India, due regard, of course, being had to the necessity of not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group and with due regard to the safety of the Empire ? "

The principal part of the question is obviously the necessity or otherwise of" not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group ". On this question official opinion expressed before the Committee was unanimous.

Lt.-General H. J. Warres, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, stated:

" I consider it is not possible to recruit the reserve of the Indian Army altogether from those parts of India which are said to produce best soldiers, without giving undue strength and prominence to the races and religions of these countries."       

The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick P. Haines, said:

" Distinct in race, language and interests from the more numerous Army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently politic and wise to maintain these armies (the Madras and Bombay Armies) as a counterpoise to it, and I would in no way diminish their strength in order that a reserve composed of what is called ' the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure ' may be established. If by this it is meant to replace Sepoys of Madras and Bombay by a reserve of men passed through the ranks of the Bengal Army and composed of the same classes of which it is formed, I would say, that anything more unwise or more impolitic could hardly be conceived."

The Lt-Governor of the Punjab also shared this view. He too declared that he was " opposed to having one recruiting field for the whole armies " in India. " It will be necessary," he added, " for political reasons, to prevent preponderance of one nationality."

The Special Committee accepted this view and recommended that the composition of the Indian Army should be so regulated that there should be no predominance of any one community or nationality in the Army.

These two principles have the governing principles of Indian Army policy. Having regard to the principle laid down by the Special Army Committee of 1879, the changes that have taken place in the communal composition of the Indian Army amount to a complete revolution. How this revolution was allowed to take place is beyond comprehension. It is a revolution which has taken place in the teeth of a well-established principle. The principle was really suggested by the tear of the growing predominance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army and was invoked with the special object of curbing that tendency. The principle was not only enunciated as a rule of guidance but was taken to be rigorously applied. Lord Roberts, who was opposed to this principle because it set a limit upon the recruitment of his pet men of the North-West, had to bow to this principle during his regime as the Commander-in-Chief of India. So well was the principle respected that when in 1903, Lord Kitchener entered upon the project of converting fifteen regiments of Madrasis into Punjab regiments, he immediately setup a counterpoise to the Sikhs and the Punjabi Musalmans by raising the proportion of

the Gurkhas and the Pathans. As Sir George Arthur, his biographer, says:

" The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element in the Indian Army to preponderate unduly. An increase in the Punjabee infantry had as its necessary sequel a further recruitment of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia."

That a principle, so unanimously upheld and so rigorously applied upto the period of the Great War, should have been thrown to the wind after the Great War, without ceremony and without compunction and in a clandestine manner, is really beyond comprehension. What is the reason which has led the British to allow so great a preponderance of the Muslims in the Indian Army ? Two explanations are possible. One is that the Musalmans really proved, in the Great War, that they were better soldiers than the Hindus. The second explanation is that the British have broken the rule and have given the Musalmans such a dominating position in the Army because they wanted to counteract the forces of the Hindu agitation for wresting political power from the hands of the British.

Whatever be the explanation, two glaring facts stand out from the above survey. One is that the Indian Army today is predominantly Muslim in its composition. The other is that the Musalmans who predominate are the Musalmans from the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. Such a composition of the Indian Army means that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are made the sole defenders of India from foreign invasion. So patent has this fact become that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are quite conscious of this proud position which has been assigned to them by the British, for reasons best known to them. For, one often hears them say that they are the ' gatekeepers ' of India. The Hindus must consider the problem of the defence of India in the light of this crucial fact.

How far can the Hindus depend upon these ' gate-keepers' to hold the gate and protect the liberty and freedom of India ? The answer to this question must depend upon who comes to force the gate open. It is obvious that there are only two foreign countries which are likely to force this gate from the North-West side of India, Russia or Afghanistan, the borders of both of which touch the border of India. Which of them will invade India and when, no one can say definitely. If the invasion came from Russia, it may be hoped that these gate-keepers of India will be staunch and loyal enough to hold the gate and stop the invader. But suppose         the Afghans singly or in combination with other Muslim States march on India, will these gate-keepers stop the invaders or will they open the gates and let them in ? This is a question which no Hindu can afford to ignore. This is a question on which every Hindu must feel assured, because it is the most crucial question.

It is possible to say that Afghanistan will never think of invading India. But a theory is best tested by examining its capacity to meet the worst case. The loyalty and dependability of this Army of the Punjabi and N. W. F. P. Muslims can only be tested by considering how it will be have in the event of an invasion by the Afghans. Will they respond to the call of the land of their birth or will they be swayed by the call of their religion, is the question which must be faced if ultimate security is to be obtained. It is not safe to seek to escape from these annoying and discomforting questions by believing that we need not worry about a foreign invasion so long as India is under the protection of the British. Such a complacent attitude is unforgivable to say the least. In the first place, the last war has shown that a situation may arise when Great Britain may not be able to protect India, although, that is the time when India needs her protection most. Secondly, the efficiency of an institution must be tested under natural conditions and not under artificial conditions. The behaviour of the Indian soldier under British control is artificial. His behaviour when he is under Indian control is his natural behaviour. British control does not allow much play to the natural instincts and natural sympathies of the men in the Army. That is why the men in the Army behave so well. But that is an artificial and not a natural condition. That the Indian Army behaves well under British control is no guarantee of its good behaviour under Indian control. A Hindu must be satisfied that it will behave as well when British control is withdrawn.

The question how this army of the Punjabi and the N. W. F. P. Muslims will behave if Afghanistan invades India, is a very pertinent and crucial question and must be faced, however unpleasant it may be.

