THE
EVOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL FINANCE IN BRITISH
INDIA
A
STUDY IN THE PROVINCIAL DECENTRALISATION OF
IMPERIAL FINANCE
______________________________________________________________
Sometime Professor of Political Economy at the Sydenham College of
Commerce and Economics, Bombay
Author
of " The Problem of the Rupee," " Castes in India," "
Small-Holdings in
India and their Remedies "
WITH
A FOREWORD BY
Professor
of Economics, Columbia University, New York
(Reprint of the edition published by P. S. King & Son Ltd. Westminster,
Great Britain, 19251
Dedicated
to
HIS
HIGHNESS SHRI SAYAJIRAO GAIKAWAD
MAHARAJA
OF BARODA
AS
A TOKEN OF MY GRATITUDE FOR HIS HELP IN THE
MATTER OF MY EDUCATION
________________________________________________________________
PART I: PROVINCIAL FINANCE: ITS ORIGIN
Contents
Part
I: Provincial Finance : Its Origin
The Imperial System : Its Growth And Its Breakdown
The Compromise—Imperial Finance Without Imperial Management
PROVINCIAL
FINANCE : ITS ORIGIN
CHAPTER
I
ITS
GROWTH AND ITS BREAKDOWN
The
Imperial system of Government in India
dates from the year 1833.
Of
the two chief motives which led Parliament to establish it,
one was to replace the existing multiplicity in the
systems of justice and police by a uniform system of the same, common as far as
possible to the whole of India with its varieties classified
and systematised. Under the existing system then
prevailing such multiplicity was inevitable, for not only the civil and military
government and the ordering and management of the revenues of each of the three
Presidencies, Bengal, Madras [f1]and
Bombay[f2],
were vested in their respective Governors in Council, but each Governor in Council was
also empowered to make and issue such rules, ordinances and regulations for the good order
and civil government of the territories he individually commanded, provided that they were
just and reasonable and not repugnant to the laws of the British realm. To the codes of
law promulgated by these authorities must be added the whole body of English Statute law
introduced in India so far as it was applicable, by the charter of George I in 1726 and
such other English Acts subsequent to that date as were expressly extended to particular
parts of the country.
The
work of administering such a diverse body of laws proved so embarrassing that it was the
view of the supreme Court of Calcutta that
"
no one person can pronounce an opinion or form a judgement... upon any disputed right of
persons, respecting which doubt and confusion may not be raised by those who may choose to
call it in question; for very few of the public or persons in office at home, not even the
Law Officers, can be expected to have so comprehensive and clear a view of the Indian
system of law, as to know readily and familiarly the bearings of each part of it on the rest."[f3]
The
other motive was to create a strong central government to deal
effectively with the European settlers in the country.
It is to be noted that if the native population suffered
under the uncertainties of law, the British population lived under the most galling restrictions. The
revelations of oppressions by Englishmen practised, in the
early days of British Rule, contained in the report
of the Secret Committee of the House of Commons appointed in 1771 to inquire into the
affairs of the East India Company, were followed by very stringent laws governing the
entry and residence of private British subjects in India. No British subject of European
birth was allowed to reside in India beyond 10 miles from any one of the principal
settlements without having previously obtained a special license from the Company or the
Governor-General of India or the Governor of the principal settlement in question[f4].
The Court of Directors of the Company, subject to revision of the Board of Control[f5]
were empowered to refuse such licenses[f6]
and the Governments in India were strictly enjoined not to sanction the residence of
British subjects on their own authorities except under special circumstances[f7]and
were authorised, in cases they deemed proper, to declare licenses otherwise valid as void[f8]. Counterfeiting licenses[f9]and
unlicensed residence[f10]
were made crimes punishable with fine or imprisonment; and persons who were dismissed
from, and who had resigned service, were declared guilty of illicit trade if they lingered
beyond the 10-mile limit after their time had expired[f11].
Unlicensed
British subjects were made liable to be deported[f12]
and
such as were licensed were required to register themselves in the court of the district in
which they resided[f13]. Subjected as they were to the regulations of the
Local Government [f14]they
were made amenable to justice in India as well as in Great Britain for all illegal acts
done in British India,[f15] or
in Native States. [f16]To
render them impotent to cause complications, they were not allowed to lend money to or be
concerned in raising any for native princes[f17]or
foreign companies or foreign European merchants. Similarly to protect the natives from
their oppression they were forbidden to lend money to the latter at a rate of interest
exceeding 12 per cent. per annum on penalty of. forfeiting for every offence treble the
value[f18]
and they were placed under the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace in all cases
involving assault or trespass[f19]
on,
and small debts[f20]due
to, the natives of India. Moreover, every British subject of European birth was required
to register in the office of his district the name, etc., of his native stewards, agents,
and partners,[f21] on penalty of being disentitled to recover or
receive any sum or sums of money by reason of the joint concern or to compel an account
thereof by any suit in law or equity in any court within the provinces.[f22]
The
ruling race had long chafed at these restrictions, under which it was placed, without much
avail. They were evidently aimed at keeping out an element dangerous to the stability of
the Indian Empire, but, as
time went on, and as the Indian
Empire was consolidated by successive victories over the
native princes, there was raised against these restrictions such a storm of indignant
criticism that even those who had acquiesced in their virtue were forced to admit that
they had outlived their purpose. While the British Parliament could not help abiding by
the sentiments of the time, it refused to disregard the consequences which it thought
would inevitably attend upon the free ingress of British subjects of European birth under
the then existing system of government. It realised that a harmonious treatment of the
immigrants and an effective control over them was absolutely essential. Parliament was
afraid that the different governments armed as they were with co-equal and independent
powers of legislation and administration by exercising these powers with regard to the
immigrants entering their respective territories, with different views and according to
inconsistent principles might integrate the whole mass of them into a disaffected body
difficult to be dealt with. Besides the necessity of a harmonious treatment based on
uniform principles, the fears of Parliament that the ingress of British immigrants would
result in the revival of oppression on the natives were not completely allayed. As its
recrudescence was felt to be a likely event, Parliament desired to subject them to a
strong and uniform central control, so that the offender in one jurisdiction might not be
able to find an asylum in another. Thus, whether considered from the standpoint of
bringing about uniformity of laws or securing stringency of
control over elements subversive of order, the then existing system of government with its
divided jurisdiction was ill-suited for the purpose held in view. An all-powerful Central
Government legislating for and controlling the affairs of India as a whole was deemed to
be the only solution for the emergency.
Accordingly
there came to be enacted in 1833 that
" the Governor-General in Council (at Fort William in Bengal) shall have power to make laws and regulations for repealing, amending, or altering any laws or regulations, whatever, now in force or hereafter to be in force in the said territories or any part thereof, and to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or others, and for all Courts of Justice, whether established by His Majesty's Charters or otherwise and the jurisdictions thereof, and for all places and every part of the said territory, and for all servants of the said Company within the dominions of princes and states in alliance with the said Company. . . . [f23];
A
Central government was thus created by vesting the legislative power exclusively in the
Governor-General of India in council. But it could not have been all-powerful had the two
Presidencies of Madras and Bombay remained as heretofore invested, by law, with the civil
and military government of their respective territories. On the other hand, if Parliament
had stopped short of divesting them, there would have ensued the possibility of a conflict
between these governing authorities and the sole legislative authority newly created.
