PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
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Contents
PART
V :
Chapter
XIII : Must there
be Pakistan
Chapter XIV : The problems of Pakistan
PART
V
Different
people have thought differently of what has been said in the foregoing pages on the
question of 'Pakistan. One set of people have alleged that I have only stated the two
sides of the issue and the problems arising out of it but have not expressed my personal
views on either of them. This is not correct. Anyone who has read the preceding parts will
have to admit that I have expressed my views in quite positive terms, if not on all,
certainly on many questions. In particular I may refer to two of the most important ones
in the controversy, namely, Are the Muslims a Nation, and Have they a case for Pakistan.
There are others whose line of criticism is of a different sort. They do not complain that
I have failed to express my personal views. What they complain is that in coming to my
conclusions I have relied on propositions as though they were absolute in their
application and have admitted no exception. I am told, " Have you not stated your
conclusions in too general terms ? Is not a general proposition subject to conditions and
limitations ? Have you not disposed of certain complicated problems in a brief and
cavalier fashion ? Have you shown how Pakistan can be brought into existence in a just and
peaceful manner ?" Even this criticism is not altogether correct. It is not right to
say that I have omitted to deal with these points. It may be that my treatment of them is
brief, and scattered. However, I am prepared to admit that there is much force in this
criticism and I am in duty bound to make good the default. This part is therefore intended
and is devoted to the consideration of the following subjects :—
1. What
ate the limiting considerations which affect the Muslim case for Pakistan ?
2. What
are the problems of Pakistan ? and what is their solution ?
3. Who has
the authority to decide the issue of Pakistan ?
MUST THERE BE PAKISTAN ?
I
With all that has gone before, the sceptic,
the nationalist, the conservative and the old-world Indian will not fail to ask "
Must there be Pakistan ?" No one can make light of such an attitude. For the problem
of Pakistan is indeed very grave and it must be admitted that the question is not only a
relevant and fair one to be put to the Muslims and to their protagonists but it is also
important. Its importance lies in the fact that the limitations on the case for Pakistan
are so considerable in their force that they can never be easily brushed aside. A mere
statement of these limitations should be enough to make one feel the force they have. It
is writ large on the very face of them. That being so, the burden of proof on the Muslims
for establishing an imperative need in favour of Pakistan is very heavy. Indeed the issue
of Pakistan or to put it plainly of partitioning India, is of such a grave character that
the Muslims will not only have to discharge this burden of proof but they will have to
adduce evidence of such a character as to satisfy the conscience of an international
tribunal before they can win their case. Let us see how the case for Pakistan stands in the light of these limitations.
II
Must there be Pakistan because a good part of
the Muslim population of India happens to be concentrated in certain defined areas which
can be easily severed from the rest of India ? Muslim population is admittedly
concentrated in certain well defined areas and it may be that these areas are severable.
But what of that ? In considering this question one must never lose sight of the
fundamental fact that nature has made India one single geographical unit. Indians are of
course quarrelling and no one can prophesy when they will stop quarrelling. But granting
the fact, what does it establish ? Only that Indians are a quarrelsome people. It does not
destroy the fact that India is a single geographical unit. Her unity is as ancient as
Nature. Within this geographic unit and covering the whole of it there has been a cultural
unity from time immemorial. This cultural unity has defied political and racial divisions.
And at any rate for the last hundred and fifty years all institutions—cultural,
political, economic, legal and administrative—have been working on a single, uniform
spring of action. In any discussion of Pakistan the fact cannot be lost sight of, namely,
that the starting point, if not the governing factor, is the fundamental unity of India.
For it is necessary to grasp the fact that there are really two cases of partition which
must be clearly distinguished. There is a case in which the starting point is a pre
existing state of separation so that partition is. only a dissolution of parts which were
once separate and which were subsequently joined together. This case is quite different
from another in which the starting point at all times is a state of unity. Consequently
partition in such a case is the severance of a territory which has been one single whole
into separate parts. Where the starting point is not unity of territory, i.e., where there
was disunity before there was unity, partition—which is only a return to the
original—may not give a mental shock. But in India the starting point is unity. Why
destroy its unity now, simply because some Muslims are dissatisfied ? Why tear it when the
unit is one single whole from historical times ?
III
Must there be Pakistan because there is
communal antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims ? That the communal antagonism
exists nobody can deny. The question however is, is the antagonism such that there is no
will to live together in one country and under one constitution ? Surely that will to live
together was not absent till 1937. During the formulation of the provisions of the
Government of India Act, 1935, both Hindus and Musalmans accepted the view that they must
live together under one constitution and in one country and participated in the
discussions that preceded the passing of the Act. And what was the state of communal
feeling in India between—say 1920 and 1935 ? As has been recorded in the preceding
pages, the history of India from 1920 up to 1935 has been one long tale of communal
conflict in which the loss of life and loss of property had reached a most shameful limit.
Never was the communal situation so acute as it was between this period of 15 years
preceding the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, and yet this long tale of
antagonism did not prevent the Hindus and the Musalmans from agreeing to live in a single
country and under a single constitution. Why make so much of communal antagonism now ?
Is India the only country where there is
communal antagonism ? What about Canada ? Consider what Mr. Alexander Brady 1[f.1] has to say on the relations between the English and the
French in Canada :—
" Of the four original provinces, three.
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario had populations substantially of the same
Anglo-Saxon stock and traditions. Originally a by-product of the American Revolution,
these colonies were established by the 50,000 United Empire Loyalists who trekked north
from persecution and cut their settlements out of the wilderness. Previous to the American
Revolution, Nova Scotia had received a goodly number of Scotch and American settlers, and
in all the colonies after the Revolution the Loyalist settlements were reinforced by
immigrants from Great Britain and Ireland."
*
*
*
*
" Very different was the province of
Quebec. French Canada in 1867 was a cultural unit by itself, divorced from the British
communities, by the barriers of race, language and religion. Its life ran in a different
mould. Stirred by a Catholic faith mediaeval in its intensity, it viewed with scant
sympathy the mingled Puritanism and other-worldliness of a Protestantism largely
Calvinistic. The religious faiths of the two peoples were indeed poles apart. In social,
if not always in religious, outlook, English
Protestantism tended towards democracy, realism and modernism: the Catholicism of the
French leaned to paternalism, idealism and a reverence for the past."
*
*
*
*
" What French Canada was in 1867 it
remains substantially today. It still cherishes beliefs, customs, and institutions which
have little hold on the English provinces. It has distinctive thought and enthusiasm, and
its own important values. Its attitude, for example, on marriage and divorce is in
conflict with the dominant view, not merely of the rest of Canada, but of the remainder of
Anglo-Saxon-North-America."