Some may say—why assume that the large proportion of Muslims in the Army is a settled fact and that it cannot be unsettled ? Those who can unsettle it are welcome to make what efforts they can. But, so far as one can see, it is not going to be unsettled. On the contrary, I should not be surprised if it was entered in the constitution, when revised, as a safeguard for the Muslim Minority. The Musalmans are sure to make this demand and as against the Hindus, the Muslims somehow always succeed. We must, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the composition of the Indian Army will remain what it is at present. The basis remaining the same, the question to be pursued remains what it was : Can the Hindus depend upon such an Army to defend the country against the invasion of Afghanistan ? Only the so-called Indian Nationalists will say * yes * to it. The boldest among the realists must stop to think before he can give an answer to the question. The realist must take note of the fact that the Musalmans look upon the Hindus as Kaffirs, who deserve more to be exterminated than protected. The realist must take note of the fact that while the Musalman accepts the European as his superior, he looks upon the Hindu as his inferior. It is doubtful how far a regiment of Musalmans will accept the authority of their Hindu officers if they be placed under them. The realist must take note that of all the Musalmans, the Musalman of the North-West is the most disaffected Musalman in his relation with the Hindus. The realist must take note that the Punjabi Musalman is fully susceptible to the propaganda in favour of Pan-lslamism. Taking note of all these considerations, there can be very little doubt that he would be a bold Hindu who would say that in any invasion by Muslim countries, the Muslims in the Indian Army would be loyal and that there is no danger of their going over to the invader. Even Theodore Morrison 36[f.36]  writing in 1899, was of the opinion that—

" The views held by the Mahomedans (certainly the most aggressive and truculent of the peoples of India) are alone sufficient to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian Government Were the Afghan to descend from the north upon an autonomous India, the Mahomedans, instead of uniting with the Sikhs and the Hindus to repel him,  would be drawn by all the ties of kinship and religion to join his flag."

And when it is recalled that in 1919 the Indian Musalmans who were carrying on the Khilafat movement actually went to the length of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India, the view expressed by Sir Theodore Morrison acquires added strength and ceases to be a matter of mere speculation.

How this Army composed of the Muslims of the Punjab and N. W. F. P. will behave in the case of an invasion by Afghanistan is not the only question which the Hindus are called upon to consider. There is another and equally important question on which the Hindus must ponder. That question is: Will the Indian Government be free to use this Army, whatever its loyalties, against the invading Afghans ? In this connection, attention must be drawn to the stand taken by the Muslim League. It is to the effect that the Indian Army shall not be used against Muslim powers. There is nothing new in this. This principle was enunciated by the Khilafat Committee long before the League. Apart from this, the question remains how far the Indian Muslims will, in future, make it their article of faith. That the League has not succeeded in this behalf against the British Government does not mean that it will not succeed against an Indian Government. The chances are that it will, because, however unpatriotic the principle may be from the standpoint of the Hindus, it is most agreeable to the Muslim sentiment and the League may find a sanction for it in the general support of the Muslim community in India. If the Muslim League succeeds in enforcing this limitation upon Indians right to use her fighting forces, what is going to be the position of the Hindus ? This is another question which the Hindus have to consider.

If India remains politically one whole and the two-nation mentality created by Pakistan continues to be fostered, the Hindus will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea, so far as the defence of India is concerned. Having an Army, they will not be free to use it because the League objects. Using it, it will not be possible to depend upon it because its loyalty is doubtful. This is a position which is as pathetic as it is precarious. If the Army continues to be dominated by the Muslims of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P., the Hindus will have to pay it but will not be able to use it and even if they were free to use it against a Muslim invader, they will find it hazardous to depend upon it. If the Hague view prevails and India does not remain free to use her Army against Muslim countries, then, even if the Muslims lose their predominance in the Army, India on account of these military limitations, will have to remain on terms of subordinate co-operation with the Muslim countries on her bolder, as do the Indian States under British paramountcy.

The Hindus have a difficult choice to make: to have a safe Army or a safe border. In this difficulty, what is the wisest course for the Hindus to pursue ? Is it in their interest to insist that the Muslim India should remain part of India so that they may have a safe border, or is it in their interest to welcome its separation from India so that they may have a sale Army ? The Musalmans of this area are hostile to the Hindus. As to this, there can be no doubt. Which is then better for the Hindus : Should these Musalmans be without and against or should they be within and against ? If the question is asked to any prudent man, there will be only one answer, namely, that if the Musalmans are to be against the Hindus, it is better that they should be without and against, rather than within and against. Indeed, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished that the Muslims should be without. That is the only way of getting rid of the Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army.

How can it be brought about ? Here again, there is only one way. to bring it about and that is to support the scheme of Pakistan. Once Pakistan is created, Hindustan, having ample resources in men and money, can have an Army which it can call its own and there will be nobody to dictate as to how it should be used and against whom it should be used. The defence of Hindustan, far from being weakened by the creation of Pakistan, will be infinitely improved by it.

The Hindus do not seem to realize at what disadvantage they are placed from the point of view of their defence, by their exclusion from the Army. Much less do they know that, strange as it may appear, they are in fact purchasing this disadvantage at a very heavy price.

The Pakistan area which is the main recruiting ground of the present Indian Army, contributes very little to the Central Exchequer as will be seen from the following figures :

Contribution to the Central Exchequer





North-West Frontier









As against this the provinces of Hindustan contribute as follows:








Bengal 37[f.37] 






C.P. & Berar









The Pakistan Provinces, it will be seen, contribute very little. The main contribution comes from the Provinces of Hindustan. In fact, it is the money contributed by the Provinces of Hindustan which enables the Government of India to carry out its activities in the Pakistan Provinces. The Pakistan Provinces are a drain on the Provinces of Hindustan. Not only do they contribute very little to the Central Government but they receive a great deal from the Central Government. The revenue of the Central Government amounts to Rs.121 crores. Of this, about Rs. 52 crores are annually spent on the Army. In what area is this amount spent ? Who pays the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores ? The bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores which is spent on the Army is spent over the Muslim Army drawn from the Pakistan area. Now the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores is contributed by the Hindu Provinces and is spent on an Army which for the most part consists of non-Hindus ! ! How many Hindus are aware of this tragedy ? How many know at whose cost this tragedy is being enacted ? Today the Hindus are not responsible for it because they cannot prevent it. The question is whether they will allow this tragedy to continue. If they mean to stop it, the surest way of putting an end to it is to allow the scheme of Pakistan to take effect. To oppose it, is to buy a sure weapon of their own destruction. A safe Army is better than a safe border.



Does Pakistan solve the Communal Question is a natural question which every Hindu is sure to ask. A correct answer to this question calls for a close analysis of what is involved in it. One must have a clear idea as to what is exactly meant, when the Hindus and Muslims speak of the Communal Question. Without it, it will not be possible to say whether Pakistan does or does not solve the Communal Question.

It is not generally known that the Communal Question like the " Forward Policy " for the Frontier has a " greater " and a " lesser intent, " and that in its lesser intent it means one thing, and in its greater intent it means quite a different thing.


To begin with the Communal Question in its " lesser intent ". In its lesser intent, the Communal Question relates to the representation of the Hindus and the Muslims in the Legislatures. Used in this sense, the question involves the settlement of two distinct problems :

(1)   The number of seats to be allotted to the Hindus and the Muslims in the different legislatures, and

(2)   The nature of the electorates through which these seats are to be filled in.