Being responsible for peace, order and good government, the former could have refused to
govern according to laws made by the latter, and all the gain expected to arise from the
institution of a central and strong government would have been lost. To eliminate this
element of weakness in the Indian politics newly established, Parliament proceeded to
divest the presidencies of Bombay and Madras of the high status which they hitherto
occupied as responsible governments, so that
according to the new Constitution
"......the
Executive Government of each of the several Presidencies ...... (was to be) administered by (not
vested in as heretofore) a Governor and three Councillors "[f24]
While
"......the
Superintendence, Direction, and Control of the whole civil and military government of all
the...... territories and Revenues in India (was) vested in
a Governor General and councillors styled the Governor-General of India in Council."[f25]
Thus
came to be established in India the Imperial system of government. It is true that long
before its establishment the Government of Bengal[f26]
had
the supreme power, not only of superintending and controlling the government and
management of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay in the matter of commencing
hostilities, or declaring or making war against any Indian prince or power, or for
negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace or other treaty with them, except in case of
emergency, but it also possessed by a later enactment the power of superintendence in all
such points as related to the collection or application of revenues, or to the forces
employed, or to the civil or military government of the said presidencies[f27]But
it must not be supposed, as is often done, that before 1833 the two Presidencies were in
any real sense subordinate to Bengal in their domestic affairs. The fact that Madras and
Bombay were required constantly and diligently to transmit to the Government of Bengal
true and exact copies of all orders and resolutions and their acts in Council, and were
enjoined to pay due obedience to the orders of the Government of Bengal, must not be
construed to mean any subordination in their internal affairs. For, barring the extra
territorial authority vested in the Government of Bengal, it must be borne in mind that,
equally with Bengal[f28]the
Governments of Madras and Bombay were vested each[f29]
with the civil and military government and also with the
ordering and management of all territorial acquisitions arid their revenues. Along with
the Government of Bengal they possessed as stated before co-equal and independent powers
of legislation within their respective jurisdictions. A truer view therefore seems to be
that they forwarded the copies of their proceedings to the Government of Bengal for information rather than for orders. At any rate, such
seems to have been the view taken by the Government of Bengal itself, for, though it had
the power to issue orders and compel obedience to them it had in practice confined its
supervision and control " to pointing out an irregularity and requesting that it be not repeated." More than
this was thought inadvisable[f30]
and
it is doubtful[f31]
whether it would have been constitutional.
The
Imperial system of Government was necessarily accompanied by the Imperial system of
Finance. Before the inauguration of the Imperial system of Administration the several
Presidencies were like separate clocks each with its own mainspring in itself. Each
possessed the powers of sovereignty, such as the legislative, the penal, and the taxing
powers. They were independent in their finance. Each was responsible for the maintenance
of services essential for peace, order and good government within its jurisdiction and was
free to find money by altering or levying taxation or borrowing on credit to meet its
obligations. For their ways and means they often drew upon the resources of one another,
not, however, because their exchequers were not distinct, but because they were parts of a
common exchequer belonging to the East India Company All this was changed by the Act
of 1833, which vested the revenues and the government of the different territories in the Governor-general
of India in council.
The revenues and the services became by law the revenues
and the services of the Government of India. The provinces became the collecting and the
spending agencies of the Government of India. They ceased to
levy any new taxes or to collect the old ones in their own name. In like manner the
services they administered became a charge of the Government of India, which distributed
among the various provinces sums from the consolidated fund for the maintenance of the
services. It was by law provided that without the previous sanction of the Government of
India the provinces were not to spend the fund allowed to them in creating any new office
or granting any salary, gratuity, or allowance[f32].
The public debt was no longer a charge upon the
revenues of any particular Presidency alone, nor did there remain any question of primary
or secondary liability as between the revenues of the other Presidencies. Ail the
provincial debts became the debts of the Government of India and were charged to the
revenues of India as a whole In short,
the financial system which was roughly analogous to the system of separation of sources
and contributions from the yield was changed into a system of aggregation of sources and
distribution of the yield; for, as observed in a Government Resolution by virtue of the
Act of 1833,
"
British India, though for the sake of convenience subdivided into Presidencies under
separate locally controlled governments, (became) in reality one sole grand Power in
dependence on Great Britain, having undivided interests, a single exchequer, and controlled in all essential and general principles by one
Government—the Governor- General in Council....... The
entire resources of India (were) applicable to one purpose only, the discharge of its
engagements and those connected with its management in England, and to whatever section of
British India funds (were) wanting, funds (were) supplied, as a matter of course, without
any reference to the particular source from which they were derived[f33]. So comprehensive did the system of Imperial
Finance become in time that when in 1858 the Crown took over from the Company the
government of India it was found that
"
no province had any separate power of legislation, any separate financial resources, or
practically any power of creating or modifying any appointments in the public service; and
the references to the Government of India which this last restriction involved gave that
Government the opportunity of interference with all the details of provincial
administration[f34].”
Whatever
may have been the merits of the Imperial system of Government from the military,
political, legislative, or administrative points of view, it is a melancholy fact that as
a system of finance it proved unequal to the strain imposed upon it. From its very start
it suffered from the fatal disease of financial inadequacy, and it was only occasionally
that the efforts of the Finance Ministers were successful in restoring an equilibrium and
slaving off the hour of crisis. How chronic the deficits
were may be seen from the following 'figures [f35]:—
YEAR |
SURPLUS |
DEFICIT |
YEAR |
SURPLUS |
DEFICIT |
1834-35 |
|
194477 |
184647 |
|
971,322 |
1835-36 |
1,441,513 |
|
47_48 |
|
1,911,986 |
1836-37 |
1,248,224 |
|
48_49 |
|
1,473,225 |
1837-38 |
780,318 |
|
49_50 |
354,187 |
|
1838-39 |
|
381,787 |
50_51 |
415,443 |
|
1839-40 |
|
2,138,713 |
51_52 |
531,265 |
|
1840-41 |
|
1,754,852 |
52_53 |
424,257 |
|
1841-42 |
|
1,771,603 |
53_54 |
|
2,044,117 |
1842-43 |
|
1,346,011 |
54_55 |
|
1,707,364 |
1843-44 |
|
1,440,259 |
55_56 |
|
972,791 |
1844-45 |
|
743,893 |
56_57 |
|
143,597 |
1845-46 |
|
1,496,865 |
57_58 |
|
7,864,222 |
Anyone
who ponders upon this pitiable story of Indian Finance as revealed by these deficits can
hardly fail to wonder with Disraeli who remarked in the
House of Commons that—
"able
as has ever been the administration of India, considerable and distinguished as have been
the men whom that administration had produced, and numerous as have been the great
Captains, the clever diplomatists, and able administrators of large districts with whom
the Government has abounded, the state of the finances of India has always been involved
in perplexity, and India that has produced so many great men, seems never to have produced
a Chancellor of the Exchequer."[f36]
The
causes of this collapse, however, are not far to seek. The inadequacy of Indian Finances
is mainly to be ascribed to an unsound fiscal policy. The policy was unsound for various
reasons. In matters of state economy it is usual to argue that the expenditure to be
incurred should determine the magnitude of revenue to be raised. But experience has shown
that this stock maxim has proved ruinous wherever its limitations have failed to receive
their due weight. It cannot be too often said that the growing expenditure of the State
can only be sustained from the growing wealth of the society. Nor can it be too strongly
emphasised that the test of sound finance does not merely consist in being capable of
raising the requisite amount of revenue. It must be remembered that the mode of raising the revenue is an aspect of the
question which is fraught with tremendous consequences for the stability and productivity of the nation. It is too obvious to be denied that a tax system
by its unequal incidence may cause social upheavals, just as by its unwise incidence on
trade and industry it may impoverish society by setting out of gear its economic
mechanism and technique and eventually beggar the State by impairing the productive powers
of society. Wisdom therefore requires that those who are entrusted with the financial
management of the State should look beyond the more immediate object of raising and
spending of money, for the " hows " of finance are very important, and can be seldom
neglected in practice with impunity. The wealth of society is the only patrimony on which
the State can draw, and the
State that damages it cannot but end in damning itself History abounds with
instances of States wrecked by the unwise neglect of these evident truths, but if an
illustration be wanted in further proof thereof, the system of Imperial Finance
established in India is matchless for the purpose.