*
*
*
*
" The infrequency of intercourse between
the two peoples is illustrated in Canada's largest city, Montreal. About 63 per cent. of
the population is French and 24 per cent British. Here, if anywhere, is ample scope for
association, but in fact they remain apart and distinct except where business and politics
force them together. They have their own residential sections; their own shopping centres,
and if either is more notable for racial reserve, it is the English."
*
*
*
*
" The English-speaking residents of
Montreal, as a whole, have made no effort to know their French-speaking fellow citizens,
to learn their language, to understand their traditions and their aspirations, to observe
with a keen eye and a sympathetic mind their qualities and their defects. The separation
of the two peoples is encouraged by the barrier of language. There is a wealth of
significance in the fact revealed by the census of 1921 ; viz., that about 50 per cent. of
the Canadians of French origin were unable to speak English and 95 per cent. of those of
British origin were unable to speak French. Even in Montreal, 70 per cent. of the British
could not speak French and 34 per cent. of the French could not speak English. The absence
of a common language maintains a chasm between the two nationalities and prevents fusion.
" The significance of Confederation is
that it provided an instrument of government which enabled the French, while retaining
their distinct national life, to become happy partners with the British and attain a
Canadian super-nationality, embracing a loyally extending beyond their own group to that
of the Dominion as a whole."
*
*
*
*
" While the federal system successfully
opened the path for a wider nationality in Canada, the co-operation which it sponsored has
at times been subjected to severe strain by the violent clash of opinion between the
French and the British. The super-nationality has indeed often been reduced to a
shadow."
What about South Africa ? Let those who do
not know the relationship between the Boers and the British ponder over what ,Mr. E. H.
Brooks 2 [f2]has to say :—
" How far is South African nationalism
common to both the white races of South Africa ? There is, of course, a very real and
intense Afrikander nationalism ; but it is, generally speaking, a sentiment confined to
one of the white races, and characterised, significantly enough, by a love of the Afrikans
language, the tongue of the early settlers from Holland, as modified slightly by Huguenot
and German influence, and greatly by the passage of time. Afrikander nationalism has a
tendency to be exclusive, and has little place for the man who, while in every way a
devoted son of South Africa, is wholly or mainly English-speaking."
*
* * *
" Is there a South African nation today
?
" There are certain factors in South
African life which militate against an affirmative answer."
*
* * *
" Among English-speaking South Africans
there are found many tendencies inclined to hinder the cause of national unity. With all
the great virtues of the race they have its one cardinal defect—a lack of
imagination, a difficulty in putting one's self in the other man's place. Nowhere does
this come out more clearly than in the language question. Until recently comparatively few
English-speaking South Africans have studied Africans except as a business proposition or
(as in the Civil Service) more or less under compulsion;
and fewer still have used it conversationally. Many have treated it with open
contempt—a contempt in inverse proportion to their knowledge of it—and the
majority with mere tolerance, exasperated or amused according to temperament."
Another witness on the same point may be
heard. He is Mr. Manfred Nathan. 3 [f3]This is what he has to say on the relations between the
Boers and the British in South Africa :—
" They are also, in the main, both of
them Protestant peoples—although this is not of too great importance nowadays, when
differences of religion do not count for much. They engage freely in commercial
transactions with each other."
*
* * *
" Nevertheless it cannot with truth be
said that hitherto there has been absolutely free social intercourse between these two
great sections of the white population. It has been suggested that this is partly due to
the fact that in the large urban centres the population is predominantly English, and that
the townsfolk know little of the people in the country and their ways of life. But even in
the country towns, though there is, as a rule, much greater friendliness, and much
hospitality shown by Boers to visitors, there is not much social intercourse between the
two sections apart from necessary business or professional relationship, and such social
functions, charitable or public, as require co-operation."
Obviously India is not the only place where
there is communal antagonism. If communal antagonism does not come in the way of the
French in Canada living in political unity with the English, if it does not come in the
way of the English in South Africa living in political unity with the Dutch, if it does
not come in the way of the French and the Italians in Switzerland living in political
unity with the Germans why then should it be impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims to
agree to live together under one constitution in India?
IV
Must there be Pakistan because the Muslims
have lost faith in the Congress majority ? As reasons for the loss of faith Muslims cite
some instances of tyranny and oppression practised by the Hindus and connived at by the
Congress Ministries during the two years and three months the Congress was in office.
Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah did not persist in his demand for a Royal Commission to inquire
into these grievances. If he had done it we could have known what truth there was in these
complaints. A perusal of these instances, as given in the reports 4[f.4] of the Muslim
League Committees, leaves upon the reader the impression that although there may be some
truth in the allegations there is a great deal which is pure exaggeration. The Congress
Ministries concerned have issued statements repudiating the charges. It may be that the
Congress during the two years and three months that it was in office did not show
statesmanship, did not inspire confidence in the minorities, nay tried to suppress them.
But can it be a reason for partitioning
India ? Is it not possible to hope that the voters who supported the Congress last time
will grow wiser and not support the Congress ? Or may it not be that if the Congress
returns to office it will profit by the mistakes it has made, revise its mischievous
policy and thereby allay the fear created by its past conduct ?
V
Must there be Pakistan because the Musalmans
are a nation ? It is a pity that Mr. Jinnah should have become a votary and champion of
Muslim Nationalism at a time when the whole world is decrying against the evils of
nationalism and is seeking refuge in some kind of international organization. Mr. Jinnah
is so obsessed with his new-found faith in Muslim Nationalism that he is not prepared to
see that there is a distinction between a society, parts of which are disintegrated, and a
society parts of which have become only loose, which no sane man can ignore. When a
society is disintegrating—and the two nation theory is a positive disintegration of
society and country—it is evidence of the fact that there do not exist what Carlyle
calls " organic filaments "—i.e., the vital forces which work to bind
together the parts that are cut asunder. In such cases disintegration can only be
regretted. It cannot be prevented. Where, however, such organic filaments do exist, it is
a crime to overlook them and deliberately force the disintegration of society and country
as the Muslims seem to be doing. If the Musalmans want to be a different nation it is not
because they have been but because they want to be. There is much in the Musalmans which,
if they wish, can roll them into a nation. But isn't there enough that is common to both
Hindus and Musalmans, which if developed, is capable of moulding them into one people ?
Nobody can deny that there are many modes, manners, rites and customs which are common to
both. Nobody can deny that there are rites, customs and usages based on religion which do
divide Hindus and Musalmans. The question is, which of these should be emphasized. If the
emphasis is laid on things that are common, there need be no two nations in India. If the
emphasis is laid on points of difference, it will no doubt give rise to two nations. The
view that seems to guide Mr. Jinnah is that Indians are only a people and that they can
never be a nation. This follows the line of British writers who make it a point of
speaking of Indians as the people of India and avoid speaking of the Indian nation.