The Muslims at the Round Table Conference claimed :

(1)   That their representatives in all the Provincial as well as in the Central Legislatures should be elected by separate electorates ;

(2)   That they should be allowed to retain the weightage in representation given to Muslim minorities in those Provinces in which they were a minority in the population, and that in addition, they should be given in those Provinces where they were a majority such as the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Bengal, a guaranteed statutory majority of seats.

The Hindus from the beginning objected to both these Muslim demands. They insisted on joint electorates for Hindus and Muslims in all elections to all the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, and on population ratio of representation, for both minorities, Hindus and Muslims, wherever they may be, and raised the strongest objections to a majority of seats being guaranteed to any community by statute.

The Communal Award of His Majesty's Government settled this dispute by the simple, rough and ready method of giving the Muslims all that they wanted, without caring for the Hindu opposition. "The Award allowed the Muslims to retain weight-age and separate electorates, and in addition, gave them the statutory majority of seats in those provinces where they were a majority in the population.

What is it in the Award that can be said to constitute a problem ? Is there any force in the objections of the Hindus to the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government ? This question must be considered carefully to find out whether there is substance in the objections of the Hindus to the Award.

Firstly, as to their objection to the weightage to Muslim minorities in the matter of representation. Whatever may be the correct measure of allotting representation to minorities, the Hindus cannot very well object to the weightage given to Muslim minorities, because similar weightage has been given to the Hindus in those Provinces in which they are a minority and where there is sufficient margin for weightage to be allowed. The treatment of the Hindu minorities in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province is a case in point.

Secondly, as to their objection to a statutory majority. That again does not appear to be well founded. A system of guaranteed representation may be wrong and vicious and quite unjustifiable on theoretical and philosophical grounds. But considered in the light of circumstances, such as those obtaining in India, the system of statutory majority appears to be inevitable. Once it is granted that the representation to be given to a minority must not reduce the majority to minority, that very provision creates, as a mere counterpart, a system of statutory majority to the majority community. For, fixing the seats of the minority involves the fixation of the seats of the majority. There is, therefore, no escape from the system of statutory majority, once it is conceded that the minority is not entitled to representation which would convert a majority into a minority. There is, therefore, no great force in the objections of the Hindus to a statutory majority of the Muslims in the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Bengal. For, even in the Provinces where the Hindus are in a majority and the Muslims are in minority, the Hindus have got a statutory majority over the Muslims. At any rate, there is a parity of position and to that extent there can be said to be no ground for complaint.

This does not mean that because the objections set forth by the Hindus have no substance, there are no real grounds for opposing the Communal Award. There does exist a substantial ground of objection to the Communal Award, although, it does not appear to have been made the basis of attack by the Hindus.

This objection may be formulated in order to bring out its point in the following manner. The Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces insisted on separate electorates. The Communal Award gives them the right to determine that issue. This is really what it comes to when one remembers the usual position taken, viz., that the Muslim minorities could not be deprived of their separate electorates without their consent, and the majority community of the Hindus has been made to abide by their determination. The Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces insisted that there should be joint electorates. Instead of conceding their claim, the Communal Award forced upon them the system of separate electorates to which they objected. If in the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minorities are allowed the right of self-determination in   the matter of electorates, the question arises : Why are not the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces given the right of self-determination in the matter of their electorates ? What is the answer to this question ? And, if there is no answer, there is undoubtedly a deep seated inequity in the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government, which calls for redress.

It is no answer that the Hindus also have a statutory majority based on separate electorates 38[f.38]   in those Provinces where the Musalmans are in a minority. A little scrutiny will show that there is no parity of position in these two cases. The separate electorates for the Hindu majorities in the Hindu Provinces are not a matter of their choice. It is a consequence resulting from the determination of the Muslim minorities who claimed to have separate electorates for themselves. A minority in one set of circumstances may think that separate electorates would be a better method of self-protection and may have no fear of creating against itself and by its own action a statutory majority based on separate electorates for the opposing community. Another minority or, for the matter of that, the same minority in a different set of circumstances would not like to create by its own action and against itself a statutory majority based upon separate electorates and may, therefore, prefer joint electorates to separate electorates as a better method of self-protection. Obviously the guiding principle, which would influence a minority, would be : Is the majority likely to use its majority in a communal manner and purely for communal purposes ? If it felt certain that the majority community is likely to use its communal majority for communal ends, it may well choose joint electorates, because it would be the only method by which it would hope to take away the communal cement of the statutory majority by influencing the elections of the representatives of the majority community in the Legislatures. On the other hand, a majority community may not have the necessary communal cement, which alone would enable it to use its communal majority for communal ends, in which case a minority, having no fear from the resulting statutory majority and separate electorates for the majority community, may well choose separate electorates for itself. To put it concretely, the Muslim minorities in choosing separate electorates are not afraid of the separate electorates and the statutory majority of the Hindus, because they feel sure that by reason of their deep-seated differences of caste and race the Hindus will never be able to use their majorities against the Muslims. On the other hand, the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces have no doubt that, by reason of their social solidarity, the Muslims will use their statutory majority to set into operation a "Resolute Muslim Government", after the plan proposed by Lord Salisbury for Ireland as a substitute for Home Rule; with this difference, that Salisbury's Resolute Government was to last for twenty years only, while the Muslim Resolute Government was to last as long as the Communal Award stood. "The situations, therefore, are not alike. The statutory majority of the Hindus based on separate electorates is the result of the choice made by the Muslim minority. The statutory majority of the Muslims based on separate electorates is something which is not the result of the choice of the Hindu minority. In one case, the Government of the Muslim minority by a Hindu communal majority is the result of the consent of the Muslim minority, In the other case, the Government of the Hindu minority by the Muslim majority is not the result of the consent of the Hindu minority, but is imposed upon it by the might of the British Government.

To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in its " lesser intent ", there is no inequity in the Award on the ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be said that there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim Provinces in which they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put upon the Muslim number of seats, also gives to the Hindus in Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot be said of the Award in the matter of the electorates. The Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords unequal treatment to the Hindu and Muslim minorities in the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim Provinces, it is the  Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it prefers and the Hindu minority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus , the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces having been given both statutory majority and separate electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor influence.

This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust any one with unlimited political power. As has been well said,

" If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always demands a limitation of political authority......"