The
land tax was the heaviest impost of the Imperial revenue system in operation. The
underlying doctrine of the tax in India has been that it is of the nature of rent paid by
the cultivator to the State in virtue of the theory that the land in India has from immemorial times been
regarded as the property owned by the State. The cultivator is not
the proprietor, but is the
occupier of the land. The land is let to him
and the State is therefore justified in claiming the whole of the economic rent arising
from the land. On this assumption the land tax has been imposed irrespective of the
question of necessity or justice.
Besides this legal fiction of State landlordism there was also another economic principle, which was, taken to be the justification for the enhancement of the land revenue. There is reason to believe that the Physiocratic doctrine of produit net had its influence in the management and fixing of the land tax in India. We find high officials in .India arguing in the early stages of the revenue management that "whether or not the principle of the French Economists of laying all the taxes on the land be...... erroneous or otherwise, it is certainly conformable to the prevalent system in India; nor is that theory supported by the French alone, but by respectable authorities in England, who contend that all taxes fall ultimately on the products of the soil, and that in advancing a different doctrine the eminent author of The Wealth of Nations is at variance with himself, inasmuch as his previous data lead to that conclusion."[f37](this footnote is given below) Whatever may have been the reasons for augmenting the land tax, few can deny that a heavy consolidated impost on the first exertions of any species of industry absorbing the whole or nearly the whole of its profits in ruinous and impolitic. It becomes an effectual bar to the creation of that produce on which the future exertions might be profitably employed and through the medium of which individual wealth and public revenue may be increased to an almost inconceivable extent. A land tax of this nature was sure to blast the very production of that wealth which industry would have otherwise brought into being. the land tax was so heavy that the system of tax prevailing in India might well have been called a near approach to the single lax system.
[f37] The
ratio of the land revenue to the total revenues of India was as given below :—
Year |
Ratio |
Year |
Ratio |
Year |
Ratio |
1792-93
to 1796-97 |
50.33 |
1817-18
to 1821-22 |
66.17 |
1842-43
to 1846-47 |
55.85 |
1797-98
to 1801-02 |
42.02 |
1822-23
to 1826-27 |
61.83 |
1847-48
to 1851-52 |
56.06 |
1802-03
to 1806-07 |
31.99 |
1827-28
to 1831-32 |
60.90 |
1852-53
to 1855-56 |
55.40 |
1807-08
to 1811 –12 |
31.68 |
1832-33
to 1836-37 |
57.00 |
Average
for 64 years |
54.07 |
1812-13
to 1816-17 |
53.33 |
1837-38
to 1841-42 |
59.05 |
|
|
While
the land tax prevented the prosperity of the agricultural industry the customs taxes hampered the manufactures of the country. There were internal
customs and external customs, and both were equally injurious to trade and industry. The
internal customs[f38]
were made up of transit and town duties. For the purposes of transit duties the country
was artificially divided into a number of small customs areas. Goods may be manufactured
and consumed ad libitum
within each customs area, but the moment they left their own division they became liable
to duty. The injurious effects of this regulation, though concealed, were none the less
real. The transit duties held up trade, which in its turn reacted adversely on the
manufacturers of the country. Adam Smith has told us how the growth of industry depends
upon the extent of the market. Here for the purposes of the transit duties the whole
country was cut up into small bits after the manner of squares on a chess board. What
wonder is there if trade, and its handmaid, industry, both
languished to a serious extent. The adverse effect on the transit duties was also felt in
another way. In every country somewhat industrially advanced there is not only a social
division of labour, but there is also a territorial division of labour, otherwise called
localisation of industry. Evidence is not wanting to show that the localisation of
industry formed a prominent feature of Indian economy[f39].
Under it each locality in India specialised in a particular art or industry; for instance,
cotton was grown in one locality, woven in another, and bleached
in a third place. But it often happened that these localities were situated in different
customs areas, and a raw good might have had to pay the transit duty many a time before it reached its finished stage. To avoid this each locality was obliged to waste its energies along unprofitable lines
in order to escape the transit duties.
The
town duties, which formed a part of the internal customs, also worked in their effects
towards de-urbanisation. Commercial entrepots are admittedly vast instruments of the trade
of a country. The opportunity of ready purchase and sale of almost every kind of commodity
in any quantity, accumulated capital, extended credit, general information all meet here
as in a centre. They support, encourage and give lift to commerce and to the trade of a
country. But the direct effect of the town duty was to distract and drive away trade, for
under the system every article which was subject to it had, after the payment of transit
duty, to pay on entry, in the town, the town duty and, if it underwent any change of form
by manufacture within the town of entry, it could not have been furnished to any
neighbouring place without a second impost being paid upon it under the transit duty
system, enhanced in proportion to the increase of value it might have acquired from the
labour and the skill bestowed upon it, The consequence was that towns dwindled both in
trade and industry owing to the reason that merchants ceased to frequent them and that no
manufactures of articles subject to the transit duty were capable of being established in
them except for their own supply.