Granted Indians are not a nation, that they are only a people. What of that ? History
records that before the rise of nations as great corporate personalities, there were only
peoples. There is nothing to be ashamed if Indians are no more than a people. Nor is there
any cause for despair that the people of India—if they wish—will not become one
nation. For, as Disraeli said, a nation is a work of art and a work of time. If the Hindus
and Musalmans agree to emphasize the things that bind them and forget those that separate
them there is no reason why in course of time they should not grow into a nation. It may
be that their nationalism may not be quite so integrated as that of the French or the
Germans. But they can easily produce a common state of mind on common questions which is
the sum total which the spirit of nationalism helps to produce and for which it is so much
prized. Is it right for the Muslim League to emphasize only differences and ignore
altogether the forces that bind ? Let it not be forgotten that if two nations come into
being it will not be because it is predestined. It will be the result of deliberate
design.
The Musalmans of India as I have said are not
as yet a nation in the de jure or de facto sense of the term and all that can be said is
that they have in them the elements necessary to make them a nation. But granting that the
Musalmans of India are a nation, is India the only country where there are going to be two
nations ? What about Canada ? Everybody knows that there are in Canada two nations, the
English and the French. Are there not two nations in South Africa, the English and the Dutch ? What about
Switzerland ? Who does not know that there are three nations living in Switzerland, the
Germans, the French and the Italians ? Have the French in Canada demanded partition
because they are a separate nation ? Do the English claim partition of South Africa
because they are a distinct nation from the Boers ? Has anybody ever heard that the
Germans, the French and the Italians have ever agitated for the fragmentation of
Switzerland because they are all different nations ? Have the Germans, the French and the
Italians ever felt that they would lose their distinctive cultures if they lived as
citizens of one country and under one constitution ? On the contrary, all these distinct
nations have been content to live together in one country under one constitution without
fear of losing their nationality and their distinctive cultures. Neither have the French
in Canada ceased to be French by living with the English, nor have the English ceased to
be English by living with the Boers in South Africa. The Germans, the French and the
Italians have remained distinct nations notwithstanding their common allegiance to a
common country and a common constitution. The case of Switzerland is worthy of note. It is
surrounded by countries, the nationalities of which have a close religious and racial
affinity with the nationalities of Switzerland. Notwithstanding these affinities the
nationalities in Switzerland have been Swiss first and Germans, Italians and French
afterwards.
Given the experience of the French in Canada,
the English in South Africa and the French and the Italians in Switzerland, the questions
that arise are, why should it be otherwise in India ? Assuming that the Hindus and the
Muslims split into two nations, why cannot they live in one country and under one
constitution ? Why should the emergence of the two-nation theory make partition necessary
? Why should the Musalmans be afraid of losing their nationality and national culture by
living with the Hindus ? If the Muslims insist on separation, the cynic may well conclude
that there is so much that is common between the Hindus and the Musalmans that the Muslim
leaders are afraid that unless there is partition whatever little distinctive Islamic
culture is left with the Musalmans will eventually vanish by continued social contact with
the Hindus with the result that in the end instead of two nations there will grow up in
India one nation. If the Muslim nationalism is so thin then the motive for partition is
artificial and the case for Pakistan loses its very basis.
VI
Must there be Pakistan because otherwise
Swaraj will be a Hindu Raj ? The Musalmans are so easily carried away by this cry that it
is necessary to expose the fallacies underlying it.
In the first place, is the Muslim objection
to Hindu Raj a conscientious objection or is it a political objection If it is a conscientious objection all one can say
is that it is a very strange sort of conscience. There are really millions of Musalmans in
India who are living under unbridled and uncontrolled Hindu Raj of Hindu Princes and no
objection to it has been raised by the Muslims or the Muslim League. The Muslims had once
a conscientious objection to the British Raj. Today not only have they no objection to it
but they are the greatest supporters of it. That there should be no objection to British
Raj or to undiluted Hindu Raj of a Hindu Prince but that there should be objection to
Swaraj for British India on the ground that it is Hindu Raj as though it was not subjected
to checks and balances is an attitude the logic of which it is difficult to follow.
The political objections to Hindu Raj rest on
various grounds. The first ground is that Hindu society is not a democratic society. True,
it is not It may not be right to ask whether the Muslims have taken any part in the
various movements for reforming Hindu society as distinguished from proselytising. But it
is right to ask if the Musalmans are the only sufferers from the evils that admittedly
result from the undemocratic character of Hindu society. Are not the millions of Shudras
and non-Brahmins or millions of the Untouchables, suffering the worst consequences of the
undemocratic character of Hindu society ? Who benefits from education, from public service
and from political reforms except the Hindu governing class—composed of the higher
castes of the Hindus—which form not even 10 per cent. of the total Hindu population ?
Has not the governing class of the Hindus, which controls Hindu politics, shown more
regard for safeguarding the rights and interests of the Musalmans than they have for
safeguarding the rights and interests of the Shudras and the Untouchables ? Is not Mr.
Gandhi, who is determined to oppose any political concession to the Untouchables, ready to
sign a blank cheque in favour of the Muslims ? Indeed, the Hindu governing class seems to
be far more ready to share power with the Muslims than it is to share power with the
Shudras and the Untouchables. Surely, the Muslims have the least ground to complain of the
undemocratic character of Hindu society.
Another ground on which the Muslim objection
to Hindu Raj rests is that the Hindus are a majority community and the Musalmans are a
minority community. True. But is India the only country where such a situation exists ?
Let us compare the conditions in India with the conditions in Canada, South Africa and
Switzerland. First, take the distribution of population. In Canada 5[f.5] out of a total population of 10,376,786 only 2,927,990 are
French. In South Africa 6 [f6]the Dutch number 1,120,770 and the English are only 783,071.
In Switzerland 7[f.7] out of the
total population of 4,066,400 the Germans are 2,924,313, the French 831,097 and the
Italians 242,034.
This shows that the smaller nationalities
have no fear of being placed under the Raj of a major community. Such a notion seems to be
quite foreign to them. Why is this so? Is it because there is no possibility of the major
nationality establishing its supremacy in those centres of power and authority, namely the
Legislature and in the Executive ? Quite the contrary. Unfortunately no figures are
available to show the actual extent of representation which the different major and minor
nationalities have in Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. That is because there is no
communal reservation of seats such as is found in India. Each community is left to win in
a general contest what number of seats it can. But it is quite easy to work out the
probable number of seats which each nationality can obtain on the basis of the ratio of
its population to the total seats in the Legislature Proceeding on this basis what do we
find? In Switzerland the total representatives in the Lower House is 187. Out of them the
German population has a possibility of winning 138, French 42 and Italians only 7 seats.