The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule. Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a majority of another community ? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the Hindu minorities.


To turn to the Communal Question in its " greater intent ". What is it, that the Hindus say is a problem ? In its greater intent the Communal Question relates to the deliberate creation of Muslim Provinces. At the time of the Lucknow Pact, the Muslims only raised the Communal Question in its lesser intent. At the Round Table Conference, the Muslims put forth, for the first time, the plan covered by the Communal Question in its greater intent. Before the Act of 1935, there were a majority of Provinces in which the Hindus were in a majority and the Muslims in a minority. There were only three Provinces in which the Muslims were in a majority and the Hindus in a minority. They were the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier Province. Of these, the Muslim majority in the North-West Frontier Province was not effective, because there was no responsible government in that province, the Montagu-Chemsford Scheme of Political Reforms not being extended to it. So, for all practical purposes, there were only two provinces—the Punjab and Bengal—wherein the Muslims were in majority and the Hindus in minority. The Muslims desired that the number of Muslim Provinces should be increased. With this object in view, they demanded that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and created into a new self-governing Province, and that the North-West Frontier Province, which was already a separate Province, should be raised to the status of a self-governing Province. Apart from other considerations, from a purely financial point of view, it was not possible to concede this demand. Neither Sind nor the North-West Frontier Province were financially self-supporting. But in order to satisfy the Muslim demand, the British Government went to the length of accepting the responsibility of giving an annual subvention to Sind 39[f.39]  and North-West Frontier Province 40[f.40]  from the Central Revenues, so as to bring about a budgetary equilibrium in their finances and make them financially self-supporting.

These four Provinces with Muslims in majority and Hindus in minority, now functioning as autonomous and self-governing Provinces, were certainly not created for administrative convenience, nor for purposes of architectural symmetry—the Hindu Provinces poised against the Muslim Provinces. It is also true that the scheme of Muslim Provinces was not a matter of satisfying Muslim pride which demanded Hindu minorities under Muslim majorities to compensate the humiliation of having Muslim minorities under Hindu majorities. What was then, the motive underlying this scheme of Muslim Provinces ? The Hindus say that the motive for the Muslim insistence, both on statutory majority and separate electorates, was to enable the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces to mobilize and make effective Muslim power in its exclusive form and to the fullest extent possible. Asked what could be the purpose of having the Muslim political power mobilized in this fashion, the Hindus answer that it was done to place in the hands of the Muslims of the Muslim Provinces an effective weapon to tyrannize their Hindu minorities, in case the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces were tyrannized by their Hindu majorities. The scheme thus became a system of protection, in which blast was to be met by counter-blast, terror by terror and tyranny by tyranny. The plan is undoubtedly, a dreadful one, involving the maintenance of justice and peace by retaliation, and providing an opportunity for the punishment of an innocent minority, Hindus in Muslim Provinces and Muslims in Hindu Provinces, for the sins of their co-religionists in other Provinces. It is a scheme of communal peace through a system of communal hostages.

That the Muslims were aware from the very start, that the system of communal Provinces was capable of being worked in this manner, is clear from the speech made by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as President of the Muslim League Session held in Calcutta in 1927. In that speech the Maulana declared:

" That by the Lucknow Pact they had sold away their interests. The Delhi proposals of March last opened the door for the first time to the recognition of the real rights of Musalmans in India. The separate electorates granted by the Pact of 1916 only ensured Muslim representation, but what was vital for the existence of the community was the recognition of its numerical strength. Delhi opened the way to the creation of such a state of at fairs as would guarantee to them in the future of India a proper share. Their existing small majority in Bengal and the Punjab was only a census figure, but the Delhi proposals gave them for the first time five provinces of which no less than three (Sind, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan) contained a real overwhelming Muslim majority. If the Muslims did not recognise this great step they were not fit to live. There would now be nine Hindu provinces against five Muslim provinces, and whatever treatment Hindus accorded in the nine provinces, Muslims would accord the same treatment to Hindus in the five Provinces. Was not this a great gain ? Was not a new weapon gained for the assertion of Muslim rights ? "

That those in charge of these Muslim provinces know the advantage of the scheme, and do not hesitate to put it to the use for which it was intended, is clear from the speeches made not long ago by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, as Prime Minister of Bengal.

That this scheme of Communal Provinces, which constitutes the Communal Question in its larger intent, can be used as an engine of communal tyranny, there can be no doubt. The system of hostages, which is the essence of the scheme of communal provinces, supported by separate electorates, is indeed insupportable on any ground. If this is the underlying motive of the demand for the creation of more Muslim Provinces, the system resulting from it is undoubtedly a vicious system.

This analysis leaves no doubt that the communal statutory majority based on separate communal electorates and the communal provinces, especially constituted to enable the statutory majority to tyrannize the minority, are the two evils which compose what is called, ' the Communal Problem '.

For the existence of this problem the Hindus hold the Muslims responsible and the Muslims hold the Hindus responsible. The Hindus accuse the Muslims of contumacy. The Muslims accuse Hindus of meanness. Both, however, forget that the communal problem exists not because the Muslims are extravagant and insolent in their demands and the Hindus are mean and grudging in their concessions. It exists and will exist wherever a hostile majority is brought face to face against a hostile minority. Controversies relating to separate vs. joint electorates, controversies relating to population ratio vs. weightage are all inherent in a situation where a minority is pitted against a majority. The best solution of the communal problem is not to have two communities facing each other, one a majority and the other a minority, welded in the steel-frame of a single government.

    How far does Pakistan approximate to the solution of the Communal Question?

The answer to this question is quite obvious. If the scheme of Pakistan is to follow the present boundaries of the Provinces in the North-West and in Bengal, certainly it does not eradicate the evils which lie at the heart of the Communal Question. It retains the very elements which give rise to it, namely, the pitting of a minority against a majority. The rule of the Hindu minorities by the Muslim majorities and the rule of the Muslim Minorities by the Hindu majorities are the crying evils of the present situation. This very evil will reproduce itself in Pakistan, if the provinces marked out for it are incorporated into it as they are, i.e., with boundaries drawn as at present. Besides this, the evil which gives rise to the Communal Question in its larger intent, will not only remain as it is but will assume a new malignity. Under the existing system, the power centered in the Communal Provinces to do mischief to their hostages is limited by the power which the Central Government has over the Provincial Governments. At present, the hostages are at least within the pale of a Central Government which is Hindu in its composition and which has power to interfere for their protection. But, when Pakistan becomes Muslim State with full sovereignty over internal and external affairs, it would be free from the control of the Central Government. The Hindu minorities will have no recourse to an outside authority with overriding powers, to interfere on their behalf and curb this power of mischief, as under the scheme, no such overriding authority is permitted to exist. So, the position of the Hindus in Pakistan may easily become similar to the position of the Armenians under the Turks or of the Jews in Tsarist Russia or in Nazi Germany. Such a scheme would be intolerable and the Hindus may well say that they cannot agree to Pakistan and leave their co-religionist as a helpless prey to the fanaticism of a Muslim National State.