It
was in this depressed condition that the Indian industries were called upon to meet foreign competitors. But the external customs
cannot be said to have protected, much less fostered them. As a rule commercial
tariffs are based upon what is called commodity competition. The import tariffs are
designed to check by means of higher duties the importation of such foreign commodities as
are likely to interfere in the successful manufacture of the same commodities at home and
the export tariffs are framed principally with a view to give bounties to such of the home
commodities as have a chance of securing a foothold in foreign markets. But the theory of
external customs in India had no connection with the theory of commodity competition In
comparison with the policy actually adopted even a protectionist would have preferred to
see trade left perfectly free, for the tariff was based on political rather than economic
considerations. The Indian Import Tariff varied not with the nature of the imports but
with the origin of the imports and the bottom on which they were shipped. Being political
in character it was preferential in design and in its framework. It is to be regretted all
the more that the preference involved an unmitigated loss to the people and to the
government. It was excusable to have admitted into India goods of English origin and
shipped on English bottoms at a rate half of what goods of foreign origin and shipped on
foreign bottoms were charged with. But nothing can extenuate the sacrifice imposed upon
the Indian industries by letting in British goods at lower rates than what the Indian
goods had to pay under the internal customs; and this was done when, be it remembered,
England was prohibiting by high tariff the entry of India-made goods and India-built ships! But while the import tariff made it easy
for the foreigners to compete successfully with Indian manufactures burdened as they heavily were by the weight of the internal
customs, Indian goods found it considerably difficult to compete in foreign markets under
the incubus of export duties which formed one of the most lamentable features of the
Indian tariff and which endured long into the nineteenth century[f40].
Thus the customs laws internal and external blockaded trade and smothered industry. The
comparatively paltry revenues derived from them is the best proof of their ruinous effects.
The
following table gives the ratio of the Customs Revenue to the total revenue :—
Year |
Ratio |
Year |
Ratio |
Year |
Ratio |
1792-93
to 1796-97 |
2.38 |
1817-18
to 1821-22 |
8.32 |
1842-43
to 1846-47 |
6.02 |
1797-98
to 1801-02 |
3.10 |
1822-23
to 1826-27 |
7.58 |
1847-48
to 1851-52 |
5.40 |
1802-03
to 1806-07 |
4.16 |
1827-28
to 1831-32 |
8.12 |
1852-53
to 1855-56 |
5.52 |
1807-08
to 1811 –12 |
5.04 |
1832-33
to 1836-37 |
7.19 |
Average
for 64 years |
6.22 |
1812-13
to 1816-17 |
6.68 |
1837-38
to 1841-42 |
6.76 |
|
|
Hendricks,
op. cit., p. 286.
When these resources failed the Government resorted to some very questionable means of raising revenue.
On
an impartial survey of the revenue system as prevailed under the Imperial regime one is
constrained to say that justice in taxation was conspicuous by its absence. It was a cruel
satire, or at best an idle maxim, for the lancet was directed not where the blood was
thickest but to that part of the body politic which on account of its weakness and poverty
most meekly bore the pang. The landlords who passed their lives in conspicuous consumption
and vicarious leisure on the earnings of the poor tenants, or the many European civil
servants who fattened themselves on pay and pickings, were supremely exempted from any
contribution towards the maintenance of the Government whose main activities were directed
towards the maintenance of pomp and privilege. On the other
hand, the salt tax# and the Moturpha[f41],
and other oppressive taxes [f42]continued
to harass the industrious poor.
#The
percentage ratio of the salt revenue to the total revenue at different times was as
follows:—
Year
|
Ratio
|
Year |
Ratio |
Year |
Ratio |
1792-93
to 1796-97 |
14.13 |
1817-18
to 1821-22 |
11.25 |
1842-43
to 18 46-47 |
11.65 |
1797-98
to 1801-02 |
12.10 |
1822-23
to 1826-27 |
11.87 |
1847-48
to 1851-52 |
9.14 |
1802-03
to 1806-07 |
11.09 |
1827-28
to 1831-32 |
12.03 |
1852-53
to 1855-56 |
9.17 |
1807-08
to 1811 –12 |
11.14 |
1832-33
to 1836-37 |
9.72 |
Average
for 64 years |
11.07 |
1812-13
to 1816-17 |
10.92 |
1837-38
to 1841-42 |
12.37 |
|
|
Hendricks,
op. cit., p. 283.
It
is indeed true that many petty and vexatious taxes prevalent under the native rule were
abolished; there is, however, enough evidence to show that the revenue thus lost was made
up by enhancing those that were continued to be levied, particularly the land tax. The
latter charge has always been officially denied[f43],
but none the less it remains true that the land tax
has been consolidated and increased concurrently with, if not consequently upon, the
abolition of such other taxes as being raised from the poor cost the Government more than
their yield.
Source
of Revenue |
Amount
of Revenue raised in Millions |
Period |
Locality
and Date of Commencement |
|
|
|
No.of
Years |
Dates |
|
Land
Revenue |
662.308 |
64 |
1792-93
to 1855-56 |
Throughout
the period in Bengal, Bombay and Madras since 1834-5 in N.W.P. and 1849-50 in the Punjab. |
Sekyer
& Abkary |
9.729 |
20 |
1836-37
to 1855-56 |
Throughout
the period in Bengal, N.W.P., Madras and Bombay, and since 1849-50 in Punjab. |
Excise |
4.987 |
,, |
,, |
Bengal
accounts exclusively. |
Moturpha |
6.455 |
,, |
,, |
Madras
accounts exclusively. |
Salt |
135.532 |
64 |
1792-93
to 1855-56 |
Bengal
since 1792, Madras 1822, Bombay 1822,
N.W.P. 1839. |
Opium |
106.707 |
,, |
,, |
Bengal
since 1792, Bombay since 1820. |
Post
Office |
8.888 |
,, |
„ |
Bengal
and Madras since 1792, Bombay since 1813, Punjab 1849, N.W.P. 1835. |
Stamps |
16.697 |
59 |
1797-98
to 1855-56 |
Bengal
from 1797, Madras from 1813, Bombay from 1819, N.W.P. from 1834, Punjab from 1849. |
Customs
Duties |
|
|
|
|
Internal
1. Transit
2.Town External
1. Import
2. Export |
76.179 |
64 |
1792-3
to 1855-56 |
Bengal,
Madras and Bombay from 1792-3, N.W.P. from 1834-5, Punjab since 1849-50. |
Mint |
3.221 |
,, |
,, |
Bengal
from 1792, Madras and Bombay from 1813. |
Revenue
Tobacco |
1.437 |
18 |
1836-37
to 1853-54 |
Madras
1836 on. |
Miscellaneous |
194.777 |
64 |
1792-93
to 1855-56 |
Same
as under land revenue. |
It ought to serve as an object lesson to all
financiers to show that when their revenue laws are harmful to the resources of the people
they must blame none but themselves for their empty treasury.