In South Africa out of the total of 153, there is a possibility of the English gaining 62,
and the Dutch 94 seats. In Canada the total is 245. Of these the French 8 [f.8] have only 65. On this basis it is quite clear that in all
these countries there is a possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy
over the minor nationalities. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that speaking de jure
and as a mere matter of form in Canada the French are living under the British Raj, the
English in South Africa under the Dutch Raj, and the Italians and French in Switzerland
under the German Raj. But what is the position de facto ? Have Frenchmen in Canada raised
a cry that they will not live under British Raj ? Have Englishmen in South Africa raised a
cry that they will not live under Dutch Raj ? Have the French and Italians in Switzerland
any objection to living under the German Raj ? Why should then the Muslims raise this cry
of Hindu Raj ?
Is it proposed that the Hindu Raj should be
the rule of a naked communal majority ? Are not the Musalmans granted safeguards against
the possible tyranny of the Hindu majority ? Are not the safeguards given to the Musalmans
of India wider and better than the safeguards which have been given to the French in
Canada, to the English in South Africa and to the French and the Italians in Switzerland?
To take only one item from the list of safeguards. Haven't the Musalmans got an enormous
degree of weightage in representation in the Legislature ? Is weightage known in Canada,
South Africa or Switzerland ? And what is the effect of this weightage to Muslims ? Is it
not to reduce the Hindu majority in the Legislature? What is the degree of reduction?
Confining ourselves to British India and taking account only of the representation granted
to the territorial constituencies, Hindu and Muslim, in the Lower House in the Central
Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, it is clear that out of a total of
187, the Hindus have 105 seats and the Muslims have 82 seats. Given these figures one is
forced to ask where is the fear of the Hindu Raj ?
If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no
doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country. No matter what the Hindus say, Hinduism
is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that account it is incompatible with
democracy. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost. But is Pakistan the true remedy
against it ? What makes communal Raj possible is a marked disproportion in the relative
strength of the various communities living in a country. As pointed out above, this
disproportion is not more marked in India than it is in Canada, South Africa and
Switzerland. Nonetheless there is no British Raj in Canada, no Dutch Raj in South Africa,
and no German Raj in Switzerland. How have the French, the English and the Italians
succeeded in preventing the Raj of the majority community being established in their
country ? Surely not by partition : What is their method ? Their method is to put a ban on
communal parties in politics. No community in Canada, South Africa or Switzerland ever
thinks of starting a separate communal party. What is important to note is that it is the
minority nations which have taken the lead in opposing the formation of a communal party.
For they know that if they form a communal political party the major community will also
form a communal party and the majority community will thereby find it easy to establish
its communal Raj. It is a vicious method of self-protection. It is because the minority
nations are fully aware how they will be hoisted on their own petard that they have
opposed the formation of communal political parties.
Have the Muslims thought of this method of
avoiding Hindu Raj. Have they considered how easy it is to avoid it ? Have they considered
how futile and harmful the present policy of the League is ? The Muslims are howling
against the Hindu Maha Sabha and its slogan of Hindudom and Hindu Raj. But who is
responsible for this ? Hindu Maha Sabha and Hindu Raj are the inescapable nemesis which
the Musalmans have brought upon themselves by having a Muslim League. It is action and
counter-action. One gives rise to the other. Not partition, but the abolition, of the
Muslim League and the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims is the only
effective way of burying the ghost of Hindu Raj. It is, of course, not possible for
Muslims and other minority parties to join the Congress or the Hindu Maha Sabha so long as
the disagreement on the question of constitutional safeguards continues. But this question
will be settled, is bound to be settled and there is every hope that the settlement will
result in securing to the Muslims and other minorities the safeguards they need. Once this
consummation, which we so devoutly wish, takes place nothing can stand in the way of a
party re-alignment, of the Congress and the Maha Sabha breaking up and of Hindus and
Musalmans forming mixed political parties based on an agreed programme of social and
economic regeneration, and thereby avoid the danger of both Hindu Raj or Muslim Raj
becoming a fact. Nor should the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims be
difficult in India. There are many lower orders in the Hindu society whose economic,
political and social needs are the same as those of the majority of the Muslims and they
would be far more ready to make a common cause with the Muslims for achieving common ends
than they would with the high caste of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of
ordinary human rights for centuries. To pursue such a course cannot be called an
adventure. The path along that line is a well trodden path. Is it not a fact that under
the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in most Provinces, if not in all, the Muslims, the
Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes united together and worked the reforms as members
of one team from 1920 to 1937 ? Herein lay the most fruitful method of achieving communal
harmony among Hindus and Muslims and of destroying the danger of a Hindu Raj. Mr. Jinnah
could have easily pursued this line. Nor was it difficult for Mr. Jinnah to succeed in it.
Indeed Mr. Jinnah is the one person who had all the chances of success on his side if he
had tried to form such a united non-communal party. He has the ability to organize. He had
the reputation of a nationalist. Even many Hindus who were opposed to the Congress would
have flocked to him if he had only sent out a call for a united party of like-minded
Hindus and Muslims. What did Mr. Jinnah do ? In 1937 Mr. Jinnah made his entry into Muslim
politics and strangely enough he regenerated the Muslim League which was dying and
decaying and of which only a few years ago he would have been glad to witness the funeral.
However regrettable the starting of such a communal political party may have been, there
was in it one relieving feature. That was the leadership of Mr. Jinnah. Everybody felt
that with the leadership of Mr. Jinnah the League could never become a merely communal
party. The resolutions passed by the League during the first two years of its new career
indicated that it would develop into a mixed political party of Hindus and Muslims. At the
annual session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 1937 altogether 15
resolutions were passed. The following two are of special interest in this connection.
" This meeting of the All India Muslim
League deprecates and protests against the formation of Ministries in certain Provinces by
the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and the spirit of the Government
of India Act, 1935, and Instrument of Instructions and condemns the Governors for their
failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the interest
of the Musalmans and other important minorities"
Resolution* No. 8:
" Resolved that the object of the All
India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of Full Independence in the form
of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Musalmans
and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the constitution."