This, of course, is a very frank statement of the consequences which will flow from giving effect to the scheme of Pakistan. But care must be taken to locate the source of these consequences. Do they flow from the scheme of Pakistan itself or do they flow from particular boundaries that may be fixed for it. If the evils flow from the scheme itself, i.e., if they are inherent in it, it is unnecessary for any Hindu to waste his time in considering it. He will be justified in summarily dismissing it. On the other hand, if the evils are the result of the boundaries, the question of Pakistan reduces itself to a mere question of changing the boundaries.

A study of the question amply supports the view that the evils of Pakistan are not inherent in it. If any evil results follow from it they will have to be attributed to its boundaries. This becomes clear if one studies the distribution of population. The reasons why these evils will be reproduced within Western and Eastern Pakistan is because, with the present boundaries, they do not become single ethnic states. They remain mixed states, composed of a Muslim majority and a Hindu minority as before. The evils are the evils which are inseparable from a mixed state. If Pakistan is made a single unified ethnic state, the evils will automatically vanish. There will be no question of separate electorates within Pakistan, because in such a homogeneous Pakistan, there will be no majorities to rule and no minorities to be protected. Similarly, there will be no majority of one community to hold, in its possession, a minority of an opposing community.

The question, therefore, is one of demarcation of boundaries and reduces itself to this : Is it possible for the boundaries of Pakistan to be so fixed, that instead of producing a mixed state composed of majorities and minorities, with all the evils attendant upon it, Pakistan will be an ethnic state composed of one homogeneous community, namely Muslims ? The answer is that in a large part of the area affected by the project of the League, a homogeneous state can be created by shifting merely the boundaries, and in the rest, homogeneity can be produced by shifting only the population.

In this connection, I invite the reader to study carefully the figures given in the Appendices V, X, XI showing the distribution of the population in the areas affected, and also the maps showing how new boundaries can create homogeneous Muslim States. Taking the Punjab, two things will be noted :

(i)              There are certain districts in which the Musalmans predominate. There are certain districts in which the Hindus predominate. There are very few in which the two are, more or less, evenly distributed; and

(ii)             The districts in which Muslims predominate and the districts in which the Hindus predominate are not interspersed. The two sets of districts form two separate areas.

For the formation of the Eastern Pakistan, one has to take into consideration the distribution of population in both the Provinces of Bengal and Assam. A scrutiny of the population figures shows—

(i)              In Bengal, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus predominate.

(ii)             In Assam also, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus predominate.

(iii)            Districts in which the Muslims predominate and those in which the Hindus predominate are not interspersed. They form separate areas.

(iv)           The districts of Bengal and Assam in which the Muslims predominate are contiguous.

Given these facts, it is perfectly possible to create homogeneous Muslim States out of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam by drawing their boundaries in such a way that the areas which are predominantly Hindu shall be excluded. That this is possible is shown by the maps given in the appendix.

In the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, the situation is rather hard. How the matter stands in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind may be seen by an examination of the figures given in the appendices VI to IX. As may be seen from the appendices, there are no districts in which the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind are concentrated. They are scattered and are to be found in almost every ^strict of the two provinces in small, insignificant numbers. These appendices show quite unmistakably that the Hindus in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province are mostly congregated in urban areas of the districts. In Sind, the Hindus outnumber the Muslims in most of the towns, while the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in villages. In the North-West Frontier Province, the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in towns as well as in villages.

The case of the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, therefore, differs totally from the case of the Punjab and Bengal. In the Punjab and Bengal, owing to the natural segregation of the Hindus and Muslims in different areas, it is possible to create a homogeneous State by merely altering their boundaries, involving the shifting of the population in a very small degree. But in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, owing to the scattered state of the Hindu population, alteration of boundaries cannot suffice for creating a homogeneous State. There is only one remedy and that is to shift the population.

Some scoff at the idea of the shifting and exchange of population. But those who scoff can hardly be aware of the complications, which a minority problem gives rise to and the failures attendant upon almost all the efforts made to protect them. The constitutions of the post-war states, as well as of the older states in Europe which had a minority problem, proceeded on the assumption that constitutional safeguards for minorities should suffice for their protection and so the constitutions of most of the new states with majorities and minorities were studded with long lists of fundamental rights and safeguards to see that they were not violated by the majorities. What was the experience ? Experience showed that safeguards did not save the minorities. Experience showed that even a ruthless war on the minorities did not solve the problem. The states then agreed that the best way to solve it was for each to exchange its alien minorities within its border, for its own which was without its border, with a view to bring about homogeneous States. This is what happened in Turky, Greece and Bulgaria. Those, who scoff at the idea of transfer of population, will do well to study the history of the minority problem, as it arose between Turky, Greece and Bulgaria. If they do, they will find that these countries found that the only effective way of solving the minorities problem lay in exchange of population. The task undertaken by the three countries was by no means a minor operation. It involved the transfer of some 20 million people from one habitat to another. But undaunted, the three shouldered the task and carried it to a successful end because they felt that the considerations of communal peace must outweigh every other consideration.

That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal peace is beyond doubt. If that is so, there is no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims should keep on trading in safeguards which have proved so unsafe. If small countries, with limited resources like Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, were capable of such an undertaking, there is no reason to suppose that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians. After all, the population involved is inconsiderable and because some obstacles require to be removed, it would be the height of folly to give up so sure a way to communal peace.

There is one point of criticism to which no reference has been made so far. As it is likely to be urged, I propose to deal with it here. It is sure to be asked, how will Pakistan affect the position of the Muslims that will be left in Hindustan ? The question is natural because the scheme of Pakistan does seem to concern itself with the Muslim majorities who do not need protection arid abandons the Muslim minorities who do. But the point is : who can raise it ? Surely not the Hindus. Only the Muslims of Pakistan or the Muslims of Hindustan can raise it. The question was put to Mr. Rehmat Ali, the protagonist of Pakistan and this is the answer given by him :

"How will it affect the position of the forty five million Muslims in Hindustan proper ?