Was the money raised by such injurious taxes without reference to
their effect on the productive powers of the country spent on such public utilities as
were calculated to enrich and elevate the economic life of the tax-paying population ? A glance at the following table giving the distribution of
the expenditure by decades on the different services will show how the money was
spent:—
Percentage Ratio of Total Expenditure on |
in
the Year |
|||||
1809-10 |
1819-20 |
1829-30 |
1839-40 |
1849-50 |
1857 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Military |
58.877 |
64.290 |
53.754 |
57.721 |
51.662 |
45.55 |
Interest
on debt |
18.010 |
12.805 |
12.124 |
9.756 |
10.512 |
7.19 |
Civil
and Political |
7.221 |
8.900 |
9.575 |
12.296 |
8.902 |
9.62 |
Judicial |
7.525 |
6.800 |
7.107 |
9.565 |
7.180 |
} |
Provincial
Police |
1.991 |
2.093 |
1.535 |
2.062 |
2.062 |
}
9.38 |
Buildings,
Fortifications, etc. |
1.639 |
1.756 |
2.810 |
1.428 |
1.661 |
|
Prominent
among this array of figures are those on the military expenditure and though they have
dwindled in years they have invariably consumed more than one half of the total revenues
of the country. But the stupendous figures opposite military do not represent the true
burden of that expenditure. To them must be added the figures for the interest charge on
debt, for the debt incurred was entirely a war debt. India
was all throughout this period a battle-ground between the Country Powers and the East
India Company. The two Mahratta Wars, the three Mysore Wars,
the two Burmese Wars, the two Afghan Wars, and the Carnatic Wars,
not to speak of the numerous other minor engagements, were fought in the interests of
adding India to the dominions of the Company and of the Crown. While Parliament claimed
that the dominions of the East India Company were the dominions of the Crown it must be
borne in mind that it refused to pay a farthing of the purchase money. On the other hand,
the entire cost of these wars was borne by India as so much dead weight on her scanty
resources. The charges shown separately under buildings and fortifications must also be
included in the military expenditure, to which category they really belonged. On making
these needful additions we find the unparalleled fact of a country wasting between 52 to
80 per cent. of its precious little money on war services. It may, perhaps be argued on
the other hand that much of the military expenditure, large though it was, went back into
the coffers of the Indians themselves as they formed the bulk of the forces employed in
the country. The Indians of course, formed a very large portion of the military# and if
the scales of salaries fixed for the European and native
forces were equal the result would have been favourable to the natives of the country,
though it cannot be said to have excused that huge military expenditure.
#This
may be seen from the following figures :—
strength
oF
THE indian army BEFORE THE mutiny*
|
European |
Native |
Total |
Artillery |
6,419 |
9,138 |
15,577 |
Sappers |
110 |
3,043 |
3,153 |
Cavalry |
3,456 |
30,533 |
32,989 |
Infantry |
29,760 |
188,660 |
218,420 |
Total
... |
38,745 |
231,374 |
270,119 |
*
Report of Major-General Hancock on the Reorganisation of the Indian Army, Parliamentary
paper of the year 1859, p. 21.
2 But
the scales of salaries for the Europeans and natives were so grossly unequal# that one European drew on an average more than the salaries
of four natives put together.
3 #This
is indicated by the following table :—
cost
OF
AN infantry regiment PER MONTH
european
|
Details |
Total |
Officers |
Rs.
As. Ps. |
Rs.
As. Ps. |
37
Officers Staff
and Establishment Command and other allowances |
14,734 14 3
4,515
12 4
2,528
8 0
|
21,779 2 7 |
Men
117N.C.O.S.
950
Privates Rations,
clothing and other charges Total |
2,289
4
5 11,203
8
4 12,506
11 3 |
25,999 8 0 |
|
|
47,778 10 7 |
So this expenditure, whether from the standpoint of public utility or private employment, did not benefit the
population which contributed to the revenues of the State.
The
civil and political charges which absorbed nearly 10 per cent. of the revenue can hardly
be said to be recuperative in their effect. This part of the expenditure again was not
shared by the native population which bore its burden. As a result of conquest the natives
naturally came to occupy a secondary position; but the conquest had done more than merely
degrade their status. It had engendered a certain sense of distrust for the natives in the
minds of Englishmen. Conquered and distrusted the natives since the commencement of
British rule had come to be excluded from the higher administrative posts of the country#.
#Before
1833 the very meagre scale on which they were employed is disclosed by the following
figures :*—
Native
Civil Servants of the 1st Class attached to the Secretariat of the 3 Precidencies
Receiving per Month Salaries of Rs. |
Bengal |
Madras |
Bombay |
Total |
||||
No. |
Total
Salary Drawn |
No. |
Total
Salary Drawn |
No. |
Total
Salary Drawn |
No. |
Total
Salary Drawn |
|
500
and upwards |
5 |
2,700 |
|
|
5 |
2,500 |
|
|
400
and upwards |
2 |
800 |
|
|
1 |
400 |
|
|
350
and upwards |
4 |
1,400 |
1 |
350 |
1 |
350 |
|
|
300
and upwards |
3 |
900 |
|
|
2 |
600 |
|
|
250
and upwards |
5 |
1,250 |
|
|
1 |
250 |
89 |
20,690 |
From
Rs. 250 to 200 |
17 |
3,460 |
5 |
1,155 |
1 |
200 |
|
|
From
Rs, 200 to 150 |
10 |
1,590 |
4 |
682
1/2 |
|
|
|
|
From
Rs. 100 to 150 |
5 |
550 |
5 |
525 |
5 |
330 |
|
|
Below
Rs. 100 |
6 |
470 |
1 |
871/2 |
2 |
140 |
|
|
Total |
57 |
13,120 |
16 |
2,800 |
16 |
4,770 |
|
|
It
was to remove this injustice that Parliament in the Act of 1833 provided
"that no native of the said territories, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company " (sec. 87).
NATIVE
|
||
|
Details |
Total |
Officers |
Rs.
As. Ps. |
|
26
Europeans 20
Natives Staff
and EstablishmentCommand and other allowances
Men 140 N.C.O.s. 1,000
Sepoys Charges |
9,861 2 1 940
0 0 1,209 1 4 1,517 5 2 1,780 0 0
7,000 0 0
826
14 0 |
13,527
8 7 9,606
14 0 |
Total |
|
23,134
6 7 |
It
is evident from this table that if we deduct the salary of 26 European officers and
command and other allowances shown under the heading "
Native " which amounts to Rs. 11,378 7. 3. we shall
find that 1,104 Europeans drew Rs. 47,778 10. 7. while 1,160 natives drew only Rs. 11,755
15. 4.
But,
as a matter of fact, till after the Mutiny not one of the natives was appointed to any
office except such as they were eligible for before this Statute was passed, because the
Court of Directors in interpreting it advised the Government of India at the very start
that by this enactment
"practically...... no very marked difference of results will be occasioned.
The
The
Judicial and police charges, which together absorbed something like 10 per cent. of the
total revenue raised, can only be regarded as protective in their distinction between the
situations allotted to the covenanted service and all other situations of any official or
public nature will remain generally as at present." [f44]character.
Thus the bulk of the money raised by injurious taxes was spent in unproductive ways. The
agencies of war were cultivated in the name of peace, and they adsorbed so
much of the total funds that nothing practically was left for the agencies of progress. Education
formed no part of the expenditure incurred and useful public works were lamentably few. Railways, canals for navigation or irrigation
and other aids to the development of commerce and industry for a long time found no corner
in the Imperial budget. For a total area of 837,000 square miles there were constructed a
few miles of railways, 2,157 miles of land ways, 580 miles of waterways
and 80 miles of telegraph. Or speaking in terms of money spent, we find that for the
entire period of fifteen years from 1837-8 to 1851-2 the average expenditure of a
productive character amounted only to £ 299,732 a year[f45].
There is a principle well known to farmers that constant cropping without manuring ends in
the exhaustion of the soil. It is, however, capable of wider application, and had it been
observed in the State economy of India the taxing capacity of the country would have grown
to the benefit of the treasury and the people. Unfortunately it was lost upon the
financiers of India to the detriment of both.