Equal number of resolutions were passed at
the next annual session of the League held at Patna in December 1938. Resolution* No. 10
is noteworthy. It reads as follows :—
"The All India Muslim League reiterates
its view that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is
not acceptable, but in view of the further developments that have taken place or may take
place from time to time it hereby authorises the President of the All India Muslim League
to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a
suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other
minorities in India." By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a common
front between the Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately the catholicity
and statesmanship that underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr. Jinnah
took a somersault and outlined the dangerous and disastrous policy of isolation of the
Musalmans by passing that notorious resolution in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason
for this isolation ? Nothing but the change of view that the Musalmans were a nation and
not a community ! ! One need not quarrel over the question whether the Muslims are a
nation or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to understand how the mere
fact that the Muslims are a nation makes political isolation a safe and sound policy ?
Unfortunately Muslims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them by this
policy. But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has achieved by making the Muslim League
the only organization for the Musalmans. It may be that it has helped him to avoid the
possibility of having to play the second fiddle. For inside the Muslim camp he can always
be sure of the first place for himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan
of isolation the Muslims from Hindu Raj ? Will Pakistan obviate the establishment of Hindu
Raj in Provinces in which the Musalmans are in a minority ? Obviously it cannot. This is
what would happen in the Muslim minority Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India
view. Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of Hindu Raj at the centre over Muslim
minorities that will remain Hindustan? It is plain that it cannot. What good is Pakistan
then ? Only to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a majority and
in which there could never be Hindu Raj ! ! To put it differently Pakistan is unnecessary
to Muslims where they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj. It
is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority, because Pakistan or no
Pakistan they will have to face a Hindu Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics
of the Muslim League ? The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims and has ended by
espousing the cause of majority Muslims. What a perversion in the original aim of the
Muslim League ! What a fall from the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy
against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.
VI
These are some of the weaknesses in the
Muslim case for Pakistan which have occurred to me. There might be others which have not
struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formidable one. How do the Muslims propose to
meet them ? That is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty as a student of the
subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses. That I have done. I have nothing more
to answer for.
There are, however, two other questions of
such importance that this discussion cannot be closed with any sense of completeness
without reference to them. The purpose of these questions is to clear the ground between
myself and my critics. Of these questions, one I am entitled to ask the critics, the other
the critics are entitled to ask me.
Beginning with the first question, what I
feel like asking the critics is, what good do they expect from a statement of these
weaknesses ? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan if they are defeated in a
controversy over the virtues of Pakistan ? That of course depends upon what method is
adopted to resolve this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow the procedure
which Christian missionaries had set up in early times in order to secure converts from
amongst the Hindus. According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputation,
which was open to public, between a Christian missionary and a Brahmin, the former
representing the Christian religion and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist
of the Hindu religion with the condition that whoever failed to meet the case against his
religion was bound to accept the religion of the other. If such a method of resolving the
dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon
there may be some use in setting out this string of weaknesses. But let it not be
forgotten that there is another method of disposing of a controversy which maybe called
Johnsonian after the manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with arguments of Bishop
Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told Dr. Johnson that the doctrine of
Bishop Berkeley that matter was non-existent and that everything in the universe was
merely ideal, was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to refute it. Dr.
Johnson with great alacrity answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large
stone, till he rebounded from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the
Musalmans will agree, as most rational people do, to have their case for Pakistan decided
by the tests of reason and argument. But I should not be surprised if the Muslims decided
to adopt the method of Dr. Johnson and say " Damn your arguments ! We want
Pakistan." In that event the critic must realize that any reliance placed upon the
limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of no avail. It is therefore no
use being jubilant over the logic of these objections to Pakistan.
Let me now turn to the other question which I
said the critic is entitled to put to me. What is my position regarding the issue of
Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out ? I have no doubts as to my
position. I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters that
follow, if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I
know my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so
extraordinary a conclusion— extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the
earlier part of this chapter that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can
be said to carry the compelling force which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said
to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case
for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have Pakistan there is no escape from
conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led me to that conclusion I shall not
hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not one of them.
In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue. First is
the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard
them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.
To begin with the first. One cannot ignore
that what is important is not the winning of independence but the having of the sure means
of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the independence of a country is a safe
army—an army on which you can rely to fight for the country at all time and in any
eventuality. The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed of Hindus and
Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can the Muslims in the army be trusted to
defend India ? Suppose invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the
invaders or will they stand against them and save India ? This is a very crucial question.
Obviously, the answer to this question must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the
army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the foundation of
Pakistan. If they are infected, then the army in India cannot be safe. Instead of being
the guardian of the independence of India, it will continue to be a menace and a potential
danger to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I hear some Britishers argue that
it is for the defence of India that they must reject Pakistan. Some Hindus also sing the
same tune. I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the determining factor
in the independence of India is or that they are talking of the defence of India not as an
independent country responsible for its own defence but as a British possession to be
defended by them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of vision. The
question is not whether the British will be able to defend India better if there was no
partition of India. The question is whether Indians will be able to defend a free India.
To that, I repeat, the only answer is that Indians will be able to defend a free India on
one and one condition alone—namely, if the army in India remains non-political,
unaffected by the poison of Pakistan. I want to warn Indians against the most stupid habit
that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of Swaraj without reference
to the question of the army. Nothing can be more fatal than the failure to realize that a
political army is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than having no
army.
Equally important is the fact that the army
is the ultimate sanction which sustains Government in the exercise of its authority inside
the country, when it is challenged by a rebellious or recalcitrant element. Suppose the
Government of the day enunciates a policy which is vehemently opposed by a section of the
Muslims. Suppose the Government of the day is required to use its army to enforce its
policy. Can the Government of the day depend upon the Muslims in the army to obey its
orders and shoot down the Muslim rebels ? This again depends upon to what extent the
Muslims in the army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory. If they have
caught it, India cannot have a safe and secure Government.
Turning to the second governing factor the
Hindus do not seem to attach any value to sentiment as a force in politics. The Hindus
seem to rely upon two grounds to win against the Muslims. The first is that even if the
Hindus and the Muslims are two nations, they can live under one state. The other is that
the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on strong sentiment rather than upon clear
argument. I don't know how long the Hindus are going to fool themselves with such
arguments. It is true that the first argument is not without precedent. At the same time
it does not call for much intelligence to see that its value is extremely limited. two nations and one state is a pretty plea. It has
the same attraction which a sermon has and may result in the conversion of Muslim leaders.
But instead of being uttered as a sermon if it is intended to issue it as an ordinance for
the Muslims to obey it will be a mad project to which no sane man will agree. It will, I
am sure, defeat the very purpose of Swaraj. The second argument is equally silly. That the
Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on sentiment is far from being a matter of weakness;
it is really its strong point. It does not need deep understanding of politics to know
that the workability of a constitution is not a matter of theory. It is a matter of
sentiment. A constitution like clothes must suit as well as please. If a constitution does
not please, then, however perfect it may be, it will not work. To have a constitution
which runs counter to the strong sentiments of a determined section is to court disaster
if not to invite rebellion.