" The truth is that in this struggle their thought has been more than a wrench to me. They are the flesh of our flesh and the soul of our soul. We can never forget them ; nor they, us. Their present position and future security is, and shall ever be, a mailer of great importance to us. As things are at present, Pakistan will not adversely affect their position in Hindustan. On the basis of population (one Muslim to four Hindus), they will still be entitled to the same representation in legislative as well as administrative fields which they possess now. As to the future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those safeguards to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan.

" But what sustains us most is the fact that they know we are proclaiming Pakistan in the highest interest of the' Millet'. It is as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national citadel, for them it will ever be a moral anchor. So long as the anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it gives way, all will be lost ".

The answer given by the Muslims of Hindustan is equally clear. They say, " We are not weakened by the separation of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected by the existence of separate Islamic States on the Eastern and Western borders of Hindustan than we are by their submersion in Hindustan. "  Who can say that they are wrong ? Has it not been shown that Germany as an outside state was better able to protect the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia than the Sudetens were able to do themselves ? 41[f.41] 

Be that as it may, the question does not concern the Hindus. The question that concerns the Hindus is : How far does the creation of Pakistan remove the communal question from Hindustan ? That is a very legitimate question and must be considered. It must be admitted that by the creation of Pakistan, Hindustan is not freed of the communal question. While Pakistan can be made a homogeneous state by redrawing its boundaries, Hindustan must remain a composite state. The Musalmans are scattered all over Hindustan—though they are mostly congregated in towns—and no ingenuity in the matter of redrawing of boundaries can make it homogeneous. The only way to make Hindustan homogeneous is to arrange for exchange of population. Until that is done, it must be admitted that even with the creation of Pakistan, the problem of majority vs. minority will remain in Hindustan as before and will continue to produce disharmony in the body politic of Hindustan.

Admitting that Pakistan is not capable of providing a complete solution of the Communal Problem within Hindustan, does it follow that the Hindus on that account should reject Pakistan ? Before the Hindus draw any such hasty conclusion, they should consider the following effects of Pakistan.

First, consider the effect of Pakistan on the magnitude of the communal Problem. That can be best gauged by reference to the Muslim population as it will be grouped within Pakistan and Hindustan.


Muslim Population in Pakistan.

Muslim Population in India

1. Punjab


1.      Total Muslim Population in British India (Excluding Burma and Aden).



2. N.W.F.P.


3. Sind


4. Baluchistan


2.      Muslim Population grouped in Pakistan and Eastern Bengal State.



5. Eastern Bengal


Muslim States


3.      Balance of Muslims in British Hindustan



(i) Eastern Bengal


(ii) Sylhet





What do these figures indicate ? What they indicate is that the Muslims who will be left in British Hindustan will be only 18,545,465 and the rest 47,897,301, forming a vast majority of the total Muslim population, will be out of it and will be the subjects of Pakistan States. This distribution of the Muslim population, in terms of the communal problem, means that while without Pakistan the communal problem in India involves 6 1/2 crores of Muslims, with the creation of Pakistan it will involve only 2 crores of Muslims. Is this to be no consideration for Hindus who want communal peace ? To me, it seems that if Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor significance and much easier of peaceful solution.

In the second place, let the Hindus consider the effect of Pakistan on the communal representation in the Central Legislature. The following table gives the distribution of seats in the Central Legislature, as prescribed under the Government of India Act, 1935 and as it would be, if Pakistan came into being.


Name of the Chamber

Distribution of seats.

Distribution of seats.


I—As at present.

II.—After Pakistan.









Total seats.

Muslim (Hindu) Territorial Scats.

Muslim Territorial Seats.

Total seals.

Muslim (Hindu) Territorial Seats.

Muslim Territorial Seats.

Council of State.







Federal Assembly.








To bring out clearly the quantitative change in the communal distribution of seats, which must follow the establishment of Pakistan, the above figures are reduced to percentage in the table that follows:


Name of the Chamber.

Distribution of seats.

Distribution of seats.


1.—As at present.

II.—After Pakistan


Percentage of Muslim seats to Hindu seals.

Percentage of Muslim scats to total seats.

Percentage of Muslim seats to Hindu seats.

Percentage of Muslim seats to total seals.

Council of State Federal Assembly










33 1/3,




From this table one can see what vast changes must follow the establishment of Pakistan. Under the Government of India Act, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total is 33% in both the Chambers, but to the Hindu seats, the ratio is 66% in the Council of State and 80% in the Assembly—almost a position of equality with the Hindus. After Pakistan, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total seats falls from 33 1/3 % to 25% in the Council and to 21% in the Assembly, while the ratio to Hindu seats falls from 66% to 33 1/3 % in the Council and from 80% to 40% in the Assembly. The figures assume that the weightage given to the Muslims will remain the same, even after Hindustan is separated from Pakistan. If the present weightage to Muslims is cancelled or reduced, there would be further improvement in the representation of the Hindus. But assuming that no change in weightage is made, is this a small gain to the Hindus in the matter of representation at the Centre ? To me, it appears that it is a great improvement in the position of the Hindus at the Centre, which would never come to them, if they oppose Pakistan.

These are the material advantages of Pakistan. There is another which is psychological. The Muslims, in Southern and Central India, draw their inspiration from the Muslims of the North and the East. If after Pakistan there is communal peace in the North and the East, as there should be, there being no majorities and minorities therein, the Hindus may reasonably expect communal peace in Hindustan. This severance of the bond between the Muslims of the North and the East and the Muslims of Hindustan is another gain to the Hindus of Hindustan.

Taking into consideration these effects of Pakistan, it cannot be disputed that if Pakistan does not wholly solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it frees the Hindus from the turbulence of the Muslims as predominant partners. It is for the Hindus to say whether they will reject such a proposal, simply because it does not offer a complete solution. Some gain is better than much harm.


One last question and this discussion of Pakistan in relation to communal peace may be brought to a close. Will the Hindus and the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal agree to redraw the boundaries of their provinces to make the scheme of Pakistan as flawless as it can be made ?