But
if the chance of augmenting the resources by judicious taxes and productive expenditure to
cover the chronic deficits was forfeited, there was at least the way open for economy in
expenditure. As might be supposed, a strong Central Government of the kind established in
1833 was capable of effecting economy wherever possible. As a matter of fact, the
centralisation was of the weakest kind. De jure there was an Imperial
system of administration, but the de facto administration was conducted as though the primary
units of executive government were the Provinces and that the Government of India was only
a co-ordinating authority. This was obvious from a variety of circumstances. Legislation
was, it is true, centred in the Government of India; none the less the laws that were
passed by the Government of India were passed for
the different provinces as though the initiative in legislation still lay in the Provinces
and that the Government of India was only a sanctioning authority. Each Province had its
own customs, internal as well as external, a survival of their sovereign status. Each
Province continued to have its own Army. Notwithstanding centralisation, the account
system still remained provincial, sustaining the sense of their financial independence.
The work of administration and collection of revenue being still conducted by them, the
provinces behaved as though they were the lawful authorities charged with the
responsibilities of Government. This spirit of independence bred insubordination, and some
of the Provinces, particularly Bombay and Madras, endeavoured to resist the attempts of
the Government of India to tax the people under their jurisdiction when the cost of the
mutiny compelled it to levy fresh burdens. The point to be borne in mind is that the Act
of 1833 made an unfortunate divorce between the legal and administrative responsibility.
The Imperial Government were responsible in law but did not administer the country. The
Provincial Governments administered the country but had no
responsibility in law. This divorce had a fatal effect on the economy in the finances of
the country. As was inevitable extravagance in expenditure had become the rule in practice
and it was inherent in the Imperial system itself. Economy is begotten of responsibility,
and responsibility is obtained where a government has to find the resources to meet the charges it desires
to incur. Prior to the inauguration of the Imperial system the Provincial Government had
the obligation to raise money for the charges included in their budgets. Consequently they
had to be economical.
But
under
the Imperial system, while the
budgets for the various services were prepared by the
provincial authorities, the responsibility for finding the ways and means rested on the
Government of India. Formerly "They knew the limits
of the purse they had to draw upon, but under the Imperial system they
"
had no means of knowing the measure by which their annual demands upon the Government of
India ought to be regulated. They had a purse to draw upon of unlimited because of unknown
depth. They saw on every side the necessity for improvements, and their constant and
justifiable desire was to obtain for their own provinces as large a share as they could
persuade the Government of India to give them out of the general revenues of the Empire.
They found by experience that the less
economy they practised and the
more importunate their demands, the more likely they were to persuade the" Government of India of
their requirements. In representing these requirements, they
felt that they did what was right, and they left to the Government of India, which had
taken upon itself, the responsibility of refusing to provide the necessary means[f46]".
To these extravagant demands the Government of India had often to yield; for, till very late, it did not possess the machinery to appraise the demands and to control the expenditure on them. It is not usual to expect much efficiency from any Imperial system of administration, much less when it covers not a department, not a province, but a country as big as a continent. Merely from being huge it is slow to move. Much slower would it necessarily be if it were a system as unorganised and unconsolidated as the Indian system was. First of all, the Imperial system in India was without its executive machinery of control. The Act which created it must be said to have grievously erred in uniting into one the Government of Bengal and the Government of India. As a result of this fusion the machinery was over stained. Its duties as the Government of Bengal left it very little time to attend to its duties as the Government of India. There was not only a common executive, but there was also a common Secretariat charged with the work of the two Governments. Overworked as the Secretariat was, its efficiency was considerably lowered by the absence of any officer specially charged with the duty of handling the finance of the country till 1843.
It
was in that year that Lord Ellenborough, the then Viceroy of
India, separated the Secretariat of Bengal from that of India,[f47]
and attached to the latter a distinct office called the Financial Secretary to the
Government of India[f48]
unencumbered with the details of any other Department of State except that of finance. But
while the want of a scrutinising officer was thus made good by this appointment of a distinct Secretary
of Finance, it was not possible for him to enforce economy in expenditure in the absence
of a centralised system of audit and account and of an appropriation budget.
Notwithstanding the establishment of the Imperial system of finance, the officers of audit
and account remained attached to the Secretariats of the various Provincial Governments.
They were not accountable to the supreme Government on whom the responsibility for the
ordering and the management of the revenues of India had by law devolved. Being attached to the provincial
Secretariat the Government of India could issue orders with regard to the accounts and the
audits not directly but only through, and with the interpretation of, the Local Government
concerned. Secondly, the budget system, though good enough
for the purposes of mercantile accounts, that is, record, was useless for the first and
elementary purpose of all good State accounts, namely, check. There were indeed three
estimates (sketch, regular, and budget) prepared for the purposes of the financial
administration of the country showing the amount of money required for the carrying on of
each of the different services. But this distribution of public money on the different
services was not held to mean appropriation. It was only treated as cash requirements.
Owing to this fact the grants were never carefully prepared nor was the limit set on them
observed in practice. As there was no budget of specific votes or sanctions for each of
the services the audit and account was simply concerned with noting whether record was
kept of all the money that was received and paid through the public treasury. It is evident that in the absence of an
appropriation budget the primary object of all State accounts and audit, namely check on
the spending authority to abide by the sanction, was never achieved. The Provincial
Governments, extravagant in their demands, were also careless in the matter of
expenditure. So long as the Government of India remained without an appropriation budget
and a centralised system of audit and account, it continued to be only a titular authority
in the matter of financial control, and the provinces, though by law the weakest of
authorities in financial matters, were really the masters of the situation.
To
its inability to curb the extravagant habits of the
provincial authorities generated by a financial irresponsibility on the part of the
Provincial Governments and inefficiency on the part of the Central Government must be
added the general spirit of apathy which marked the Executive Council of the Government of
India in matters of finance. While it was true that nothing could be spent from the
revenues of India without the specific vote of the Executive Council, it does not appear
that the Council from its way of working could have taken any keen interest in promoting
economy in expenditure. The Council acted collectively, and there was no distribution of executive work among the
different members which composed it. With the exception of the Department of War and
Legislation the whole work of the Government was brought before the Governor-General and
his Councillors. As a result of its collective working
"
every case actually passed through the hands of each member of the Council, circulating at
a snail's pace in little mahogany boxes from one Councillor’s house to another."[f49]
Under
such a system nobody was a Chancellor of the Exchequer to urge economy, because everybody
was supposed to be one. The result was that finance in being everybody's business suffered
from being nobody's business, so that funds were distributed
not according to the genuine needs of the services, but according to the relative claims
and persistency of the clamour made for them.
Sufficient
evidence has been given to show that the collapse of the Imperial system was due to a
faulty fiscal system marked by injurious taxes and unproductive and extravagant
expenditure. It must not, however, be supposed that this faulty fiscal policy commenced
with the inauguration of the Imperial system. On the other hand, it was a heritage which
descended to the Imperial system from the past. None the less it is obvious that a timely
revision of the fiscal policy and the strengthening of central control would have
solidified the foundation of the Imperial system. But a much too long continuance thereof
undermined its financial foundations, and as it could get no more money to meet its rising
expenditure from a people whom it had beggared, the Imperial system succumbed to the shock of the Mutiny, never
to rise again in its original garb.