It is not realized by the Hindus that,
assuming there is a safe army, rule by armed forces is not the normal method of governing
a people. Force, it cannot be denied, is the medicine of the body politic and must be
administered when the body politic becomes sick. But just because force is the medicine of
the body politic it cannot be allowed to become its daily bread. A body politic must work
as a matter of course by springs of action which are natural. This can happen only when
the different elements constituting the body politic have the will to work together and to
obey the laws and orders passed by a duly constituted authority. Suppose the new
constitution for a United India contained in it all the provisions necessary to safeguard
the interests of the Muslims. But suppose the Muslims said " Thank you for your
safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you " ; and suppose they boycott the
Legislatures, refuse to obey laws, oppose the payment of taxes ; what is to happen ? Are
the Hindus prepared to extract obedience from Muslims by the use of Hindu bayonets ? Is
Swaraj to be an opportunity to serve the people or is it to be an opportunity for Hindus
to conquer the Musalmans and for the Musalmans to conquer the Hindus ? Swaraj must be a
Government of the people by the people and for the people. This is the raison d'etre of
Swaraj and the only justification for Swaraj. If Swaraj is to usher in an era in which the
Hindus and the Muslims will be engaged in scheming against each other, the one planning to
conquer its rival, why should we have Swaraj and why should the democratic nations allow
such a Swaraj to come into existence ? It will be a snare, a delusion and a perversion.
The non-Muslims do not seem to be aware that
they are presented with a situation in which they are forced to choose between various
alternatives. Let me state them. In the first place they have to choose between Freedom of
India and the Unity of India. If the non-Muslims will insist on the Unity of India they
put the quick realization of India's freedom into jeopardy. The second choice relates to
the surest method of defending India, whether they can depend upon Muslims in a free and
united India to develop and sustain along with the non-Muslims the necessary will to
defend the common liberties of both: or whether it is better to partition India and
thereby ensure the safety of Muslim India by leaving its defence to the Muslims and of
non-Muslim India by leaving its defence to non-Muslims.
As to the first, I prefer Freedom of India to
the Unity of India. The Sinn Feinners who were the staunchest of nationalists to be found
anywhere in the world and who like the Indians were presented with similar alternatives
chose the freedom of Ireland to the unity of Ireland. The non-Muslims who are opposed to
partition may well profit by the advice tendered by the Rev. Michael O'Flanagan, at one
time Vice-President of the Feinns to the Irish Nationalists on the issue of the partition
of Ireland. 10[f.10] Said the Rev.
Father :—
" If we reject Home Rule rather than
agree to the exclusion of the Unionist parts of Ulster, what case have we to put before
the world ? We can point out that Ireland is an island with a definite geographical
boundary. That argument might be all right if we were appealing to a number of Island
nationalities that had themselves definite geographical boundaries. Appealing, as we are,
to continental nations with shifting boundaries, that argument will have no force
whatever. National and geographical boundaries scarcely ever coincide. Geography would
make one nation of Spain and Portugal; history has made two of them. Geography did its
best to make one nation of Norway and Sweden ; history has succeeded in making two of
them. Geography has scarcely anything to say to the number of nations upon the North
American continent; history has done the whole thing. If a man were to try to construct a
political map of Europe out of its physical map, he would find himself groping in the
dark. Geography has worked hard to make one nation out of Ireland; history has. worked
against it. The island of Ireland and the national unit of Ireland simply do not coincide.
In the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of the people."
These words have emanated from a profound
sense of realism which we in India so lamentably lack.
On the second issue I prefer the partitioning
of India into Muslim India and non-Muslim India as the surest and safest method of
providing for the defence of both. It is certainly the safer of the two alternatives. I
know it will be contended that my fears about the loyalty of the Muslims in the army to a
Free and United India arising from the infection of the two nation theory is only an
imaginary fear. That is no doubt true. That does not militate against the soundness of the
choice I have made. I may be wrong. But I certainly can say without any fear of
contradiction that, to use the words of Burke, it is better to be ridiculed for too great
a credulity than to be ruined by too confident a sense of security. I don't want to leave
things to chance. To leave so important an issue, as the defence of India, to. chance is
to be guilty of the grossest crime.
Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for
Pakistan unless he is forced to do so. At the same time, it would be a folly not to face
what is inevitable and face it with courage and common sense. Equally would it be a folly
to lose the. Part one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the whole.
These are the reasons why I hold that if the
Musalman will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then Pakistan must come. So far as I am
concerned the only important question is : Are the Musalmans determined to have Pakistan ?
Or is Pakistan a mere cry ? Is it only a passing mood ? Or does it represent their
permanent aspiration ? On this there may be difference of opinion. Once it becomes certain
that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to
concede the principle of it.
THE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN
I
Among the many problems to which the
partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan must give rise will be the following three
problems:—
(1) The problem of the allocation of the financial
assets and liabilities of the present Government of India,
(2) The problem of the delimitation of the areas,
and
(3) The problem of the transfer of population from
Pakistan to Hindustan and vice versa.
Of these problems the first is consequential,
in the sense, that it would be worth while to consider it only when the partition of India
has been agreed to by the parties concerned. The two other problems stand on a different
footing. They are conditions precedent to Pakistan in the sense that there are many people
who will not make up their mind on Pakistan unless they are satisfied that some reasonable
and just solution of them is possible. I will, therefore, confine myself to the
consideration only of the last two problems of Pakistan.
II
On the question of the boundaries of Pakistan
we have had so far no clear and authoritative statement from the Muslim League. In fact it
is one of the complaints made by the Hindus that while Mr. Jinnah has been carrying on a
whirlwind campaign in favour of Pakistan, which has resulted in fouling the political
atmosphere in the country, Mr. Jinnah has not thought fit to inform his critics of the
details regarding the boundaries of his proposed Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah's argument has all
along been that any discussion regarding the boundaries of Pakistan is premature and that
the boundaries of Pakistan will be a matter for discussion when the principle of Pakistan
has been admitted. It may be a good rhetorical answer, but it certainly does not help
those who wish to apply their mind without taking sides to offer whatever help they can to
bring about a peaceful solution of this problem. Mr. Jinnah seems to be under the
impression that if a person is committed to the principle of Pakistan he will be bound to
accept Mr. Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. There cannot be a greater mistake than this. A
person may accept the principle of Pakistan, which only means the partition of India. But
it is difficult to understand how the acceptance of this principle can commit him to Mr.
Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. Indeed if no plan of Pakistan is satisfactory to him he will be
quite free to oppose any form of Pakistan although he may be in favour of the principle of
Pakistan. The plan of Pakistan and the principle of Pakistan are therefore two quite
distinct propositions. There is nothing wrong in this view. By way of illustration it may
be said that the principle of self-determination is like an explosive substance. One may
agree in principle to its use when the necessity and urgency of the occasion is proved.
But no one can consent to the use of the dynamite without first knowing the area that is
intended to be blown up. If the dynamite is going to blow up the whole structure or if it
is not possible to localize its application to a particular part he may well refuse to
apply the dynamite and prefer to use some other means of solving the problem.
Specifications of boundary lines seem therefore to be an essential preliminary for working
out in concrete shape the principle of Pakistan. Equally essential it is for a bona fide
protagonist of Pakistan not to hide from the public the necessary particulars of the
scheme of Pakistan. Such contumacy and obstinacy as shown by Mr. Jinnah in refusing to
declare the boundaries of his Pakistan is unforgivable in a statesman. Nevertheless those
who are interested in solving the question of Pakistan need not wait to resolve the
problems of Pakistan until Mr. Jinnah condescends to give full details. Only one has to
carry on the argument on the basis of certain assumptions. In this discussion I will
assume that what the Muslim League desires is that the boundaries of the Western Pakistan
should be the present boundaries of the Provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab,
Sind and Baluchistan, and that the boundaries of Eastern Pakistan should be the boundaries
of the present Province of Bengal with a few districts of Assam thrown in.
Ill
The question for consideration therefore is :
Is this a just claim ? The claim is said to be founded on the principle of
self-determination. To be able to assess the justice of this claim it is necessary to have
a clear understanding of the scope and limitations of the principle of self-determination.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a complete lack of such an understanding. It is therefore
necessary to begin with the question : What is the de facto and de jure' connotation of
this principle of self-determination ? The term self-determination has become current
since the last few years. But it describes something which is much older. The idea
underlying self-determination has developed along two different lines. During the 19th
century self-determination meant the right to establish a form of government in accordance
with the wishes of the people. Secondly, self-determination has meant the right to obtain
national independence from an alien race irrespective of the form of government. The
agitation for Pakistan has reference to self-determination in its second aspect.
Confining the discussion to this aspect of
Pakistan it seems to me essential that the following points regarding the issue of
self-determination should be borne in mind.
In the first place, self-determination must
be by the people. This point is too simple even to need mention. But it has become
necessary to emphasize it. Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Maha Sabha seem to be
playing fast and loose with the idea of self-determination. An area is claimed by the
Muslim League for inclusion in Pakistan because the
people of the area are Muslims. An area is also claimed for being included in Pakistan
because the ruler of the area is a Muslim though the majority of the people of that area
are non-Muslims. The Muslim League is claiming the benefit of self-determination in India.
At the same time the League is opposed to self-determination being applied to Palestine.
The League claims Kashmir as a Muslim State because the majority of people are Muslims and
also Hyderabad because the ruler is Muslim. In like manner the Hindu Maha Sabha claims an
area to be included in Hindustan because the people of the area are non-Muslims. It also
comes forward to claim an area to be a part of Hindustan because the ruler is a Hindu
though the majority of the people are Muslims. Such strange and conflicting claims are
entirely due to the fact that either the parties to Pakistan, namely, the Hindus and the
Muslims do not understand what self-determination means or are busy in perverting the
principle of self-determination to enable them to justify themselves in carrying out the
organized territorial loot in which they now seem to be engaged. India will be thrown into
a state of utter confusion whenever the question of reorganization of its territories
comes up for consideration if people have no exact notions as to what self-determination
involves and have not the honesty to stand by the principle and take the consequences
whatever they be. It is, therefore, well to emphasize what might be regarded as too simple
to require mention, namely, that self-determination is a determination by the people and
by nobody else.
The second point to note is the degree of
imperative character with which the principle of self-determination can be said to be
invested. As has been said by Mr. O' Connor 11[f.11] :
" The doctrine of self-determination is
not a universal principle at all. The most that can be said about it is that generally
speaking, it is a sound working rule, founded upon justice, making for harmony and peace
and for the development of people in their own fashion, which, again generally speaking,
is the best fashion. But it must yield to circumstances, of which size and geographical
situation are some of the most important. Whether the rule should prevail against the
circumstances or the circumstances against the rule can be determined only by the
application of one's common sense or sense of justice, or, as a Benthamite would prefer to
put it, by reference to the greatest good of the greatest number— all these three, if
properly understood, are really different methods of expressing the same thing. In solving
a particular case very great difficulties may arise. There are facts one way and facts
another way. Facts of one kind may make a special appeal to some minds, little or none to
others. The problem may be of the kind that is called imponderable, that is to say, no
definite conclusion that will be accepted by the generality of the mankind may be
possible. There are cases in which it is no more possible to say that a nation is right in
its claim to interfere with the self-determination of another nation than that it is to
say that it is wrong. It is a matter of opinion, upon which honest and impartial minds may
differ."
There are two reasons why this must be so.
Firstly, nationality is not such a sacrosanct and absolute principle as to give it the
character of a categorical imperative, over-riding every other consideration. Secondly,
separation is not quite so essential for the maintenance and preservation of a distinct
nationality.
There is a third point to be borne in mind in
connection with the issue of self-determination. Self-determination for a nationality may
take the form of cultural independence or may take the form of territorial independence.
Which form it can take must depend upon the territorial layout of the population. If a
nationality lives in easily severable and contiguous areas, other things being equal, a
case can be made out for territorial independence. But where owing to an inextricable
intermingling the nationalities are so mixed up that the areas they occupy are not easily
severable, then all that they can be entitled to is cultural independence. Territorial
separation in a case like this is an impossibility. They are doomed to live together. The
only other alternative they have is to migrate.
IV
Having defined the scope and limitations of
the idea of self-determination we can now proceed to deal with the question of boundaries
of Pakistan. How does the claim of the Muslim League for the present boundary to remain
the boundaries of Pakistan stand in the light of these considerations ? The answer to this
question seems to me quite clear. The geographical layout seems to decide the issue. No
special pleading of any kind is required. In the case of the North-West Frontier Province,
Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims are intermixed. In these Provinces a case
for territorial separation for the Hindus seems to be impossible. They must remain content
with cultural independence and such political safeguards as may be devised for their
safety. The case of the Punjab and Bengal stands on a different footing. A glance at the
map shows that the layout of the population of the Hindus and the Muslims in these two
Provinces is totally different from what one finds in the other three Provinces. The
non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal are not found living in small islands in the midst of
and surrounded by a vast Muslim population spread over the entire surface as is the case
with the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal and the Punjab the
Hindus occupy two different areas contiguous and severable. In these circumstances, there
is no reason for conceding what the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the
present boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the boundaries of Western
Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.