As for the Muslims, they ought to have no objection to redrawing the boundaries. If they do object, it must be said that they do not understand the nature of their own demand. This is quite possible, since the talk that is going on among Muslim protagonists of Pakistan, is of a very loose character. Some speak of Pakistan as a Muslim National State, others speak of it as a Muslim National Home. Neither care to know whether there is any difference between a National State and a National Home. But there can be no doubt that there is a vital difference between the two. What that difference is was discussed at great length at the time of constituting in Palestine a Jewish National Home. It seems that a clear conception of what this difference is, is necessary, if the likely Muslim opposition to the redrawing of the boundaries is to be overcome.

According to a leading authority :

" A National Home connotes a territory in which a people, without receiving the rights of political sovereignty, has nevertheless a recognised legal position and receives the opportunity of developing its moral, social and intellectual ideals. "

The British Government itself, in its statement on Palestine policy issued in 1922, defined its conception of the National Home in the following terms :

" When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish Community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should be known that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. This is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection. "

From this, it will be clear that there is an essential difference between a National Home and a National State. The difference consists in this : in the case of a National Home, the people who constitute it do not receive the right of Political sovereignty over the territory and the right of imposing their nationality on others also living in that territory. All that they get, is a recognized legal position guaranteeing them the right to live as citizens and freedom to maintain their culture. In the case of a National State, people constituting it, receive the rights of political sovereignty with the right of imposing their nationality upon the rest.

This difference is very important and it is in the light of this that one must examine their demand for Pakistan. What do the Muslim want Pakistan for ? If they want Pakistan to create a National Home for Muslims, there is no necessity for Pakistan. In the Pakistan Provinces, they already have their National Home with the legal right to live and advance their culture. If they want Pakistan to be a National Muslim State, they are claiming the right of political sovereignty over the territory included in it. This they are entitled to do. But the question is : Should they be allowed to retain, within the boundaries of these Muslim States, Non-Muslim minorities as their subjects, with a right to impose upon them the nationality of these Muslim States ? No doubt, such a right is accepted to be an accompaniment of political sovereignty. But it is equally true that in all mixed States, this right has become a source of mischief in modern times. To ignore the possibilities of such mischief in the creation of Pakistan will be to omit to read the bloody pages of recent history on which have been recorded the atrocities, murders, plunders and arsons committed by the Turks, Greeks, Bulgars and the Czechs against their minorities. It is possible to take away from a state this right of imposing its nationality upon its subjects, because it is incidental to political sovereignty. But it is possible not to provide any opportunity for the exercise of such a right. This can be done by allowing the Muslims to have such National Muslim States as are strictly homogeneous, strictly ethnic states. Under no circumstances can they be allowed to carve out mixed states composed of Muslims opposed to Hindus, with the former superior in number to the latter.

This is probably not contemplated by the Muslims who are the authors of Pakistan. It was certainly not contemplated by Sir M. Iqbal, the originator of the scheme. In his Presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930, he expressed his willingness to agree to " the exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some other districts where non-Muslims predominate " on the ground that such exclusion " will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population ". On the other hand, it may be that those who are putting forth the Scheme of Pakistan, do contemplate that it will include the Punjab and Bengal with their present boundaries. To them it must become clear, that to insist upon the present boundaries is sure to antagonise even those Hindus who have an open mind on the question. The Hindus can never be expected to consent to the inclusion of the Hindus in a Muslim State deliberately created for the preservation and propagation of Muslim faith and Muslim culture. The Hindus will no doubt oppose. Muslims must not suppose that it will take long to find them out. Muslims, if they insist upon the retention of the present boundaries, will open themselves to the accusation that behind their demand for Pakistan there is something more sinister than a mere desire to create a National Home or a National State. They will be accused of a design to perfect the scheme of Hindu hostages in Muslim hands by increasing the balance of Muslim majorities against Hindu minorities in the Muslim areas.

So much, for considerations which ought to weigh with the Muslims in the matter of changing the provincial boundaries to make Pakistan.

Now, as to the considerations which ought to weigh with the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindus are the more difficult of the two parties to the question. In this connection it is enough to consider the reaction of the high caste Hindus only. For, it is they who guide the Hindu masses and form Hindu opinion. Unfortunately, the high caste Hindus are bad as leaders. They have a trait of character which often leads the Hindus to disaster. This trait is formed by their acquisitive instinct and aversion to share with others the good things of life. They have a monopoly of education and wealth, and with wealth and education they have captured the State. To keep this monopoly to themselves has been the ambition and goal of their life. Charged with this selfish idea of class domination, they take every move to exclude the lower classes of Hindus from wealth, education and power, the surest and the most effective being the preparation of scriptures, inculcating upon the minds of the lower classes of Hindus the teaching that their duty in life is only to serve the higher classes. In keeping this monopoly in their own hands and excluding the lower classes from any share in it, the high caste Hindus have succeeded for a long time and beyond measure, it is only recently that the lower class Hindus rose in revolt against this monopoly by starting the Non-Brahmin Parties in the Madras and the Bombay Presidencies and the C. P. Still the high caste Hindus have successfully maintained their privileged position. This attitude of. keeping education, wealth and power as a close preserve for themselves and refusing to share it, which the high caste Hindus have developed in their relation with the lower classes of Hindus, is sought to be extended by them to the Muslims. They want to exclude the Muslims from place and power, as they have done to the lower class Hindus. This trait of the high caste Hindus is the key to the understanding of their politics.

Two illustrations reveal this trait of theirs. The Hindus in 1929 opposed the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency before the Simon Commission, strenuously and vehemently. But in 1915, the Hindus of Sind put forth the opposite plea and wanted Sind to be separated from Bombay. The reason in both the cases was the same. In 1915, there was no representative Government in Sind, which, if there was one would have undoubtedly been a Muslim Government. The Hindus advocated separation because in the absence of a Muslim Government, they could obtain jobs in Government in a greater degree. In 1929, they objected to the separation of Sind because they knew that a separate Sind would be under a Muslim Government, and a Muslim Government was sure to disturb their monopoly and displace them to make room for Muslim candidates. The opposition of the Bengali Hindus to the Partition of Bengal is another illustration of this trait of the high caste Hindus. The Bengali Hindu had the whole of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam and even U. P. for his pasture. He had captured the civil service in all these Provinces. The partition of Bengal meant a diminution in the area of this pasture. It means that the Bengali Hindu was to be ousted from Eastern Bengal to make room for the Bengali Musalman who had so far no place in the civil service of Bengal. The opposition to the partition of Bengal on the part of the Bengali Hindus, was due principally to their desire not to allow the Bengal Musalmans to take their place in Eastern Bengal. Little did the Bengali Hindus dream that by opposing partition and at the same time demanding Swaraj they were preparing the way for making the Musalmans the rulers of both Eastern as well as Western Bengal.