IMPERIALISM
V. FEDERALISM
As
the result of the cost of the Mutiny of 1857 the already precarious condition of the
Imperial Finance became so grave that no problem during the succeeding decade can be said
to have engrossed the attention of responsible authorities as the one relating to the
rehabilitation of that tottering system. Although the controversy as to the proper line of
reconstruction to be adopted was long drawn out, the causes of the collapse were so patent
that all those who had anything to do with Indian Finance unmistakably laid their finger
on one supreme defect in the system whose breakdown they had witnessed, namely, the
irresponsible extravagance it engendered in the Provincial Governments. To obviate this
evil it was sought on the one hand by some responsible authorities
"
to make the Local Governments partners in the great joint stock of Indian Finances, and,
so to enlist their interest and animated co-operation with the Government of India,
instead of keeping them on the footing of agents and servants, who, having no motive for
economy and using the means of their masters, think only of enhancing their own demands by
comparisons more or less well founded, with the indulgence conceded to others."[f50]
This
view gradually led to the formation of a considerable body of well-trained opinion for
changing united India into the United States of India,[f51]
by making the provinces into separate and sovereign States. The aim was to substitute a
Federal system for the Imperial system and to assimilate the financial position of the
Central authority in India to that of the Central authority in the United States. For the
consummation of the Federal plan it was urged that the revenues of India should not be
dealt with as one income, collected into the Imperial Treasury and thence distributed
among the different Provincial Governments. According to the plan each province was to be
allowed to keep its revenues and meet its charges from them. The Central Government was to
have its own separate resources and, if need be, supplemented by contributions from the
provinces as their share of the expenditure of the Central Government based on some
equitable standard. Thus under the Federal plan the consolidated Imperial Budget with its
formal division between Imperial and Provincial was sought to be replaced by the creation
of distinctly separate budgets, Central and Provincial, based on a genuine division of
services and allocation of revenues.
Many
advantages were claimed in favour of the Federal plan. First it was believed that the
separation of the revenues and services would lead the ways and means of the Central as
well as of the Provincial Governments to be clearly defined, so that each one of them
would be responsible for administering its affairs within the funds allotted to it.
Heretofore the Provincial Governments sent up their estimates of revenue and expenditure
as returns unconnected with each other, and the task of balancing them was left to be done
by the Supreme Government upon the aggregate of the different provincial estimates
submitted to it. Under the Federal plan the provincial estimates would have to be balanced
accounts of receipts and charges made over to them. Though primary it was not the only
advantage which the Federalists claimed for their plan, for
it was advanced not only as a measure to set bounds to the extravagant expenditure of the
Local Governments by limiting the funds on which they were to draw, but also as a measure
for setting bounds to the growing expenditure of the Central Government as well. The Federalists did not conceal the
fact that the Central Government, being in a position to draw upon the total resources of
India as a whole, was inclined to be extravagant in its own expenditure. They therefore
thought that the Federal plan, involving as it did the allocation of revenues and
services, would result in enforcing economy on the Central as well as on the Provincial
Government.
The
Federal plan was not only proposed by its advocates in the interests of economy and
responsibility, but also in the interests of plenty. The Federalists
denied that India offered few sources of revenue for the growing expenditure of the State.
Though the Indian Finance ferry was water-logged, it was their view that there were many
sources of taxation with the outpourings of which it could be set afloat. But they argued
that these available sources were left untapped, as the Imperial Government, which could
tap them, would not do so because of their restricted locale', and Provincial Government, which would like to tap them,
because of their restricted locale could not
do so under the existing constitutional law. But if the Provincial Governments were vested
or rather re-vested with the powers of taxation as they would be under the Federal plan,
such sources of taxation as were given up for being too regional-in
character by the Imperial Government would be used by the Provincial Government to the
great relief of Indian Finance as a whole.
Not
only was Federalism advocated in the interests of economy
and plenty, but also in the interests of equity. It was contended that the existing system
resulted in an iniquitous treatment of the different provinces. If we take public works of
provincial utility and the expenditure incurred upon them in the different provinces as
the criterion, the criticism of the Federalists cannot be said to have been unfounded. On
the other hand, the following figures go to substantiate a very large part of their
arguments :—
outlay
on public works
Average
for the years 1937-8 to 1845-6
Province |
Population
in thousands |
Area
in sq. miles |
Revenues
in hundreds of Rs. |
Expenditure
on Public
works in
hundreds of Rs. |
Bengal |
40,000,000 |
1,65,443 |
10,239,500 |
1,79,812 |
N.W. P. |
23,200,000 |
71,985 |
5,699,200 |
1,41,450 |
Madras |
22,000,000 |
1,45,000 |
5,069,500 |
30,300 |
Complied from Calcutta
Review, 1851, Vol. XVI, p. 466.
Thus
the outlay on public works was in Bengal 1 3/4 per cent.; in North-Western Provinces, 2 1/2 per cent.; and in Madras a little over 1/2 per cent/of their respective
revenues. This favoured treatment of some provinces as against the others was justified by
the Imperial Government, which distributed the funds, on the ground that the favoured
provinces showed surpluses in their accounts. But the Federalists
pointed out these deficits and surpluses ascribed to the different provinces were grossly
fictitious. They were the result of a bad system of accounts. The system was bad for the
reason that it continued to show the accounts of the financial transactions of the country
not according to Heads of Account but according to the provinces in which they occurred as
used to be the case before 1833 when there was no common system of finance. With the
passing of the Act of 1833 this system of accounts had become quite out of keeping with
the spirit and letter of that Act. This would not have mattered very much if the All-India
items were separated from the purely provincial items in the General Heads of Account. In
the absence of this the evils of the system were aggravated by entering exclusively into
the accounts of a province the charges for what was really an All-India Service, so that
it continued to show deficits, while others which escaped continued to show surpluses and
claim in consequence the favoured treatment given to them. The Presidency of Bombay
offered to the Federalists a case in point. The demands of the Presidency were invariably
received with scant courtesy by the Government of India, for in its history Bombay seldom
showed any surplus in her accounts. But, if it had been realised that the deficits were
caused by the barbarous system of accounts which kept on charging the Presidency with the
cost of the Indian Navy, it undoubtedly would have fared better. Such vicious ways of
appointment were not the only evil features of the system of accounts. Under it it was
quite common to charge one Presidency with the cost of a service and to credit another
with the receipts thereof. How the deficits found in the Madras accounts were inflicted
upon it by the erroneous system of accounts may be seen from the following :—
Cost
of the Army of Occupation |
Revenues
derived from
the Occupied territory |
||
Debited
to |
Amount
Rs. |
Credited
to |
Amount
Rs. |
Madras |
79,83,000 |
Bombay |
20,00,000 |
|
|
Bengal |
1,04,22,870 |
Taking
into consideration the iniquities involved in such a system of accounts, it is beyond
dispute that the advantage claimed by the Federalists for
their plan was neither fictitious nor petty. A division of functions between the Federal
and Provincial Governments would have in itself been an advantage by comparison with the
existing chaos. And, if it did not result in equity, it had at least the merit of opening
a way for it.