Two conclusions necessarily follow from the
foregoing discussion. One is that the non-Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal have a case for
exclusion from Pakistan by territorial severance of the areas they occupy. The other is
that the non-Muslims of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind have no case
for exclusion and are only entitled to cultural independence and political safeguards. To
put the same thing in a different way it may be said that the Muslim League claim for
demanding that the boundaries of Sind, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan shall remain as
they are cannot be opposed. But that in the case of the Punjab and Bengal such a claim is
untenable and that the non-Muslims of these Provinces, if they desire, can claim that the
territory they occupy should be excluded by a redrawing of the boundaries of these two
Provinces.
V
One should have thought that such a claim by
the non-Muslim minorities of the Punjab and Bengal for the redrawing of the boundaries
would be regarded by the Muslim League as a just and reasonable claim. The possibility of
the redrawing of boundaries was admitted in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League
passed in March 1940. The Resolution 12[f.12] said :—
" The establishment of completely
independent States formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions
which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary,
that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the
north-western and eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute
independent States as Muslim free national homelands in which the constituent units shall
be autonomous and sovereign."
That this continued to be the position of the
Muslim League is clear from the resolution passed by the Muslim League on the Cripps
Proposals as anyone who cares to read it will know. But there are indications that Mr.
Jinnah has changed his view. At a public meeting held on 16th November 1942in Jullunder
Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed himself in the following terms:—
" The latest trick—1 call it
nothing but a trick—to puzzle and to mislead the ignorant masses purposely, and those
playing the game understand it, is, why should the right of self-determination be confined
to Muslims only and why not extend it to other communities ? Having said that all have the
right of self-determination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many bits ;
likewise the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. Thus there will be hundreds of
Pakistans.
" Who is the author of this new formula
that every community has the right of self-determination all over India ? Either it is
colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give them a reply, that the Musalmans
claim the right of self-determination because they are a national group on a given
territory which is their homeland and in the zones where they are in a majority. Have you
known anywhere in history that national groups scattered all over have been given a State
? Where are you going to get a State for them ? In that case you have got 14 per cent.
Muslims in the United Provinces. Why not have a State for them ? Muslims in the United
Provinces are not a national group; they are scattered. Therefore in constitutional
language they are characterized as a sub-national group who cannot expect anything more
than what is due from any civilized Government to a minority. I hope I have made the
position clear. The Muslims are not a sub-national group; it is their birthright to claim
and exercise the right of self-determination."
Mr. Jinnah has completely missed the point.
The point raised by his critics was not with regard to the non-Muslim minorities in
general. It had reference to the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal. Does Mr.
Jinnah propose to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy a compact and an
easily severable territory by his theory of a sub-nation ? If that is so, then one is
bound to say that a proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any
political literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an
ingenious concept but it is also a preposterous concept. What does the theory of a
subnation connote ? If I understand its implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must
not be severed from the nation to which it belongs even when severance is possible: it
means that the relations between a nation and a sub-nation are no higher than the
relations which subsist between a man and his chattels, or between property and its
incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a sub-nation goes
with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah's argument. But does Mr.
Jinnah seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal are only chattels
so that they must always go wherever the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal
choose to drive them ? Such an argument will be too absurd to be entertained by any
reasonable man. It is also the most illogical argument and certainly it should not be
difficult for so mature a lawyer as Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality of it. If a
numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation in relation to a numerically larger nation
and has no right to territorial separation, why can it not be said that taking India as a
whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a sub-nation they have
no right to self-determination or territorial separation ?
Already there exists a certain amount of
suspicion with regard to the banafides of Pakistan. Rightly or wrongly, most people
suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief. They think that it has two motives, one
immediate, the other ultimate. The immediate motive, it is said, is to join with the
neighbouring Muslim countries and form a Muslim Federation. The ultimate motive is for the
Muslim Federation to invade Hindustan and conquer or rather reconquer the Hindu and
re-establish Muslim Empire in India. Others think that Pakistan is the culmination of the
scheme of hostages which lay behind the demand, put forth by Mr. Jinnah in his fourteen
points, for the creation of separate Muslim Provinces. Nobody can fathom the mind of the
Muslims and reach the real motives that lie behind their demand for Pakistan. The Hindu
opponents of Pakistan if they suspect that the real motives of the Muslims are different
from the apparent ones, may take note of them and plan accordingly. They cannot oppose
Pakistan because the motives behind it are bad. But they are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah,
Why does he want to have a communal problem within Pakistan ? However vicious may be the
motives behind Pakistan it should possess at least one virtue. The ideal of Pakistan
should be not to have a communal problem inside it. This is the least of virtues one can
expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be plagued by a communal problem in the same way
as India has been, why have Pakistan at all ? It can be welcomed only if it provides an
escape from the communal problem. The way to avoid it is to arrange the boundaries in such
a way that it will be an ethnic State without a minority and a majority pitched against
each other. Fortunately it can be made into an ethnic State if only Mr. Jinnah will allow
it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to it. Therein lies the chief cause for suspicion and
Mr. Jinnah, instead of removing it, is deepening it by such absurd, illogical and
artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations.
Rather than resort to such absurd and
illogical propositions and defend what is indefensible and oppose what is just, would it
not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what Sir Edward Carson did in the matter of the
delimitation of the boundaries of Ulster ? As all those who know the vicissitudes through
which the Irish Home Rule question passed know that it was at the Craigavon meeting held
on 23rd September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson formulated his policy that in Ulster there
will be a government of Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never a Home
Rule Government. As the Imperial Parliament was proposing to withdraw its government, this
policy meant the establishment of a provisional government for Ulster. This policy was
embodied in a resolution passed at a joint meeting of delegates representing the Ulster
Unionist Council, the County Grand Orange Lodges and Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on
25th September 1911. The Provisional Government of Ulster was to come into force on the
day of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. An important feature of this policy was to
invest the Provisional Government with a jurisdiction over all " those districts
which they (Ulsterites) could control."
The phrase " those districts which they could control " was no doubt meant to include the whole of the administrative division of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster included nine counties. Of these three were overwhelmingly Catholic. This meant the compulsory retention of the three Catholic counties under Ulster against their wishes. But what did Sir Edward Carson do in the end ? It did not take long for Sir Edward Carson to discover that Ulster with three overwhelmingly Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all the courage of a true leader he came out with a declaration that he proposed to cut down his losses and make Ulster safe. In his speech in the House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920 he announced that he was content with six counties only. The speech that he made on that occasion giving his reasons why he was content only with six counties is worth quoting. This is what he said