These thoughts occur to one's mind because one fears that the high caste Hindus, blinded by their hereditary trait, might oppose Pakistan for no other reason except that it limits the field for their self-seeking careers. Among the many reasons that might come in the way of Pakistan, one need not be surprised, if one of them happens to be the selfishness of the high caste Hindus.

There are two alternatives for the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal and they may be asked to face them fairly and squarely. The Muslims in the Punjab number 13,332,460 and the Hindus, with Sikhs and the rest, number 11,392,732. The difference is only 1,939,728. This means that the Muslim majority in the Punjab is only a majority of 8 p.c. Given these facts, which is better: To retain the unity of the Punjab and allow the Muslim majority of 54 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 46 p.c. or to redraw the boundaries, to allow the Muslims and the Hindus to be under separate national states, and thus rescue the whole body of Hindus from the terrors of the Muslim rule ?

The Muslims in Bengal number 27,497,624 and the Hindus number 21,570,407. The difference is only of 5,927,217. This means that the Muslim majority in Bengal is only a majority of 12 p.c. Given these facts, which is better : To oppose the creation of a National Muslim State out of Eastern Bengal and Sylhet by refusing to redraw the boundaries and allow the Muslim majority of only 12 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 44 p.c.; or to consent to redraw the boundaries, to have Muslims and Hindus placed under separate National States, and thus rescue the 44 p.c. of the Hindus from the horrors of the Muslim rule ?

Let the Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab consider which alternative they should prefer. It seems to me that the moment has come when the high caste Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab should be told that if they propose to resist Pakistan, because it cuts off a field for gainful employment, they are committing the greatest blunder. The time for successfully maintaining in their own hands a monopoly of place and power is gone. They may cheat the lower orders of the Hindus in the name of nationalism, but they cannot cheat the Muslim majorities in the Muslim Provinces and keep their monopoly of place and power. The resolution of the Hindus—if their cry against Pakistan can be regarded as such— to live under a Muslim majority and oppose self-determination may be a very courageous thing. But it will not be a very wise thing if the Hindus believe that they will be able to maintain their place and power by fooling the Musalmans. As Lincoln said, it is not possible to fool all people for all times. If the Hindus choose to live under a Muslim majority the chances are that they may loose all. On the other hand, if the Hindus of Bengal and the

Punjab agree to separate, true, they will not get more, but they will certainly not lose all.


Contents                                                                     PART III

 [f.1]Cunnigham's Ancient Geography of India (Ed. Majumdar), pp. 13-14. The writers of the Puranas divided India into nine divisions.

 [f.2]Sind was reoccupied by Mahommed Ghori.

 [f.3]Indian Islam by Dr. Titus, p. 10.

 [f.4]Quoted by Dr. Tilus—Ibid., p. 10.



 [f.7]Quoted by Lane Poole in Medieval India, p. 155.

 [f.8]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 22

 [f.9]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam,

 [f.10]p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

 [f.11]Lane Poole: Medieval India, p. 26

 [f.12]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, pp. 23-24.

 [f.13]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 24.


 [f.15]Ibid.. pp. 31-32.

 [f.16]Quoted by Dr. Titus—Indian Islam, p. 24.

 [f.17]lbid.,p.26 [f.17]

 [f.18]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 29

 [f.19]Ibid., p. 30.

 [f.20]Lane Poole : Medieval India, p. 104.

 [f.21]Quoted by Dr. Titus—Indian Islam, p. 29.

 [f.22]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources and by the Central Government from Central revenues.

 [f.23]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources and by the Central Government from Central revenues.

 [f.24]See his series of articles on " The Martial Races of India " published in the Modern Review for July 1930, September 1930, January 1931 and February 1931.

 [f.25]The Questionnaire circulated by the Committee included the following question:— " If an efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army be considered necessary for the safely of the Empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than amongst the weakest and least warlike races of India ?".......

 [f.26]In his Forty-One Years he wrote: " Each cold season, I made long lours in order to acquaint myself with the needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras Army. I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities which had distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century. . . And I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them, as it had died in the ordinary Hindustani of Bengal and the Mahratta of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safely be pitted against warlike races, or employed outside the limit of Southern India."

 [f27]Indian Social Reformer, January 27lh, 1940.

 [f.28]This table shows the percentage of men of each eligible class in the Indian Infantry (82 active and 18 training battations), the Indian Cavalry (21 regiments), and the 20 battalions of the Gurkha infantry. This table does not include the Indian personnel of (a) the 19 ballerics of Indian Mountain Artillery, and (b) 3 regiments of Sappers and Miners, (c) the Indian Signal Corps, and (d) the Corps of Indian Pioneers, all of which are composed of different proportions of the Punjabi Musalmans, Sikhs, Pathans, Hindustani Ilindus and Musalmans, Madrasis of all classes and Hazra Afghans, either in class units or class companies. Except that some units in these arms of the service are composed of the Madrasis and Hazras, now enrolled in other units of the Indian Army, the class composition of these units docs not materially alter the proportion of the classes as given in the table. This table does not also include the Indian personnel attached to the British Infantry and Artillery units.

 [f.29]Legislative Assembly Debales, 1938 Vol. VI, page 2462.

 [f.30]Legislative Assembly Debates, 193S, Vol. VI, page 2478.

 [f.31]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. VI, page 2754.

 [f.32]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol.VII, page 3313.

 [f.33]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1939, Vol. I, page 253.

 [f.34]MacMunn and Lovett, The Armies of India, pp. 84-85, quoted by Chaudhari

 [f.35]As quoted by Chaudhari

 [f.36]Imperial Rule in India, page 5.

 [f.37]Only 1/2 revenue is shown because nearly 1/2 population is Hindu.

 [f.38]It is perhaps not quite correct to speak of a Hindu Electorate. The Electorate is a General Electorate consisting of all those who are not included in any separate electorate. But as the majority in the General Electorate consists of Hindus, it is called a Hindu Electorate

 [f.39]Sind gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1.05,00,000.

 [f.40]North-West Frontier Province gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1,00,00,000

 [f.41]The leaders of the Muslim League seem to have studied deeply Hitler's bulling tactics against Czechoslovakia in the interest of the Sudeten Germans and also learned the lessons which those tactics teach. See their threatening speeches in the Karachi Session of the League held in 1937.