When however the Federal plan was put before the
authorities in the form of a practical proposal, it gave rise to a determined opposition.
The challenge was at once taken up by the supporters of the Imperial system who, be it
noted, were mostly military men in civil employ. They opened their attack on the Federal
plan from two sides, that of practicability and expediency.
Is
it possible, asked the Imperialists, to localise the revenues and charges of India as
belonging distinctively to one particular province? They insisted that
"from
the commencement of (the British) power (in India)...... the
interests and affairs of (the) presidencies and the provinces have been interwoven and
interlaced—one often overlapping the other, and vice versa—in a manner from
which extrication or disentanglement is now impossible,
without making changes which would entail inconveniences greater than any entailed
by the existing system...... The army of Bengal Presidency
is quartered not in the rich districts of the Lower Ganges, but mainly in the poorer
districts of the Punjab. Thus placed, that army defends virtually the whole Presidency.
The Madras army is not kept within that Presidency, but holds, besides the Madras country,
the Deccan, the Central Provinces, and British Burma.
Similarly the Bombay army holds, besides its own Presidency, the State of Rajputana and of Malwa. The Lower
Provinces or Bengal proper are in themselves rich; but besides their own revenues they
receive large customs receipts, which belong partly to them, but largely also to the other
Divisions of the Bengal Presidency. Even Bengal opium does not entirely belong to Bengal,
a large portion being raised in the North-Western provinces.
In Bombay the opium revenue does not, strictly speaking, belong to that Presidency at all,
being raised beyond its limits, in the territories which, if included in any Presidency at
all, would pertain to that of Bengal. Some of the Salt Duties, both of Madras and of
Bombay, are raised on salt destined for consumption in Central India, and, in strictness,
should be credited to the Government of India. Instances might be multiplied; but it
becomes instantly evident that, if an adjustment of these matters with a view to complete
localisation of finance were to be attempted, many difficulties, perhaps even disputes,
would arise...... "[f52]
Arguing in the same strain, Lord Lawrence, the then Viceroy of India, wrote:
"
Experience has shown that it is convenient that the resources of British India should be
considered in the aggregate and not with reference to the particular province in which it
is raised. If the rule were otherwise, we must enter into the question—what are the
revenues which each province may fairly claim? What are the items of expenditure which may justly be charged to each? Is the Punjab, for instance,
to be charged for all the British troops located in the hills for sanitary considerations ? Is the whole of the force ranged against the Northwestern
border to be similarly debited ? Are the troops quartered in
Rajputana to be charged to the Bombay Presidency to which they belong, or in what manner
is their cost to be arranged for ? On the other hand, we may
be asked, why should not Bengal in particular—which, having no foreign neighbours,
and a docile and timid population, requires only a minimum garrison—have the benefit
of her surplus revenues ? Why on the opposite view of the
question should not Bengal bear her share of the cost of the troops located in the
North-Western Provinces, the Punjab and Central India, which guard her from such invasions
as those of the Rohillas, the Mahrattas
and the Pindarics of former times? These are all questions
which would require solution if each were to have a financial system of its own."[f53]
and
in his opinion the question was impossible of solution.
But
the Imperialists went further than this and argued that, even if it were possible to
distinguish and localise the charges and the revenues into provincial and central, it was
inexpedient to do so. Under the existing system of finance, they held that
"
the Imperial Government, disposing of financial resources of the whole of India, can carry
those resources at once where they are most needed. There are objects which have a truly
national importance, though they may appear chiefly beneficial to a particular district.
There may be evils, necessities and dangers in particular districts, which it is the duty
of the supreme Government to correct and remedy at the charge of the whole. The creation
or improvement of a part may have a national importance, though the expenditure on it may
seem unfairly beneficial to a particular locality. A road, a canal, a railway from a
cotton district or a coffee district, or a tea district, may have a vital significance to
the whole people and commerce of India ; and yet the
expenditure on such a work be out of all proportion to the present revenue of the district
which it is destined to develop...... or the supreme
Government may find it necessary to lay out, for moral and social purposes, larger sums on
recently conquered, savage, or dissatisfied provinces than the revenues of those provinces
seemed to warrant, in order to remove causes of disturbances or dangers, and to force
those provinces into some degree of harmony with the long settled, pacified, reclaimed
portions of the Empire....... The old provinces of the
Empire conquer the new provinces. The old are bound in duty to civilise what they conquer.
We have no right to annex a country and then throw it on its own resources. Conquest has
its own duties as well as its rights."
"
I venture to demur," wrote Lord Napier of Merchiston, President
of the Council of Madras, " to the policy of those who
would restrict the benefits of the supreme Government to its receipts, and who would
measure out in a parochial spirit to every province appropriations proportional to its
specific returns. On the contrary, it ought to be a satisfaction to the rich to help the
poor; to the old to protect the young; to the good to improve the bad;
for thus all can co-operate in building up the glorious fabric of a—United India.
Such ends can only be attained by a Central Government disposing of the financial
resources of a whole Empire [f54]
It
is evident that arguments or sermons such as the above by themselves could never have
supported the cause of the Imperialists. Notwithstanding the emphasis laid upon the
difficulty of separating the revenues and charges into Imperial and Provincial, it must be
conceded that the task was by no means so insuperable as the Imperialists made it out to
be. The difficulty of apportioning the military charges could have been easily obviated by
centralising the military and making it a charge of the Central Government. On the same
basis all those services charged to a particular Presidency or Province, but which from
their nature benefited the whole Empire, could have been easily incorporated into the
budget of the Central Government. Similarly it was possible in practice to allocate the
existing sources of revenue between the Central and the Local Governments. The Central
Government could have been allowed to retain for its use such sources of revenue the locale of which extended beyond the limits of a
Presidency or the maximum yield of which depended upon a uniform administration of the
same throughout the country. While on the other hand the Provincial Government could have
been allowed to appropriate such sources which were restricted in their locale or the yield of which depended upon local
vigilance. For instance, the customs duties could have been easily made a central
resource, not only because their incidence was wider, but because they required a common
and uniform policy of legislation and administration. The opium revenue could have been
treated as a central source of revenue, and the same treatment could have been granted to
the salt revenue. Of course it would have been difficult to effect a separation of the
sources of revenue in such a way as would have granted to each of the several Governments
concerned resources adequate to meet the charges devolving upon them. A certain adjustment
of funds by contributions from the provinces to the Central Government or from the Central
Government to the provinces would have been inevitable; neither could it have been
possible to obviate the adoption of principles more or less arbitrary in the matter of
apportionment of revenues or of charges. But admitting the difficulties and arbitrariness
involved in the problem of separating the Imperial Budget into a Central and several Provincial Budgets, it must still
be said that it was quite capable of satisfactory solution. Colonel Chesney in response to the challenge thrown out by the
Imperialists had made a notable attempt to distinguish the existing heads of charges into
Imperial and Provincial. In his Indian Polity he says :
"The i